Thursday, July 03, 2014

California Supreme Court Confirms: "Refusing to Sign" Is Insubordination. But it's not "Misconduct."

Somewhere along the line, employees got the idea that they can "refuse to sign" personnel documents.  Our advice is always to clearly indicate on a form that "signing" simply means acknowledgement of receipt.  Yet, employees still refuse to sign, even with that disclaimer.  Some then claim they did not receive them, usually during depositions.

Can the employer fire a worker for refusing to sign?  One of this blog's most popular posts addressed the court of appeal's decision in Paratransit v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board.  (Here)  The court there held that an employee's "refusing to sign" a disciplinary notice was insubordination, warranting discharge. But the court also held that the employee's refusing to sign was also "misconduct" within the meaning of  unemployment insurance law, disqualifying the fired worker from benefits.

The California Supreme Court has now weighed in on the case. As stated by the Court:
Craig Medeiros (Claimant) worked for Paratransit, Inc. (Employer) as a vehicle operator for approximately six years. As a condition of his employment, Claimant was required to join a union. The union and Employer were parties to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) containing the following provision: “The Employer shall provide a Vehicle Operator with copies of complimentary letters received regarding his or her job performance and with copies of disciplinary notices, including verbal warnings that have been put in writing. All disciplinary notices must be signed by a Vehicle Operator when presented to him or her provided that the notice states that by signing, the Vehicle Operator is only acknowledging receipt of said notice and is not admitting to any fault or to the truth of any statement in the notice.”

Yet, when Paratransit attempted to discipline Medeiros, he refused to sign the document.  Later, he claimed he was tired and confused, and believed he did not have to sign because of advice he had received from his union.  

Paratransit contested Medeiros's claim for unemployment benefits.  Ultimately, the Court of Appeal decided, 2-1, that Medeiros was disqualified, because his refusal to sign amounted to "misconduct" within the meaing of California's Unemploymet Insurance Code section 1256.

The Supreme Court previously ruled in Amador v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 671, that misconduct means the following:

“conduct evincing such wilful or wanton disregard of an employer‟s interests as is found in deliberate violations or disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right to expect of his employee, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree or recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer‟s interests or of the employee‟s duties and obligations to his employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed "misconduct" within the meaning of the statute.” 
With respect to insubordination, the Court noted prior rulings established that

“an employee‟s unequivocal refusal to comply with the employer‟s rule, without more, is not misconduct within the meaning of section 1256.” (Robles v. Employment Development Dept. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1029, 1035 (Robles).) As in all cases of misconduct, the employee‟s insubordination must be marked by fault. (See Amador, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 678; Robles, at p. 1035.) Hence, violating an employer‟s reasonable order because of a good faith error in judgment does not disqualify an employee from receiving benefits. (See Amador, at p. 680; Moore v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 235, 243 (Moore).)
The Supreme Court acknowledged that refusing to sign the paper was insubordinate and justified discharge.  But the Court also unanimously held that Medeiros's refusing to sign one disciplinary notice was insufficient evidence of "misconduct" under the above definitions.

So, the Court found the disciplinary notice's disclaimer ambiguous, because it did not say that signing was "only" for acknowledging receipt of the document.  So, it pays to include a clear statement on documents requiring an employee's signature.  Additionally, the Court was concerned that Medeiros merely made a "good faith error in judgment" rather than misconduct.  The Court may have been persuaded otherwise had Medeiros engaged in a pattern of insubordination, or if his action had been detrimental to the employer.

This case is Paratransit v. CUIAB and the opinion is here.