Two More Changes to California Employment Law

California Governor Jerry Brown signed into law two more employment law-related bills.

SB 770 expands California's "paid family leave" program. This law provides up to six weeks of paid disability benefits for employees who are off work to care for covered family members or to bond with a child. Existing law applied only to leave taken to care for spouses, domestic partners, parents or children. (California' state disability insurance benefits apply to the employee's own illness.) 

Effective July 1, 2014, the new law will expand the benefit for when the employee takes leave to care for grandchildren, grandparents, siblings, or in-laws. 

AB 241 is a new wage-hour law that provides for overtime pay to certain employees who qualify as "domestic service employees." California Wage Order 15-2001 usually governs the overtime rules for domestic workers, such as housekeepers and personal attendants for households. The new law will modify the wage order.

Basically, those employees who qualify under this law as "a domestic worker who is a personal attendant" will earn time and one half overtime pay for all hours worked over 9 in a day or 45 in a week.  But the trick is: this law is full of exceptions and definitions regarding who counts as a "domestic worker who is a personal attendant." For example certain family members performing care, and "casual" baby sitters do not count, but full-time baby sitters do. Another example - nursing home employees do not count under this law.  The definitions go on for days:

(a) (1) “Domestic work” means services related to the care of persons in private households or maintenance of private households or their premises. Domestic work occupations include childcare providers, caregivers of people with disabilities, sick, convalescing, or elderly persons, house cleaners, housekeepers, maids, and other household occupations.

(2) “Domestic work” does not include care of persons in facilities providing board or lodging in addition to medical, nursing, convalescent, aged, or child care, including, but not limited to, residential care facilities for the elderly.

(b) (1) “Domestic work employee” means an individual who performs domestic work and includes live-in domestic work employees and personal attendants.

(2) “Domestic work employee” does not include any of the following:

(A) Any person who performs services through the In-Home Supportive Services program under Article 7 (commencing with Section 12300) of Chapter 3 of Part 3 of Division 9 of, or Sections 14132.95, 14132.952, and 14132.956 of, the Welfare and Institutions Code.

(B) Any person who is the parent, grandparent, spouse, sibling, child, or legally adopted child of the domestic work employer.

(C) Any person under 18 years of age who is employed as a babysitter for a minor child of the domestic work employer in the employer’s home.

(D) Any person employed as a casual babysitter for a minor child in the domestic employer’s home. A casual babysitter is a person whose employment is irregular or intermittent and is not performed by an individual whose vocation is babysitting. If a person who performs babysitting services on an irregular and intermittent basis does a significant amount of work other than supervising, feeding, and dressing a child, this exemption shall not apply and the person shall be considered a domestic work employee. A person who is a casual babysitter who is over 18 years of age retains the right to payment of minimum wage for all hours worked, pursuant to Wage Order No. 15-2001 of the Industrial Welfare Commission.

(E) Any person employed by a licensed health facility, as defined in Section 1250 of the Health and Safety Code.

(F) Any person who is employed pursuant to a voucher issued through a regional center or who is employed by, or contracts with, an organization vendored or contracted through a regional center or the State Department of Developmental Services pursuant to the Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act (Division 4.5 (commencing with Section 4500) of the Welfare and Institutions Code) or the California Early Intervention Services Act (Title 14 (commencing with Section 95000) of the Government Code) to provide services and support for persons with developmental disabilities, as defined in Section 4512 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, when any funding for those services is provided through the State Department of Developmental Services.

(G) Any person who provides child care and who, pursuant to subdivision (d) or (f) of Section 1596.792 of the Health and Safety Code, is exempt from the licensing requirements of Chapters 3.4 (commencing with Section 1596.70), 3.5 (commencing with Section 1596.90), and 3.6 (commencing with Section 1597.30) of Division 2 of the Health and Safety Code, if the parent or guardian of the child to whom child care is provided receives child care and development services pursuant to any program authorized under the Child Care and Development Services Act (Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 8200) of Part 6 of Division 1 of Title 1 of the Education Code) or the California Work Opportunity and Responsibility to Kids Act (Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 11200) of Part 3 of Division 9 of the Welfare and Institutions Code).

(c) (1) “Domestic work employer” means a person, including corporate officers or executives, who directly or indirectly, or
through an agent or any other person, including through the services of a third-party employer, temporary service, or staffing agency or similar entity, employs or exercises control over the wages, hours, or working conditions of a domestic work employee.

