NLRB's "Joint Employer" Case Matters to Non-Union Employers, Too

As you may have read, the NLRB has changed its definition of what is a "joint employer" relationship.  In the labor law context, this may come up, for example, when the Board decides what is an appropriate unit for bargaining or voting.  Additionally, a joint employer may have to bargain alongside its co-employer about the employment conditions under its "joint" control. Joint employers also can be jointly liable for unfair labor practice decisions and more. 

Before you decide this is "union stuff" and irrelevant, remember that courts may use the "joint employer" doctrine to impose liability on one company for the discrimination, sexual harassment, etc.  perpetrated by employees of another company.  The standards for transferring liability between separate companies (single employer, integrated enterprise, alter ego, joint employer) are influenced by NLRB decisional law.   So, this case could affect other areas of the law unrelated to union stuff.  Plus, the NLRB's reach continues to expand. Sooner or later, it is going to create more private-sector unionization unless the current trend is reversed. So, it pays to pay attention.

"Joint" employer is when there are two separate entities, owned and managed by different enterprises. But they both exercise sufficient control over a group of workers that they are considered "jointly" responsible for issues that arise.  A "single" employer or "integrated enterprise" on the other hand, usually refers to when there are related entities, like parents and subsidiaries, that are deemed one enterprise.  An "alter ego" is when one entity pretends to be unrelated to another, usually to disguise itself and avoid liability.

Joint employer relationships often come up in the context of temporary agencies, or when an employer subcontracts some of its work to a separate company, such as cleaning.  

In the case under consideration, Browning-Ferris Industries operated a recycling plant.  They employed their own employees, who operated forklifts, loaders and other equipment.   Inside the facility, there are a series of conveyor belts that sort the recycled materials.  BFI hired another company, Leadpoint, to staff the conveyor belts.  The Leadpoint workers cleaned the facility, sorted the materials and performed other work.  A union sought to represent the Leadpoint workers. The same union already represented the BFI employees mentioned above.   

BFI and Leadpoint had a written agreement, under which Leadpoint was the employer of its workers. Here are some of the provisions:

• Leadpoint had its own supervisors and managers on site.
• Leadpoint management scheduled its workers
• Leadpoint evaluated its own employees' work.
• Leadpoint had its own HR manager on site.
• Leadpoint made all hiring decisions, but BFI provided criteria / job qualifications
• BFI imposed hiring criteria including a drug panel and skills test
• Leadpoint made all discipline and termination decisions, although BFI requested a couple of discharges after catching Leadpoint employees engaged in misconduct at the facility.
• Leadpoint set pay rates with employees, but BFI's agreement provided the maximum it would reimburse Leadpoint.
• BFI set the hours of operation of the plant and the shift times. But Leadpoint scheduled the employees.

The Board undertook an historical analysis of the joint employer test. It found that the Board over the years had narrowed the test to exclude many relationships that were "joint employers" under older Board and case law.   The Board then announced its "new" rule, which it argues is really a "return" to the old rule:

The Board may find that two or more entities are joint employers  of a single work force if they are both employers within the meaning of the common law, and if they share or codetermine those matters governing the essential terms and conditions of employment. In evaluating the allocation and exercise of control in the workplace, we will consider the various ways in which joint employers may “share” control over terms and conditions of employment or “codetermine” them, as the Board and the courts have done in the past

So, there are two prongs.  First, what is "employer within the meaning of the common law?"   The Board quoted from the Restatement of Agency:

a servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the other’s control or right to control.

The Board emphasized that, going forward, it would merely look to the "right" to control, rather than the exercise of control.  So, BFI owns the equipment, sets the starting and ending times, and has its own quality and management standards in play in its own plant.  Does BFI always have the "right" to control its own property and, therefore, the sub's employees to one degree or another?  Probably yes, right?  I think that's the way the Board wants it.    Am I just trying to scare you?  Nope. From the opinion:

The common law, indeed, recognizes that control may be indirect . For example, the Restatement of Agency (Second) §220, comment l (“Control of the premises”) observes that

[i]f the work is done upon the premises of the employer with his machinery by workmen who agree to obey general rules for the regulation of the conduct of employees, the inference is strong that such workmen are the servants of the owner... and illustrates this principle by citing the example of a coal mine owner employing miners who, in turn, supply their own helpers. Both the miners and their helpers are servants of the mine owner.

So, that is the outer limit of what an employee is, but it's not enough to ensure joint employer status. Hence the second prong: "share or codetermine those matters governing the essential terms and conditions of employment." Here, the Board decided to return to prior case law that expanded the list of criteria it considers relevant to "share or codetermine." 

