Court of Appeal Affirms Summary Judgment on Sexual Harassment Claim and More

The Court of Appeal's decision in McCoy v. Pacific Maritime Association covers a lot of ground.  The opinion contains analysis of a variety of issues important for pre-trial and trial lawyers alike.

Here are the main issues -

1. The plaintiff's allegations of hostile work environment harassment and intentional infliction of emotional distress were not severe / pervasive / extreme / outrageous enough to reach the jury.  The plaintiff's claim is summarized here:

Appellant testified that she was harassed and shunned throughout her training period. Her complaints centered around one vessel planner in particular, Anthony Spanjol. Appellant testified that Spanjol would disrespect her by talking down to her and by putting his feet up on her work space. On one occasion, he yelled at her in front of other employees and called her stupid. One of appellant‟s supervisors, Marc Izzo, witnessed this incident, but left the room rather than address it. Appellant testified that when she complained about the incident she was told that she should go home and that Spanjol‟s behavior was just a part of his personality. She also stated that Spanjol often made racially derogatory remarks and engaged in sexually offensive behavior. He would comment on the buttocks of other female employees once they left the room, using terms like "„nigger ass‟" and "„J-Lo ass.‟" On at least one occasion, Spanjol also made crude gestures toward a woman when the woman‟s back was turned. He also mocked these women in appellant‟s presence. During another incident, appellant asked Spanjol a question regarding the unloading of a ship, but he ignored her and "never spoke to [her] again." Appellant testified that shortly after this incident she decided she could no longer handle the work environment and quit her job entirely.

The court held that the harassment was not severe or pervasive enough to require a jury's consideration. The court also held that the allegations of co-worker harassment were not actionable because the plaintiff did not prove that her employer knew or should have known of the conduct directed toward her.

2.  The court held that the trial court properly excluded evidence of harassment of other women because the only claim tried was retaliation.

3.   "Me-too" evidence of retaliation against other women should have been admitted.

4.   The plaintiff claimed denial of promotion based on retaliation. The court held she was entitled to damages if she prevailed even if she did not prove constructive discharge. The amount of those damages would have to be limited to what she actually lost (the difference between her pay and the pay if she had been promoted).  I don't understand how she would be entitled to that differential after she quit if it's not a constructive discharge.  If you voluntarily quit, you no longer receive pay...  I know, there I go thinking again.

5.   The court held that PMA, an association that negotiated collective bargaining agreements, was not the plaintiff's employer, and therefore could not be held liable for retaliation or other FEHA based actions.

So, lots of reasons to cite this case.  It's long, but worth reading.  The opinion in McCoy v. Pacific Maritime Association is here.

DGV
 

Court of Appeal: Meal/Rest/Wage Statement Class Action Should Be Certified

Safeway compensated truck drivers based on a compensation formula rather than a straight hourly rate: 

The collective bargaining agreements also obligated Safeway to utilize what it calls an activity based compensation system to determine the drivers‟ wages. Pay was calculated based on (1) mileage rates applied according to the number of miles driven, the time of day the trips were taken, and the locations where the trips began and ended; (2) fixed rates for certain tasks (e.g., rates for number of pallets delivered and picked up); (3) an hourly rate for a predetermined amount of minutes for certain tasks (e.g., paid for 10 minutes at hourly rate for set-up time at each store); and (4) an hourly rate for delays (e.g., breakdowns, impassable highways, time spent at scales, or other causes beyond the driver‟s control).

Drivers logged their mileage and activities for each trip manually on trip sheets. They also logged their activities into an onboard computer system known as the XATA system. Through XATA, Safeway tracked the drivers' moves, including their stops. The drivers input codes into XATA to record specific reasons for delays. Neither the trip sheets nor the XATA system, however, provided a place or means to record meal or rest periods.

 
So, the compensation system did not include separate payment for contractually and legally required rest periods.  Safeway argued that the paid rest periods were included in its compensation formula, presumably because the payment for miles and tasks assumed the rest periods would be taken during these activities.  Safeway also had drivers sign time cards to acknolwedge they were authorized and permitted to take rest periods. 
The trial court refused to certify a sub-class of rest period claims.  But the court of appeal reversed.  The court held Safeway's system of compensation was akin to a piece rate method of compensation.  And, the court decided, California law does not allow paid rest periods to be included in piece rates because it was an improper averaging of compensation: 

under the rule of Armenta v. Osmose, Inc. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 314, 323 (Armenta), rest periods must be separately compensated in a piece-rate system. Rest periods are considered hours worked and must be compensated. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 11070, subd. 12; 11090, subd. 12.) Under the California minimum wage law, employees must be compensated for each hour worked at either the legal minimum wage or the contractual hourly rate, and compliance cannot be determined by averaging hourly compensation.