(2) “Domestic work employer” does not include any of the following: (A) Any person or entity that employs or exercises control over the wages, hours, or working conditions of an individual who performs domestic work services through the In-Home Supportive Services program under Article 7 (commencing with Section 12300) of Chapter 3 of Part 3 of Division 9 of, or Sections 14132.95, 14132.952, and 14132.956 of, the Welfare and Institutions Code or who is eligible for that program.

(B) An employment agency that complies with Section 1812.5095 of the Civil Code and that operates solely to procure, offer, refer, provide, or attempt to provide work to domestic workers if the relationship between the employment agency and the domestic workers for whom the agency procures, offers, refers, provides, or attempts to provide domestic work is characterized by all of the factors listed in subdivision (b) of Section 1812.5095 of the Civil Code and Section 687.2 of the Unemployment Insurance Code.

(C) A licensed health facility, as defined in Section 1250 of the Health and Safety Code.

(d) “Personal attendant” means any person employed by a private householder or by any third-party employer recognized in the health care industry to work in a private household, to supervise, feed, or dress a child, or a person who by reason of advanced age, physical disability, or mental deficiency needs supervision. The status of personal attendant shall apply when no significant amount of work other than the foregoing is required. For purposes of this subdivision, “no significant amount of work” means work other than the foregoing did not exceed 20 percent of the total weekly hours worked.

Understand?  Right. 

The law is set to "sunset" (or expire) on 1/1/17, which coincides with the date you will be able to figure out who is covered.  Presumably, the sunset provision exists in case this new law results in a problem because, for example, people who need in-home care reduce caregivers' hours to avoid paying overtime, or maybe because those who are attempting to work as domestic employees lose work they otherwise would have received if they did not earn overtime...  But the bill mandates a "Governor's Council" to evaluate its effects on such issues and others.

This new law will have to be read with the U.S. Department of Labor's new rules on personal attendants (discussed here). Employers must comply with the more employee-friendly law. We will have a more detailed analysis in an article soon. SV plug: We also will cover these laws in more detail in our annual employment law update (information here).

California State Minimum Wage Going Up...and Then Up Some More

The Governor will sign AB 10 on 9/25.  The new bill will raise the California minimum wage from its current $8.00 per hour to $9.00 on July 1, 2014.  Then it will go up to $10.00 on January 1, 2016.
This change will affect overtime calculations, the retail inside sales exemption (measured based on whether employees earn more than 1.5 X minimum wage), and the salaried exemptions (based on salary of at least 2 X minimum wage).  It will also affect the "split shift" threshold which imposes a split shift premium for those workers who earn less than minimum wage + 1 hour at minimum.
There will be a new poster!
Read the new law here.

Court of Appeal: Employer Liable for Employee's "Off Duty" Car Accident

Here are the facts as told by the Court of Appeal:

An employee of an insurance broker was required each workday to drive to and from the office in her personal vehicle. During the workday, the employee had to use her vehicle to visit prospective clients, make presentations, provide educational seminars, follow leads, and transport company materials and coemployees to work-related destinations.

On April 15, 2010, the employee left the office at the end of the workday and began driving in the direction of her home. She had decided that, on the way, she would stop for some frozen yogurt and take a yoga class. As the employee made a left turn at the yogurt shop, she collided with a motorcyclist.

Motorcyclist sues driver of course. But motorcyclist also sues the employer.  Employer moves the trial court for summary judgment and wins.  After all, she's commuting and then she did not go home, but rather for a snack and some exercise. So, her accident is her responsibility.  End of post, right?

Nope.  Here's how the court summarized its lengthy decision:

Because the employer required the employee to use her personal vehicle to travel to and from the office and make other work-related trips during the day, the employee was acting within the scope of her employment when she was commuting to and from work. The planned stops for frozen yogurt and a yoga class on the way home did not change the incidental benefit to the employer of having the employee use her personal vehicle to travel to and from the office and other destinations. On the day of the accident, the employee had used her vehicle to transport herself and some coemployees to an employer-sponsored program, and the employee had planned to use her vehicle the next day to drive to a prospective client‘s place of business. Nor did the planned stops constitute an unforeseeable, substantial departure from the employee‘s commute. Rather, they were a foreseeable, minor deviation. Finally, the planned stops were not so unusual or startling that it would be unfair to include the resulting loss among the other costs of the employer‘s business. Thus, under the required vehicle exception to the going and coming rule, the employee was acting within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident, and the doctrine of respondeat superior applies. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting the employer‘s summary judgment motion

Here's how it breaks down:

1. The doctrine of "respondeat superior" requires an employer to answer for the torts of the employee, if those torts are committed within the "scope of employment."  This is also called "vicarious" liability.  Good so far?