Essential terms indisputably include wages and hours, as reflected in the Act itself.82 Other examples of control over mandatory terms and conditions of employment found probative by the Board include dictating the number of workers to be supplied;83 controlling scheduling,84 seniority, and overtime; 85 and assigning work and determining the manner and method of work performance

The Board overruled at least four decisions "and others" that conflict with its new standard.  

Then, the Board turned to BFI and found, yes, it is a joint employer with Leadpoint.  

• Re hiring, BFI required drug testing, asked Leadpoint not to hire those BFI previously employed and deemed ineligible, and BFI could reject anyone brought to its premises.  

• Re discipline and termination, BFI could report to Leadpoint employees whom BFI felt should be disciplined or discharged.

• Re working conditions, BFI had the right to control its conveyor belt, including the speed at which it operated.  BFI held meetings with Leadpoint employees to provide feedback and training.  And because BFI set the shift times and decided how many workers were needed to staff the plant, those were indirect indicia of control. 

• Re wages:

Under the parties’ contract,  Leadpoint determines employees’ pay rates, administers all payments, retains payroll records, and is solely responsible for providing and administering benefits. But BFI specifically prevents Leadpoint from paying employees more than BFI employees performing comparable work.111 BFI’s employment of its own sorter at $5 more an hour creates a de facto wage ceiling for Leadpoint workers. In addition, BFI and Leadpoint are parties to a cost-plus contract, under which BFI is required to reimburse Leadpoint for labor costs plus a specified percentage markup.112 Although this arrangement, on its own, is not necessarily sufficient to create a joint-employer relationship,113 it is coupled here with the apparent requirement of BFI approval over employee pay increases.114

The Board's decision is 3-2.  Two Members dissented in an opinion that expressed more than a touch of concern about the affect the majority's decision may have on labor law.  Here are a couple of  excerpts from the beginning of the dissent:

Today, in the most sweeping of recent major decisions, the Board majority rewrites the decades-old test for determining who the “employer” is. More specifically, the majority redefines and expands the test that makes two separate and independent entities a “joint employer” of certain employees. This change will subject countless entities to unprecedented new joint-bargaining obligations that most do not even know they have, to potential joint liability for unfair labor practices and breaches of collective-bargaining agreements, and to economic protest activity, including what have heretofore been unlawful secondary strikes, boycotts, and picketing.

What do you really think, dissenters?

no bargaining table is big enough to seat all of the entities that will be potential joint employers under the majority’s new standards.

But, the majority said that the Board is merely returning to an existing set of precedents, right?

today’s majority holding does not represent a “return to the traditional test used by the Board,” as our colleagues claim even while admitting that the Board has never before described or articulated the test they announce today. Contrary to their characterization, the new joint-employer test fundamentally alters the law applicable to user-supplier, lessor-lessee, parent-subsidiary, contractor-subcontractor, franchisor-franchisee, predecessor-successor, creditor-debtor, and contractor-consumer business relationships under the Act. In addition, because the commerce data applicable to joint employers is combined for jurisdictional purposes,11 the Act’s coverage will extend to small businesses whose separate operations and employees have until now not been subject to Board jurisdiction.

This decision will mean more collective bargaining, and that can't be bad!  Can it?

The Act encourages collective bargaining, but only by  an “employer” in direct relation to its employees. Our colleagues take this purpose way beyond what Congress intended, and the result unavoidably will be too much of a good thing. We believe the majority’s test will actually foster substantial bargaining instability by requiring the nonconsensual presence of too many entities with diverse and conflicting interests on the “employer” side. Indeed, even the commencement of good-faith bargaining may be delayed by disputes over whether the correct “employer” parties are present. This predictable outcome is irreconcilable with the Act’s overriding policy to “eliminate
the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce.”

The dissent then goes into great detail to explain its reasons for why the new Board decision is so problematic, contrary to the Board's authority, and how it will have unintended consequences.  But I have a day job so I cannot summarize it all here. 

This case likely will be appealed to the court of appeals. So we will see it it is enforced.  The courts are very deferential to board decisions, however. So, the odds are that this is another major shift in labor law.  Or "fundamental transformation" as someone might say.

This case is Browning-Ferris Indus. of Calif. and the opinion is here.

Court of Appeal: Incorporation of AAA Rules = Delegation to Arbitrator

In many employment arbitration agreements, the employer provides that the arbitration will be conducted under the employment dispute rules of the American Arbitration Association or AAA.  (The formal name of these rules is the National Rules for Resolution of Employment Disputes.)  Why?  These rules have been upheld as sufficiently benign to employee rights such that arbitration under those rules will be compelled.  And sometimes they're probably just included by default.

