Saturday, February 28, 2015

Court of Appeal Finds Insufficient Evidence Attributing Electronic Signature to Employee

Employers increasingly rely on electronic acknowledgements of policies and procedures.  An "electronic signature" is valid under California law.  But the reason those signatures exist is so that employers can prove the employee read and signed the document.  That's what Moss Bros. Auto found out in a recent case.

The document was an arbitration agreement, which Moss Bros. claimed that its employee, Ruiz, signed.  However, Ruiz claimed he did not "remember" signing it.  So, Moss Bros. had to establish that he did when it moved to compel Ruiz to arbitrate his wage-hour claims.


Moss Bros. adduced the declaration of its business manager, Mary K. Main, who was “required to be familiar with the generation and maintenance” of employee personnel records. Main summarily asserted that Ruiz “electronically signed” the 2011 agreement “on or about September 21, 2011,and that the same agreement was presented to all persons who seek or seek to maintain employmentwith Moss Bros. or its affiliated dealerships and service/parts centers. Main did not explain how Moss Bros. verified that Ruiz, or other Moss Bros. employees, electronically signed the 2011 agreement. 
The 2011 agreement is just over two pages in length. “Ernesto Zamora Ruiz” appears in print on the first page, under the title, “Employee Acknowledgment and Agreement,and the phrases “Ernesto Zamora Ruiz (Electronic Signature)” and “9/21/2011 11:47:27 AM” appear in print on the third page, under the signature and date lines of the 2011 agreement. 
In a supplemental declaration, Main testified that Ruiz had to log in using a unique user name and password. 

The court of appeal decided that was not enough because Main did not "authenticate" the electronic signature.  here is the standard for doing so:
Civil Code section 1633.9 addresses how a proponent of an electronic signature may authenticate the signaturethat is, show the signature is, in fact, the signature of the person the proponent claims it is. The statute states: “(a) An electronic record or electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was the act of the person. The act of the person may be shown in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any security procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic record or electronic signature was attributable.” (Civ. Code, § 1633.9, subd. (a), italics added.) 
Here, the court found that Main's testimony about the general procedures applicable to electronically signing the arbitration agreement was insufficient.  The court provided some hints as to what would have been enough:


Main did not explain that an electronic signature in the name of “Ernesto Zamora Ruiz” could only have been placed on the 2011 agreement (i.e., on the Employee Acknowledgement form) by a person using Ruiz’s “unique login ID and password”; that the date and time printed next to the electronic signature indicated the date and time the electronic signature was made; that all Moss Bros. employees were required to use their unique login ID and password when they logged into the HR system and signed electronic forms and agreements; and the electronic signature on the 2011 agreement was, therefore, apparently made by Ruiz on September 21, 2011, at 11:47 a.m. Rather than offer this or any other explanation of how she inferred the electronic signature on the 2011 agreement was the act of Ruiz, Main only offered her unsupported assertion that Ruiz was the person who electronically signed the 2011 agreement. In the face of Ruiz’s failure to recall electronically signing the 2011 agreement, the fact the 2011 agreement had an electronic signature on it in the name of Ruiz, and a date and time stamp for the signature, was insufficient to support a finding that the electronic signature was, in fact, the act ofRuiz. (Civ. Code, § 1633.9, subd. (a).) For the same reason, the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the electronic signature was what Moss Bros. claimed it was: the electronic signature of Ruiz. (Evid. Code, § 1400, cl. (a).) This was not a difficult evidentiary burden to meet, but it was not met here. 
As a result, the court found there was insufficient evidence of an agreement to arbitrate and upheld the trial court's denial of Moss Bros.'s petition to compel arbitration.

Yes, it may be that Moss Bros. failed to compel Ruiz to arbitrate due to a poorly drafted declaration, rather than some flaw in the electronic signing protocol.  But litigators need proof that an employee signed handbook acknowledgements, training attendance forms, etc. Although an arbitration agreement was involved here, this decision applies to all sorts of electronically signed documents.  The average manager has no idea how the electronic signing process works, cannot testify that he or she actually saw the employee at the computer electronically signing, etc.

Therefore, when implementing electronic versions of documents, employers must have their IT professionals build in ways to do so.  For example, there could be an acknowledgment email sent to the employee, with a copy to the employer.  Or  the IT management could create a step-by-step explanation of how the system ensures that the  name appearing on the electronic application is attributable to the actual person and not merely inserted later. 

This case is Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto and the decision is here.





Thursday, February 19, 2015

Ninth Circuit to California Supreme Court: About that One Day's Rest in Seven Law?

If only I could ask the California Supreme Court to answer some wage and hour questions for my clients and me. Fortunately, the federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has that authority.
In this instance, the Ninth Circuit has asked the California Court to take up three questions pertaining to California's rarely litigated "day of rest" laws.   In California, there is a statute requiring "one day's rest" in seven. There are some exceptions too.

Here are the questions the Court asked about these statutes:

"Rolling v. Workweek" 

(A) California Labor Code section 551 provides that “[e]very person employed in any occupation of labor is entitled to one day’s rest therefrom in seven.” Is the required day of rest calculated by the workweek, or is it calculated on a rolling basis for any consecutive seven- day period?
This question is very important.  Sometimes employees may work seven days in a row, but across two different work weeks.  If the rule is any consecutive seven days, that could cause significant scheduling issues.