2.  Under the "going and coming" rule, employers are not liable for the torts of employees committed during the regular commute to and from work / home.  Right, so that's why the employer should have  won! Not so fast, grasshopper.

3.  The "required vehicle exception" to the going and coming rule means that when an employer requires an employee to use a personal vehicle as part of her duties, the "going and coming rule" does not apply, and accidents that occur on the way to or from work may be the employer's responsibility.  In this case, the court held that the "required vehicle" exception applied because the employer required the employee to use her personal car for work-related trips, including on the day she had the accident.

4.  Even under the required vehicle exception, the employer is not liable for everything that an employee does in her personal vehicle.  The employer may not be liable if the employee's side trip is not "foreseeable."  But not "foreseeable" is way more than just a short side-trip for yogurt and yoga.   It is "foreseeable," the court noted, that employees using their own cars would do personal errands for their own comfort and convenience.  Had she visited a friend in another town, committed an intentional act or a crime, I believe this would have come down a different way.

5.  If driving is not part of the job, or if the employer does not require employees to use their cars as part of their jobs, then the going and coming rule still applies and there is no liability for accidents that occur during the commute.  In this case, the employee used her personal car two to five times a week for work-related business. How much work-related driving is enough to trigger the required vehicle exception?  There will be litigation. 

The court went over several different prior decisions and provided detailed analysis.  So, if you would like to know how courts draw the line, you can read the full opinion at the link below.

This decision is an important reminder that employers who require employees to use their personal cars for business will take on additional liabilities.  Therefore, employers imposing such requirements should ensure employees are properly licensed and ensure business insurance is sufficient to cover these types of accidents.  

Employers thinking of imposing restrictions on employees' activities during the "going and coming" to minimize liability for traffic accidents could cause a wage-hour problem.  So, as WW says, "tread lightly" or get some advice first.

The opinion in Moradi v. Marsh USA is here.

Greg 

9th Circuit Taketh Away in an Amended Opinion

We posted about the Ninth Circuit's post-Wal-Mart v. Dukes decision in Wang v. Chinese Daily News here.   This was an overtime class action involving newspaper employees. The Court of Appeals in the earlier opinion remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration of its class certification decision after Wal-Mart v. Dukes.

The plaintiffs apparently sought a rehearing. The Court issued an amended opinion instead.  The Court softened some of its language in the first opinion.  For example, it removed this line, quoted from its own precedent, addressing the plaintiffs' burden of proof on a motion for class certification:

Plaintiffs must show “significant proof that [CDN] operated under a general policy of [violating California labor laws].” Ellis, 657 F.3d at 983 (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553 (alteration omitted)).

The Court in the first opinion foreclosed class certification for injunctive relief Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23(b)(2)

Further, it appears that none of the named plaintiffs has standing to pursue injunctive relief on behalf of the class, as none of them is a current CDN employee. See Wang, 623 F.3d at 756. We therefore reverse the district court’s class certification under Rule 23(b)(2).

In the new opinion, the Court opened the door to injunctive relief:

It appears that none of the named  plaintiffs has standing to pursue injunctive relief on behalf of the class, as none of them is a current CDN employee. See Wang, 623 F.3d at 756. However, because the Rule 23(b)(2) class was certified by the district court while they were current employees, the class certification with respect to injunctive relief may survive if there are identifiable class members who are still employed by CDN.

The Court's new opinion also deletes the section of the prior opinion called "Damages."  In the first opinion the Court wrote this, which could have been helpful to defense lawyers in class action cases:

in Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court disapproved what it called “Trial by Formula,” wherein damages are determined for a sample set of class members and then applied by extrapolation to the rest of the class “without further individualized proceedings.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561. Employers are “entitled to individualized determinations of each employee’s eligibility” for monetary relief. Id. at 2560. Employers are also entitled to litigate any individual affirmative defenses they may have to class members’ claims. Id. at 2561. 

