Tuesday, March 25, 2014

U.S. Supreme Court: Severance is Wages; California Employers Take Note

Quality Stores laid off many employees as part of a bankruptcy. The Company paid severance, duly withheld taxes, and duly reported the severance on employees' W-2 forms.  Then the Company sought a refund of the "FICA" taxes paid on behalf of employees (and presumably the employer's portion of the FICA paid as well).

Everyone with a paycheck knows that FICA is a mandatory withholding from employees' paychecks, which goes towards funding social security.  "FICA" is the Federal Insurance Contributions Act.  As explained by the Court:
FICA taxes “wages” paid by an employer or received by an employee “with respect to employment.” 26 U. S. C. §§3101(a), (b), 3111(a), (b) . . . . FICA defines “wages” as “all remuneration for employment, including the cash value of all remuneration (including benefits) paid in any medium other than cash.” §3121(a). The term “employment” encompasses “any service, of whatever nature, performed . . . by an employee for the person employing him.” §3121(b).

So, that's a broad definition.  Does it include severance payments to laid off employees?  Yes, said the Court.  (Unanimous opinion, except Justice Kagan was recused):

Under this definition, and as a matter of plain meaning, severance payments made to terminated employees are“remuneration for employment.” Severance payments are,of course, “remuneration,” and common sense dictates that employees receive the payments “for employment.” Severance payments are made to employees only. It would be contrary to common usage to describe as a severancepayment remuneration provided to someone who has not worked for the employer. Severance payments are made in consideration for employment—for a “service . . . performed” by “an employee for the person employing him,”per FICA’s definition of the term “employment.” Ibid.

(emphasis mine).

Caveat for California employers: 

Some severance plans are covered by ERISA.  If so, then federal law governs the payment  of severance, the timing, and the conditions.  However, the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement may decide that a severance claim is not subject to ERISA. The DLSE will consider whether there is a plan in place, the discretion involved in calculating the eligibility and formula for payment, and other factors. 
If ERISA does not apply, California law may consider severance to be in the form of a deferred payment of wages.  Wages must be paid timely under California law. 

Employers should therefore ensure that they pay severance when it is earned in accordance with the contract (severance agreement or plan).  For example, if ERISA does not apply, a promise to pay a lump sum severance, without any conditions such as the signing of a release, may require payment on the date of termination.  

On the other hand, if the employer requires the employee to sign a release to "earn" the severance, then the severance is not due until earned.  (That is another good reason to require signing a release before severance is earned.)


This case is U.S. v. Quality Stores, Inc. and the opinion is here.

Friday, March 21, 2014

Court of Appeal: Employers Cannot Shorten Statutes of Limitations in FEHA Discrimination Cases

The employment relationship is contractual (e.g., I'll work for you and you will pay me).  Statutes of limitations generally can be shortened by contract, even in California.  Now forget all of these general rules. An agreement shortening the California Fair Employment and Housing Act's statute of limitations is void, said the Court of Appeal in Ellis v. U.S. Security Associates.

Ashley Ellis sued her employer and manager for sexual harassment, retaliation and failure to prevent discrimination / harassment / retaliation under the Fair Employment and Housing Act.  She agreed in her employment application to bring any claim against the employer within six months, notwithstanding any law to the contrary.

The trial court enforced the provision. The Court of Appeal reversed.  The Court was particularly concerned that the six-month statute would impede the Fair Employment and Housing Act's administrative charge process.  (By statute, the employee has a year from the discriminatory event to file a charge with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing, and then a year from the end of the administrative process to file a lawsuit.  The DFEH itself has a year to investigate.)  The six-month limitation would limit the DFEH's ability to investigate, which the court found troubling.

So, the Court went about distinguishing and casting aside contrary authority in other jurisdictions and other legal contexts to hold that limiting the statute of limitations in FEHA cases to six months is unenforceable as "unreasonable and contrary to public policy."