The court expressly held that there was a common issue for determining liability - that the compensation system did not compensate employees for paid rest periods separately. The court did so by holding that piece rates may not include payment for rest periods. That is another way of saying that there was no payment for rest periods as a matter of law.

With all respect to the court of appeal, this decision seems to over-analyze the merits of the case.  The court seems to be saying the common proof is that all rest periods were paid incorrectly as a matter of law.  Without saying so, therefore, the court essentially granted summary judgment for the plaintiff rather than just class certification. 

While we're talking about the merits, I am not sure I understand why the piece rate payment cannot include implied payment for rest periods, as Safeway testified it did. An hourly pay rate does not expressly include payment for rest periods either.  During the hour that an employee takes a rest period, he is paid the same hourly rate, but simply works less.  During the hour that an employee does not take a rest period, she receives the same rate as if she did take one. Employers likely set their hourly rates under the assumption that the employee will take a rest period during one of every four hours worked.  The hourly rate therefore "averages" compensation, which the cout said could not be done.   Anyway, I don't get a vote.  So, I descend from my soap box, dejected.

The court also certified a meal period sub-class class on the basis that there was a common issue regarding whether Safeway adequately provided second meal periods before 2006, which is when the case was filed.  The court did not reach the plaintiff's argument that Safeway did not do enough to ensure drivers were relieved of duty, because the one common issue was enough for class certification.  This part of the decision may not be all that significant to employers who adequately provide for both meal periods per Brinker.  Safeway changed practices in 2006.

Finally, the court of appeal decided the wage statement sub-class should be certified.  The court agreed that the wage statement did not adequately spell out wage rates applicable to miles driven, such that the employees would have to refer to their own trip sheets to verify whether they received adequate compensation and engage in mathematical calculations:

Plaintiff‟s argument goes to the structure of the wage statements. As a result, his and the other drivers‟ claims of injury on account of the wage statements will be resolved by means of common proof. The structural omissions in the wage statements, and their alleged violation of Labor Code section 226, are, like employer policies, the types of matters best resolved by class adjudication.

There have been other decisions regarding  piece rates lately. See, e.g., here.  Employers should review their compensation plans to ensure compliance with minimum wage, overtime, meal and rest period laws.

This case is Bluford v. Safeway Stores, Inc. and the opinion is here.

Court of Appeal - Managers Supervising While Performing Non-Exempt Tasks Are Non-Exempt

Safeway stores employ assistant managers who supervise many employees and have responsibility for hiring, supervising, budget compliance, etc.  But the stores' "operating budgets" and other policies allegedly require assistant managers to work the cash register and perform bookkeeping duties at times.  The assistant managers can supervise associates while "multi-tasking" / working the checkout line.

The plaintiff, Linda Heyen, was an assistant manager. The trial court found she worked about 54 hours a week, and spent a great deal of time at the check stand and performing bookkeeping tasks, even though she was able to supervise the store simultaneously.  An advisory jury concluded that Safeway did not prove Heyen was exempt.  The trial court instructed the jury that it should consider the primary purpose for "mixed" activities - those that involved both non-exempt work and supervision.

Safeway argued this:

So long as the manager is still actively functioning in his/her managerial capacity, and addressing his/her attention to managerial tasks such as observing how the store is running and considering how to make the store perform more efficiently and profitably, how to best model and train the store's employees in proper service activities, how to resolve any employee or operational problems that have arisen or are arising, and instructing employees in that regard, etc., all that time should be considered to fall on the 'exempt' side of the ledger—even if the manager is helping customers or handling product at the same time.

The court engaged in a detailed analysis of federal regulations, the wage order, and California case law, which you can read in the opinion. The punch line is this:

the federal regulations cited in Wage Order 7 expressly recognize that managers sometimes engage in tasks that do not involve the "actual management of the department [or] the supervision of the employees therein." (§ 541.108(a).) In those circumstances, the regulations do not say, as Safeway would have us hold, that those tasks should be considered "exempt" so long as the manager continues to supervise while performing them. Instead, the regulations look to the supervisor‟s reason or purpose for undertaking the task. If a task is performed because it is "helpful in supervising the employees or contribute[s] to the smooth functioning of the department for which [the supervisors] are responsible" (§ 541.108(a), (c)), the work is exempt; if not, it is nonexempt.

The court also found that when the company's expectations regarding the budgeted non-exempt hours, production standards, etc. virtually or expressly require the exempt manager to take on non-exempt tasks, the employer cannot argue that the employee did not live up to its expectations by performing non-exempt work.

So, employers, "working" / floor management, leads, etc. are more likely to be classified as "non-exempt" after this opinion, particularly when these managers are performing duties that non-exempt workers are simultaneously performing.   I predict the price of cheesy-poofs will be increasing or the checkout lines are going to be a little longer.

The case is Heyen v. Safeway and the opinion is here.