Exemption for Part Timers?
(B) California Labor Code section 556 exempts employers from providing such a day of rest “when the total hours of employment do not exceed 30 hours in any week or six hours in any one day thereof.” (Emphasis added.) Does that exemption apply when an employee works less than six hours in any one day of the applicable week, or does it apply only when an employee works less than six hours in each day of the week?
The Court wants to know:  may an employee work 7 days if he works 8-8-8-5-8-8-8 without causing a violation?  Or must the hours be under 6 for each day worked in the seven consecutive days, e.g., 5-5-5-5-5-5-5?

Switching / Trading Shifts 
(C) California Labor Code section 552 provides that an employer may not “cause his employees to work more than six days in seven.” What does it mean for an employer to “cause” an employee to work more than six days in seven: force, coerce, pressure, schedule, encourage, reward, permit, or something else? 
Here the Court wants to know whether an employer violates the law merely by allowing a worker to work 7 days in a row?  For example, what if an employee is scheduled to work only 6 days per week. But the employee 'picks up" a shift because a co-worker asks him or her to do so?

* * * *

The Supreme Court may decline to answer the questions, but may choose to do so.   If the Court rules in favor of the employee-friendly interpretation presented as an alternative in the Ninth Circuit's order, it would completely change the way employers schedule employees, and likely would result in fewer hours worked per employee.   So, this is a very important case for the Supreme Court to rule on.

The case is Mendoza v. Nordstrom, and the opinion is here.  Interesting reading, employers and lawyers.

Sunday, February 15, 2015

Court of Appeal Limits Meal Break Waivers in Healthcare Industry

Here's one of those cases where California's labyrinth of employment laws conflict, the employer chooses to rely on one of them, and the employer finds out it made the wrong choice.  The lesson arises in the context of a meal break class action.

Many health care workers work 12-hour shifts, often as part of an alternative workweek arrangement.  And many of this 12-hour shift workers prefer to keep the day 1/2 hour shorter, and, therefore, waive a second meal period.  Otherwise, they are going to be at work for at least 13 hours for each 12-hour shift, because they have to take two meal periods of at least 30-minutes each.  It seems to me the employer does not gain financially from permitting employees to waive the second meal period; the meal period is unpaid.  Only the employee benefits, because the employee can go home 1/2 hour earlier.  

Fortunately, the Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Orders include one applicable to the health care industry.  This is Wage Order 5-2001.  Section 11(D) of that Wage Order says:

Notwithstanding any other provision of this order, employees in the health care industry who work shifts in excess of eight (8) total hours in a workday may voluntarily waive their right to one of their two meal periods.” 
Relying on that provision, Orange Coast Memorial Medical Center issued a policy allowing health care workers to voluntarily waive second meal periods. Employees duly signed waivers authorizing this waiver. However, because of the language in Section 11(D), the waiver applied even when employees occasionally worked more than 12 hours. 

So, what's the problem?  Well, the Labor Code also contains meal period requirements, enacted as part of AB 60, that 1999 law that created the penalties for meal period violations, among other things.


Labor Code Section 512(a) provides in pertinent part:
 “An employer may not employ an employee for a work period of more than 10 hours per day without providing the employee with a second meal period of not less than 30 minutes, except that if the total hours worked is no more than 12 hours, the second meal period may be waived by mutual consent of the employer and the employee only if the first meal period was not waived.” (Italics added.) 
Furthermore, section 516 explains: “Except as provided in Section 512, the [IWC] may adopt or amend working condition orders with respect to break periods, meal periods, and days of rest for any workers in California consistent with the health and welfare of those workers.” (Italics added.) 
Rejecting the hospital's arguments, the Court of Appeal held that Section 11(D) of the Wage Order could not stand because section 512 of the Labor Code was controlling.  Therefore, under Section 512 and 11(D) employees could waive second meal periods. But, because of Section 512's limitations, the waiver is valid only if the total hours worked were 12 or less. 

That means 

- if an employee has to work 12 1/2 hours, the meal period waiver is invalid, and
- the employee must either take a second meal period or be paid one extra hour of premium pay.

Given that employees' shifts sometimes will go longer than 12 hours because of unanticipated issues that arise after the 10th hour of work, employers will have to be nimble to schedule second meal periods or pay the one-hour premium.

More bad news, the hospital argued that the decision should not be retroactive, because the hospital relied on the Wage Order, which has the force of law.   The Court of Appeal decided that prior decisions of the courts held that no Wage Order could grant any waivers or vary the meal period structure set forth in section 512.  Therefore, Section 11(D) of the Wage Order was invalid from the beginning, waiting only for a court to expressly say so.  The Court held that the hospital would be liable for meal period premiums resulting from its employing health care workers for more than 12 hours without providing a second meal period.

So, this case applies only to the health care industry, and only to meal period waivers allowing a waiver for shifts > 12 hours.  But it's also precedent that precludes employers from relying on Wage Order provisions that are more employer-friendly than AB 60 allows.

This case is Gerard v. Orange Coast Memorial Med. Ctr. and the opinion is here.