We do not know what the Court would have done if the employer had limited to six months the time to file the administrative charge with the DFEH (instead of the year employees normally are allowed), or if the employer had limited to six months the time to file a lawsuit from the receipt of the "right-to-sue letter."  Perhaps a court will address a more generous statute of limitations in a later case.  For now, though, employers who shorten limitations periods should carve out FEHA-based claims.

The case is Ellis v. U.S. Security Associates and the opinion is here.

Wednesday, March 19, 2014

9th Circuit: Employer's Credit for Paid Overtime Calculated Week by Week

So, the Ninth Circuit decided that Los Angeles mis-classified certain employees as "engaged in fire protection."  Under the FLSA, those "fire protection" employees are due overtime only after 212 hours worked in a 28-day work period (or 204 hours worked in a 27-day period).  Employees who are not "engaged in fire protection" are due the normal overtime pay for work > 40 hours in a workweek (unless another exemption applied).

These county fire dispatchers and air paramedic employees worked standard hours of 9 X 24 hour shifts in a 27 day work period, or 216 hours.  So, because they were mis-classified, overtime is due each workweek for each hour worked > 40.

Anyway, I know most of you are not running a city or fire protection operations and are not concerned with the above. But wait.  There's more.

After the district court found in favor of the employees, the parties disagreed on how to calculate the overtime due. LA argued that it was entitled to offset overtime already paid, as it was paying employees for the hours worked > 204 in a 27-day work period.

For example, under the normal rule, if an employee worked  60 hours per week for 4 weeks, that would be 20 hours per week of overtime, times 4 weeks = 80 hours of overtime premium pay due.   Under the exemption for fire protection, the overtime due for 240 hours worked in 28 days would be approximately 36 hours.  (Assuming 28 instead of 27 days).  So, big liability.

The city argued that it dutifully had been paying overtime for > 204 hours in the 27 day period Therefore, the city argued, it should be liable only for overtime hours not already paid for during that same 27-day period.  Meaning, the overtime paid during the entire work period would be offset against what was still owing.  The city  argued in the alternative it should be given  an offset for all overtime paid in the three year period of the lawsuit, with the amount paid credited against the total overtime owed.

No, said the Ninth Circuit.  The employer would be allowed to credit / offset overtime only for the workweek in which the overtime was paid.


Under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207(h)(2), an employer may credit overtime payments already made to employees against overtime payments owed to them under the FLSA. The statute, however, does not specify the method to be used to calculate these overtime payments. The statute simply states that “[e]xtra compensation . . . shall be creditable toward overtime compensation payable pursuant to this section.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(h)(2).
* * *
The district court correctly applied a week-by-week approach. Section 207(a) sets forth the basic overtime standard, set at forty hours in a seven-day workweek and time and one-half for overtime. To determine the overtime owed for each workweek, the total hours worked over forty is multiplied by one and one-half the regular rate. Then, under § 207(h), the overtime already paid by the employer is determined and credited against the overtime owed. While § 207(h) does not state whether credits must be determined on a workweek basis, it must still be read within the context of the overtime due under § 207(a), which is calculated on a workweek basis. Under this reading, compensation already paid for work done within one workweek should not be transferrable and offset against overtime due in another workweek. This makes sense because Plaintiffs are owed what they should have been paid had the City obeyed the law.
This decision adds to a split in the circuit courts.  The Supreme Court eventually may decide this issue. Until then, in the Ninth Circuit, employers will not be able to offset overtime already paid, except on a work week by workweek basis.

Although this is an FLSA case, California wage-hour laws track the FLSA unless there's a reason in the California law to depart from federal law.  In this instance, California courts are likely to follow the FLSA on this point, because it is the calculation method that is most generous to employees.

This case is Haro v.  City of Los Angeles and the opinion is here. 

Monday, March 17, 2014

CA Supreme Court Will Answer Ninth Circuit's Suitable Seating Questions

We wrote an article about the California wage orders' "suitable seating" requirement here.