The Court of Appeal in Universal Protection Service LP v. Superior Court (opinion here) decided that the parties' arbitration agreement incorporating these rules meant that the arbitrator, rather than the court, had the power to decide whether class-wide arbitration was available.

UP employees sued the company based on wage-hour claims and termination-based claims in a purported class action. The employees sought to arbitrate the class action. UP sought to compel individual claims to arbitration. The trial court ordered the entire claim, class and all to arbitration and stayed the lawsuit, thereby leaving the decision on whether the class was arbitrable to the arbitrator.   UP sought relief from the Court of Appeal via writ of mandate.  UP wanted the appellate court to rule that only individual claims were arbitrable.

Here's what the arbitration clause said:

“I further expressly acknowledge and agree that, to the fullest extent allowed by law, any controversy, claim or dispute between me and the Company . . . relating to or arising out of my employment or the cessation of that employment will be submitted to final and binding arbitration before a neutral arbitrator . . . for determination in accordance with the American Arbitration Association’s [AAA] National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes as the exclusive remedy for such controversy, claim or dispute.”

Given that incorporation of AAA rules, the Court of Appeal noted that the AAA employment dispute rules authorize the arbitrator to rule on the scope of the arbitration agreement:

Paragraph No. 6(a) of those rules provides: “The arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement.”

The Court also noted that the AAA rules include supplemental rules governing purported classwide claims.

“Upon appointment, the arbitrator shall determine as a threshold matter, in a reasoned, partial final award on the construction of the arbitration clause, whether the applicable arbitration clause permits the arbitration to proceed on behalf of or against a class (the ‘Clause Construction Award’). The arbitrator shall stay all proceedings following the issuance of the Clause Construction Award for a period of at least 30 days to permit any party to move a court of competent jurisdiction to confirm or to vacate the Clause Construction Award.”

Having found these provisions were included in the parties' agreement to arbitrate, the Court decided that the Arbitrator had the power to rule on whether the arbitration would include class-based claims.

Employers of course may mandate individual employees to arbitrate their individual claims (excluding PAGA claims).  Employers also may exclude class-based claims from arbitration.   Employers may do so expressly, which is legal.

The parties to an arbitration agreement may agree to have courts rule on arbitrability of class claims or may agree on having an arbitrator do so.  This decision simply says that incorporating the AAA employment rules means that the parties elected the arbitrator as the decider of this critical issue.  Not that there's anything wrong with that.

California Supreme Court Upholds California's Tough Arbitration Jurisprudence Again, Mostly

In a non-employment decision, the California Supreme Court held the following:

1.  The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion requires the Court to uphold a waiver of class actions in a consumer arbitration agreement (this one within an auto-sales contract). This is not news, as the California Supreme Court already recognized this rule in a prior case, which was decided while this one was pending.

2.  SCOTUS's Concepcion case permits California to continue to apply an "unconscionability" defense to arbitration agreements under state law, provided the courts do not single out arbitration contracts for disfavored treatment.  However, the Court, perhaps subtly, is putting some brakes on how courts may apply the doctrine of "unconscionability" to invalidate arbitration agreements.

This case involved a contract between a consumer and car dealership over the sale of a luxury car. So,  not an employment case. We will have to wait some more for the courts of appeal to apply this decision, Sanchez v. Valencia Holdings LLC, to employment agreements. I think there will be a relaxation of the unconscionability standard, but not enough to allow significant changes to employers' arbitration contracts.

The language of the arbitration agreement is not entirely transferable to employment agreements. But some of the provisions may allow employers to include provisions that previously had been struck down as "unconscionable."

Justice Liu penned the 6-1 opinion.  Justice Liu does not provide a lot of concrete standards for what is going to be considered "unconscionable."  For example, as Justice Chin, concurring and dissenting, points out, the majority simply refuses to announce one formal standard for what counts as "unconscionable."  Does a contract have to "shock the conscience" or must it be simply too one-sided that it's too unfair to the other side?

The standard the court distills is quite mushy and guarantees continued litigation over unconscionability:

The ultimate issue in every case is whether the terms of the contract are sufficiently unfair, in view of all relevant circumstances, that a court should withhold enforcement.