Court of Appeal - Hourly Pay X Busy Employee = Non-Exempt Compensation

The plaintiff was an insurance adjuster.  He was paid $29 / hour for every hour worked, including overtime.  He always worked more than 40 hours per week.  In a wage-hour lawsuit, he claimed he was not properly classified as exempt because he was not paid on a salary basis.  (He challenged the duties test as well it appears).  The employer argued that he was never paid less than 40 X $29 because he always worked overtime. Therefore, he earned the equivalent of a salary.  The trial court bought that argument.

But the Court of Appeal reversed.

The question presented in this case is whether a compensation scheme based solely upon the number of hours worked, with no guaranteed minimum, can be considered a “salary” within the meaning of the pertinent wage and hour laws. We conclude that such a payment schedule is not a salary and, therefore, does not qualify the employee as exempt.

The employer argued "no harm, no foul," in that the employee always received more than 40 hours x $29 per hour, in that he was always working more than 40 hours.  But, said the court,

The problem here is that defendant stipulated to the fact that it “never paid [plaintiff] a guaranteed salary”; if he worked fewer claims “he made less money than if he worked more claims.” That is the same thing as saying that plaintiff was not paid “a predetermined amount” that “was not subject to reduction based upon the quantity of work performed.” He was not paid a salary. For that reason, defendant did not prove that the administrative exemption of Wage Order 4 applies in this case.

The court did not address whether the employee was properly classified as exempt based on his duties, because the salary issue destroyed his claim.

So, a salary is a predetermined sum, that is not reduced because of the quantity or quality of work performed.  To qualify for exempt status, the fixed salary must be at least 2 X minimum wage (currently $8.00 in California) X 40 hours.  Certain deductions from salary are authorized, as detailed in the federal FLSA regulations, 29 CFR 541.602 (here).

This case is Negri v. Koning & Associates and the opinion is here.

Court of Appeal: Union Contracts Must Clearly and Unmistakably Waive Rights Under California Vacation Law

It's California employment law 101 that employers must pay out all "vested" vacation time when an employee's employment ends.  No "use it or lose it" and no limits on "carry over" are allowed under Labor Code Section 227.3.  There's an exception in the statute though, which says the statute applies "[u]nless otherwise provided by a collective-bargaining agreement."

What does "otherwise provided" mean?  Well employer Celite had a collective bargaining relationship, and their agreement provided as follows, according to the Court of Appeal:

Celite granted its employees between one and five weeks of vacation annually. Each January, Celite calculated a yearly "vacation allotment" based on each employee's length of employment and the number of hours they worked the year before. [The] employees terminated from Celite were entitled to "receive whatever vacation allotment is due them upon separation."[fn] For 25 years, both Celite and the Union understood this provision to refer to the "vacation allotment" as defined above. Accordingly, Celite paid terminated employees for the vacation time already allotted to them for the year of their termination, but did not pay them the vacation time they had accrued toward the next year's allotment.

The description above suggests that the contract required payment of whatever vacation balance the employee had, but did not take into account "accrual" of vacation during the current year.  Pretty clear to me.

 

Not clear enough for the Court of Appeal, though, and I don't get a vote.  The Court decided that because vacation pay is a significant state-law right, any waiver of 227.3's requirements had to be "clear and unmistakable." Here's what the Court said:

To be clear and unmistakable, a waiver must do more than speak in "'[b]road, general language." (Vasquez, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 435.) It must be specific, and mention either the statutory protection being waived or, at a minimum, the statute itself. (Accord, Hoover v. American Income Life Ins. Co. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1208.) The Agreements here neither mention pro rata vacation pay nor cite section 227.3. Celite points out that the Agreements "affirmatively address" vacation payments upon termination. But discussing a topic while at the same time saying nothing about the statutory right at issue does not affect a clear and unmistakable waiver of that right.

So, please check your union contracts and either negotiate a clear provision that waives Section 227.3 expressly and, preferably, quotes the statute.  This is why California release agreements quote Civil Code Section 1542, in case you've ever wondered about that.

On the bright side, the Court of Appeal decided the employer did not act "willfully" by following the collective bargaining agreement and, therefore, was not on the hook for "waiting time" penalties.  The court said that this was the first opinion deciding the standard for waivers under Section 227.3, and so the employer's mistake of law was not "willful."

Some times I wonder what all those class action plaintiff lawyers are doing after Brinker and Dukes v. Walmart put a damper on things.  (Ok, not really).  Well, here is the Court of Appeal riding to the rescue. 

It may be that the California or even U.S. Supreme Court may review this case, but the odds are long. If this case stays on the books, all union contracts prescribing a vacation payout provision that is less generous than Section 227.3 are subject to attack.  Make with the bargaining, employers.

The case is Choate v. Celite Corporation, and the opinion is here.