We blogged about the Ninth Circuit's certified questions to the California Supreme Court here. 

Turns out the California Supreme Court just agreed to answer the 9th Circuit's questions.  You can sign up to follow the case here.
The questions presented are: For purposes of IWC Wage Order 4-2001 § 14(A) and IWC Wage Order 7-2001 § 14(A), "(1) Does the phrase 'nature of the work' refer to an individual task or duty that an employee performs during the course of his or her workday, or should courts construe 'nature of the work' holistically and evaluate the entire range of an employee's duties? (a) If the courts should construe 'nature of the work' holistically, should the courts consider the entire range of an employee's duties if more than half of an employee's time is spent performing tasks that reasonably allow the use of a seat?
(2) When determining whether the nature of the work 'reasonably permits' the use of a seat, should courts consider any or all of the following: the employer's business judgment as to whether the employee should stand, the physical layout of the workplace, or the physical characteristics of the employee? 
(3) If an employer has not provided any seat, does a plaintiff need to prove what would constitute 'suitable seats' to show the employer has violated Section 14(A)?

We'll keep you posted....

U.S. Supreme Court: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act's Retaliation Protection

Extends to private companies' employees.

Remember Enron?  Me neither.  That was one stock I somehow failed to buy.  And it was before the iPad .Anyway, those of you who do remember know that Enron resulted in a big financial mess.  There were Enron employees who attempted to uncover the fraud the management was perpetrated. They suffered retaliation by Enron's management.  Allegedly. Employees of Enron's auditors and lawyers who tried to blow the whistle on corrupt Enron managers. But these employees experienced retaliation by their employers as well. (Allegedly).

So, after the Enron debacle, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act which, in part, protects whistleblowers from retaliation for reporting fraud by public companies.

As it turns out, mutual funds are public companies and, therefore, covered by SOX. But they typically have no employees.  Mutual funds hire private companies to act as "investment advisers." The advisers have the employees. The funds just hold the stocks, bonds, etc.

So, Lawson worked for an "adviser" to a mutual fund, which was a privately held company.  She allegedly complained about certain mutual fund accounting practices she believed were illegal.
The question for the Supreme Court in Lawson v. FMR LLC was whether the SOX anti-retaliation provision applies only to the employees of the publicly traded company (the mutual fund itself).  Or, did the anti-retaliation protections also apply to employees of non-publcly traded companies who blow the whistle on public corporation fraud (Lawson's employer, the investment advisor).

The Supreme Court decided to extend protections to non-public companies.
The prohibited retaliatory measures enumerated in §1514A(a)—discharge, demotion, suspension, threats, harassment, or discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment—are commonly actions an employer takes against its own employees. Contractors are not ordinarily positioned to take adverse actions against employees of the public company with whom they contract. FMR’s interpretation of §1514A, therefore, would shrink to insignificance the provision’s ban on retaliation by contractors.The dissent embraces FMR’s “narrower” construction. See post, at 2, 3, 4, 7.
The dissent (Sotomayor, Kennedy, and Alito) opined that the whistleblower protections apply only to the employees of the public employer, not to employees of the private companies who may "contract" with the public company.

This is Lawson v. FMR LLC and the opinion is here.



Saturday, March 15, 2014

President Calls on DOL to Revise Exemption Regulations


He doesn't expressly say how:

I hereby direct you to propose revisions to modernize and streamline the existing overtime regulations. In doing so, you shall consider how the regulations could be revised to update existing protections consistent with the intent of the Act; address the changing nature of the workplace; and simplify the regulations to make them easier for both workers and businesses to understand and apply.
The memorandum is here.