Nevertheless, the Court set forth a definition of unconscionable that appears to signal that courts should not be too eager to strike down terms that they feel are simply unfair:

that unconscionability doctrine is concerned not with ‗a simple old-fashioned bad bargain‘ (Schnuerle v. Insight Communications Co. (Ky. 2012) 376 S.W.3d 561, 575 (Schnuerle)), but with terms that are ‗unreasonably favorable to the more powerful party‘ (8 Williston on Contracts (4th ed. 2010) § 18.10, p. 91). These include ‗terms that impair the integrity of the bargaining process or otherwise contravene the public interest or public policy; terms (usually of an adhesion or boilerplate nature) that attempt to alter in an impermissible manner fundamental duties otherwise imposed by the law, fine-print terms, or provisions that seek to negate the reasonable expectations of the nondrafting party, or unreasonably and unexpectedly harsh terms having to do with price or other central aspects of the transaction.‘ (Ibid.)‖ (Sonic II, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1145.) Because unconscionability is a contract defense, the party asserting the defense bears the burden of proof. (Id. at p. 1148.

* * *

unconscionability requires a substantial degree of unfairness beyond ‘a simple old-fashioned bad bargain.’ (Id. at p. 1160, italics added.) This latter qualification is important. Commerce depends on the enforceability, in most instances, of a duly executed written contract. A party cannot avoid a contractual obligation merely by complaining that the deal, in retrospect, was unfair or a bad bargain. Not all one-sided contract provisions are unconscionable; hence the various intensifiers in our formulations: ―overly harsh,―unduly oppressive,―unreasonably favorable. (See Pinnacle, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 246 [―A contract term is not substantively unconscionable when it merely gives one side a greater benefit . . . .].)

The Court also made clear that it wants to avoid federal intervention be emphasizing that courts may not single out arbitration agreements for more scrutiny than other contracts.

our unconscionability standard is, as it must be, the same for arbitration and nonarbitration agreements. (Concepcion, supra, 563 U.S. at p. __ [131 S.Ct. at p. 1747].) Of course, unconscionability can manifest itself in different ways, depending on the contract term at issue. (See, e.g., Washington Mutual Bank v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 906, 916–917 [choice of law clause]); City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 747, 777 [waivers of liability provision]); Moreno v. Sanchez (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1434 [statutes of limitation provision]; Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 491, 495–496 [forum selection clause].) But the application of unconscionability doctrine to an arbitration clause must proceed from general principles that apply to any contract clause. In particular, the standard for substantive unconscionability — the requisite degree of unfairness beyond merely a bad bargain — must be as rigorous and demanding for arbitration clauses as for any contract clause.

Here are a few issues the Court addressed that can help employers' arbitration agreements:

1. The Court made clear that there is no obligation to set an arbitration provision apart from other contractual provisions or call it to the consumer's attention.

2. The Court also does not have lot of sympathy for the argument that the consumer did not read the contract or that it was buried under a lot of other papers, which employees often argue.

3. The Court upheld a provision where the plaintiff could appeal a $0 award to a panel of 3 arbitrators, and the defendant could appeal if the award exceeded $100,000.  Therefore, provisions do not have to be 100% mirror image, which some lower courts have insisted on.

4.  Along the same lines, the Court said that requiring the plaintiff to bear the expenses of the appeal was not unconscionable because the plaintiff did not prove he was unable to bear that cost.  However, this case arose under a different statutory scheme than applies to employment disputes.  So, employers should continue to bear any "type" of cost that is not incurred in court.

5. On the mirror-image "mutuality" issue, the Court said that a provision exempting "self help" such as repossession was OK because of the car dealer's legitimate business needs to repossess cars, and because the agreement exempted small claims cases, which benefited the consumer. Trade-offs, therefore, may save unconscionable provisions.  Caution, though, because the Court in part based its decision on the fact that "self-help" itself is outside of litigation, so it was naturally something that need not be arbitrated.   If the lower courts run with this, employers may be able to "carve out" some issues from arbitration - like intellectual property - if they carve out other claims that favor employees - like expense reimbursements maybe, for example?  We shall see.

To sum up, the Supreme Court upheld the business's agreement. But it did not set forth clear standards on unconscionability. It may have relaxed the law of unconscionability a bit, but it did not hold that Concepcion guts California's (de facto) tough stance on arbitration agreements.

This case is not a blockbuster for employers or employees.  It remains to be seen whether the employer or employee will try for U.S. Supreme Court review.

The court system in California is still under water. It can take a long time to get to trial. Judges are worked hard, and may not give your case the attention you think it deserves.  So, arbitration can be quicker, which can cut down on defense costs.  On the other hand, the cost of the arbitrator and administration can be expensive.  And arbitrators are not afraid to issue large awards when they find cause to do so.  So, arbitration is a yellow light, before and after Sanchez.  Nothing in this case changes that view for me.   Just my 0.02. YMMV.  YOLO.  [Insert cliche].

Sanchez v. Valencia Holdings LLC is here.