So, what will this mean to employers?  The White House's  "Fact Sheet" about the memorandum, which is longer and more detailed than the memo itself, provides some clues:
Workers who are paid hourly wages or who earn below a certain salary are generally protected by overtime regulations, while those above the threshold who perform executive, professional or administrative duties are not. That threshold has failed to keep up with inflation, only being updated twice in the last 40 years and leaving millions of low-paid, salaried workers without these basic protections. Specifically: 
In 1975 the Department of Labor set the threshold below which white collar workers were entitled to overtime pay at $250 per week.
In 2004 that threshold was set at $455 per week (the equivalent of $561 in today's dollars). 
This is below today’s poverty line for a worker supporting a family of four, and well below 1975 levels in inflation adjusted terms. 
Today, only 12 percent of salaried workers fall below the threshold that would guarantee them overtime and minimum wage protections (compared with 18 percent in 2004 and 65 percent in 1975). Many of the remaining 88 percent of salaried workers are ineligible for these protections because they fall within the white collar exemptions. Many recognize that these regulations are outdated, which is why states like New York and California have set higher salary thresholds.

If you haven't heard, the administration is pushing hard to raise the minimum wage to $10.10 per hour, which is equivalent to a full time salary of $21,008 or so.  (They have not invented a pajama boy for the minimum wage - yet- but they're still pretty committed.)  Under the current regulations, the salary basis minimum is just over $23,000.  So, raising the salary basis threshold is another way of raising the "minimum wage," at least for those workers who qualify as "exempt" under federal law.

As for the duties tests, the DOL revised them in 2004, which addressed some outdated regulations and terms.  The DOL also simplified certain exempt tests, particularly when workers earned more tha $100,000 per year.  So "simplification" must mean "tougher exemptions." For example, the executive exemption might be changed to require supervision of more than the current two employees.  The administrative exemption could be reserved to senior administrative employees with greater discretion.  The professional exemption might be revised to include the salary test (hi, contract lawyers).  The duties test could be turned into a quantitative measure of time spent on exempt work (a la California) rather than a qualitative test.  Etc.

So, by now, some of you may be concerned that these regulations are going to happen and soon. The press and seminar sellers write articles etc. as though this is just around the corner.   I don't think any changes are nigh, or imminent, even.

First, it will take years to draft, vet, re-draft, re-vet, and finally promulgate these regulations.  Because that's how the DOL issues regulations.  Second, although it is true that this administration has issued gobs of regulations, it also has failed to issue others (Hi, NLRB poster, NLRB quickie election rules, etc.).   Third, I hear there's an election in 2016.  The outcome could affect whether and to what extent any proposed changes are implemented.  Even the 2014 election could shift the winds.  Who knows?

Finally, as the White House memo points out, California employers already must apply exemptions that are much stricter than federal law.  So, don't expect much impact on California employers' practices unless the DOL regulations are incredibly onerous.

Feel better?  Go look at pajama boy again.





Friday, March 14, 2014

9th Circuit - Employee Can Opt out of FMLA, Even at Her Peril

Maria Escriba found out her dad was ill in Guatemala.  She told her bosses at Foster Poultry Farms that her father was sick.  But she asked to use two weeks'  vacation time to visit. She did not request FMLA leave.  She said "no" when the company asked her if she needed more than two weeks' vacation time.  She took more than two weeks off anyway. She was discharged under the no-call / no-show policy.

Her argument was that she did not have to request FMLA leave.  The employer should have designated all her time off as FMLA time, protecting her from discharge.   She exhausted the vacation time, did not request FMLA leave, did not ask for an extension, did not have her husband ask for an extension (although he worked for the same employer), and so, was no-call no show.  Even the union figured she'd be fired.  The union was right.

Escriba then sued under FMLA and analogous California law, the California Family Rights Act.
The district court let her claims go to the jury. After a "short" deliberation, the jury found for the employer.  The key issue at trial and on appeal was whether Escriba's time off qualified as FMLA, even though she declined FMLA.   The Court analyzed the issue:

Holding that simply referencing an FMLA-qualifying reason triggers FMLA protections would place employers like Foster Farms in an untenable situation if the employee’s stated desire is not to take FMLA leave. The employer could find itself open to liability for forcing FMLA leave on the unwilling employee. See, e.g., Wysong v. Dow Chem. Co., 503 F.3d 441, 449 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that “[a]n involuntary-leave claim,” alleging that an “employer forces an employee to take FMLA leave,” is “really a type of
interference claim”). We thus conclude that an employee can affirmatively decline to use FMLA leave, even if the underlying reason for seeking the leave would have invoked FMLA protection. See, e.g., Ridings v. Riverside Med. Ctr.537 F.3d 755, 769 n.3 (7th Cir. 2008) (“If an employee does not wish to take FMLA leave but continues to be absent from work, then the employee must have a reason for the absence that is acceptable under the employer’s policies, otherwise termination is justified.” (emphasis added)).

The Court also upheld the jury's conclusion that Escriba indeed declined to use FMLA. There was evidence at trial that she wanted to preserve her FMLA entitlement. And she knew the ropes, apparently, because she had sought FMLA leave on 15 previous occasions

there is substantial evidence that Escriba elected not to take FMLA leave. After Linda Mendoza’s initial meeting with Escriba on November 19, 2007, Mendoza met with Escriba and an interpreter, twice asking if Escriba needed more time in Guatemala. Escriba twice answered “no.” Mendoza testified that she then told Escriba to visit the Human Resources Department if she later decided to request more than two weeks of leave.
This decision is good for employees, too.  For example, if a pregnant employee wishes to use vacation to care for a parent so she can preserve 12 weeks of FMLA for baby bonding, should she be able to do so?  See?

This case is Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc. and the opinion is here


Thursday, March 13, 2014

California Court of Appeal SLAPPs Claim for Breach of Settlement Agreement

Perhaps you have read about the EEOC's recent lawsuits attacking severance agreements as allegedly containing illegal provisions, because they impede the EEOC's work. The EEOC is challenging everything from "cooperation clauses," to general releases that broadly preclude the releasing employee from bringing future claims.  You know, in exchange for money.   Here's an example of what the EEOC is doing.  If the EEOC wins,  and they don't win all of these efforts to radically change the law via agency internal policy and litigation rather than legislation (Hi, credit check lawsuits), many standard releases will have to be modified.

Yes, the above discussion is related to why I asked you here today.  Somewhat. The California Court of Appeal just found that an employer's lawsuit against a union for breach of settlement agreement should be stricken because the lawsuit was a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation.   The court's ruling in part is based on a conclusion that the parties' non-cooperation agreement was not enforceable.

The United Farmworkers Union settled one of two pending unfair labor practice charges with a company called D'Arrigo Bros. of California.

On February 18, 2011, UFW's attorney sent D'Arrigo's counsel a letter purporting to "memorialize the UFW's agreement." In the letter UFW acknowledged that it had obtained dismissal of the second ULP, and it promised not to refile this charge "and/or the substantive allegations at a later date." . . . UFW therefore agrees that said Objection Five will in fact be dismissed in its entirety or that, in the event the Executive Secretary for any reason declines to dismiss all or any of it prior to a hearing, UFW will timely act to withdraw its declarations and argument regarding Objection Five and will not present any evidence thereon in the objection process; and will continue to advise (in writing, on the record) the Executive Secretary, General Counsel, and/or assigned administrative law judge that UFW wants Objection Five entirely dismissed; and that UFW will not pursue, nor assist [in] pursuing, Objection Five in any fashion whatsoever."
Then, during proceedings on the remaining unfair labor practice charge, D'Arrigo believed the UFW breached the above agreement and cooperated with the Agrigultural Labor Relations Board's general counsel.

D'Arrigo sued the UFW for breaching the settlement agreement.  The UFW filed a motion to strike the D'Arrigo lawsuit under California's anti-SLAPP law.  The UFW's basis for the motion was that D'Arrigo's claim was really a lawsuit designed to retaliate against UFW for cooperating with the ALRB's proceedings in the matter that was not settled.

The Court of Appeal held that UFW should win the anti-SLAPP motion, resulting in dismissal of D'Arrigo's lawsuit.    Of note, the Court held that D'Arrigo's basis for asserting breach of contract - that the UFW violated an agreement not to cooperate with the ALRB - was unenforceable:

we agree with UFW—and with the General Counsel as amicus curiae-- that any interpretation of the stipulated language to prohibit UFW from cooperating with [the general counsel] in his investigation and prosecution of the first ULP charge must be rejected as contrary to the public policy inherent in the ALRA.
*  *  * 
Moreover, the [employer's] ability to guarantee the silence of witnesses by means of a legally enforceable private agreement does not comport with either the spirit or the stated purpose of the ALRA." 
That purpose is clearly stated in Labor Code section 1140.2: "[T]o encourage and protect the right of agricultural employees to full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of their employment, and to be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers . . . ." This public interest is not advanced if private agreements between employer and employee are allowed to obstruct the General Counsel's prosecution of complaints. (Cf. E.E.O.C. v. Astra U.S.A., Inc. (1st Cir. 1996) 94 F.3d 738, 744-745 [settlement provision prohibiting employee from assisting EEOC in its investigation of sexual harassment charges against employer is void as against public policy].)

So, another trend in employment law appears to be increased scrutiny of releases.  Employers should ensure they know what they are bargaining for when they settle claims.  Absolute confidentiality is not realistic. Neither is a promise never to participate or cooperate in a future proceeding.  Employers should not pay settlements or separation pay expecting to fully achieve these goals.   That said, there are ways to draft agreements to comply with the limitations.   At least there used to be. We'll have to see what happens in the EEOC's litigation.

This case is D'Arrigo Bros. of California v. United Farmworkers of Am.  and the opinion is here.





Wednesday, March 12, 2014

To Compel Arbitration Under Federal Arbitration Act, Employer Must Prove It Applies

Lab. Code section 229 is a California law that expressly precludes arbitration of certain wage-hour claims.
229. Actions to enforce the provisions of this article for the collection of due and unpaid wages claimed by an individual may be maintained without regard to the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate.
Of course that law is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. The U.S. Supreme Court has said as much. 

The catch is that preemption applies only if the Federal Arbitration Act applies to the agreement to arbitrate.  The Federal Arbitration Act applies only to arbitration agreements made by employers in "interstate commerce."  So, technically, the employer looking to enforce an arbitration agreement in spite of section 229 has to establish FAA jurisdiction, or section 229 will apply and no wage claim arbitration will be permitted.

When Martin Lane sued Francis Capital Management over wage-hour and other issues, Francis petitioned to compel arbitration.  Lane invoked Labor Code section 229, arguing it precluded arbitration.  The Court of Appeal decided Francis did not establish it was subject to the Federal Arbitration Act:
Seeking to avoid application of section 229 to Lane's third cause of action, FCM contends that in the instant case, section 229 was preempted by the FAA. {Slip Opn. Page 13} (See Perry v. Thomas (1987) 482 U.S. 483, 492 [where FAA applies, it preempts section 229].) In the trial court, FCM's only mention of FAA preemption came in a footnote, and the court's rejection of the argument was predicated on FCM's failure to develop a factual record in support of preemption. Assuming the argument was preserved for appeal, we agree that FCM neither sought to nor succeeded in presenting facts sufficient to support a finding of FAA preemption.
So, lawyers, do not assume that a court will find that an employer is involved in "interstate commerce" within the meaning of the Federal Arbitration Act.  

Anyway, this case seems like it's anti-arbitration, but it's not.  The court rejected the trial court's conclusion that the arbitration agreement was void because it did not attach the American Arbitration Association's rules.  The court also held that section 229 applied to just one of the causes of action and the others would be arbitrated.   The court obviously can sense the winds of change in arbitration law. (The California Supreme Court will rule on the continuing viability of its arbitration jurisprudence within the next four months).

This case is Lane v. Francis Capital Management and the opinion is here.