Poof. That language is gone from the amended opinion. The Court mentions in the new opinion that it expresses no opinion regarding damages.
The case is Wang v. Chinese Daily News and the amended opinion is here. 

Court of Appeal: No Duty to Pay for Defendant Employee's Choice of Lawyer

Several years ago, a radio station conducted a contest that involved consuming water. The one who "held it in" the longest would win a prize.  Unfortunately, one contestant died from drinking too much.

Anyway, the contestant's representative sued the radio station as well as Matt Carter, an individual who helped with the contest.  Carter hired a lawyer and tendered his defense to his  employer's insurance company. The insurance company appointed its own defense counsel to represent Carter.  ]
Carter refused to change lawyers and sued his employer for indemnification under Labor Code Section 2802. Carter sought over $800,000 in attorney's fees for his attorneys' representation.

The insurance company settled with the plaintiff on behalf of all individuals.  The plaintiff recovered millions against the radio station.

Carter's indemnity claim went to trial to the court. The court decided that Carter's attorney's fees were not covered under Labor Code Section 2802, except for about $1980 he spent before the insurance company offered counsel.

The Court of Appeal clarified what Labor Code Section 2802 requires employers to do when individual employees are sued for actions undertaken within the course and scope of employment:

Subdivision (a) of section 2802 provides that “[a]n employer shall indemnify his  or her employee for all necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the employee in direct consequence of the discharge of his or her duties, or of his or her obedience to the directions of the employer, even though unlawful, unless the employee, at the time of obeying the directions, believed them to be unlawful.”
***
As the court explained in Grissom v. Vons Companies,  Inc. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 52, “Section 2802 does not say that an employer must ‘defend’ an employee. The word ‘defend’ does not appear in section 2802. The statute merely requires the employer to indemnify the employee for all that the employee necessarily expends in direct consequence of the discharge of the employee’s duties. The focus of the actual words of the statute is on the employee’s expenditure. If that expenditure is necessarily in direct consequence of the discharge of the employee’s duties, then the employer must ‘indemnify’ (i.e., reimburse) the employee.” (Grissom, at pp. 57-58, fn. omitted; see also Cassady v. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 220, 236 [“Section 2802 does not impose a duty to defend upon an employer”].)

The Court emphasized that an employer that does not offer to pay for counsel up front will be responsible for necessary expenses the employee incurs.  In this case, though, the employer did make that offer.

The Court rejected Carter's claim that he had a "right" to choose his own counsel.  True enough, said the court. In fact, Carter did so. The issue here, though, was whether the employer had to pay for that right.  The Court of Appeal also rejected Carter's argument that the insurance company's lawyer was insufficient because of the potential for punitive damages liability or criminal charges against Carter.

So, employers (and their carriers) may appoint a lawyer to defend an employee involved in employment litigation.  It may be that conflicts of interest or competence issues will cause disputes between employees and employers over whether the appointment is adequate to conduct the defense.  If representation is not adequate, employees likely can request different counsel or seek their own and argue that the related expense is "necessary."

This case is Carter v. Entercom Sacramento LLC and the opinion is here.

Half a SLAPP Still Hurts

Jessica Chang sued her former employer and an individual named Howard Cho for sexual harassment.  Cho counter-sued Chang for IIED and defamation.

Chang believed Cho filed his cross-claim in retaliation for her own.  She filed a motion to strike Cho's cross-claim as a "SLAPP" or Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation.

Cho in part claimed that Chang's discrimination charges filed at the EEOC/DFEH were defamatory.  But Cho also based his cross-claim for defamation in part on statements Chang made to co-workers and a written report she submitted accusing Cho of harassment.  So, the court had different types of conduct to sort through.

Each of the two causes of action in Cho's cross-complaint, defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, is based on three separate and discrete alleged activities by Chang: (1) Chang‟s discrimination claim filed with the EEOC and DFEH; (2) her written report to Midway management; and (3) her verbal comments to co-workers regarding the November and December incidents.

Cho argued that Chang's statements to other employees about his alleged harassment were not "protected" by either the litigation privilege or the anti-SLAPP provisions.  Therefore, Chang could be sued for slander.   The trial court agreed with Cho, as did the Court of Appeal.

Chang submitted no evidence that her comments to Lee or to other co-workers were made to seek the assistance of any other person as a witness or as a person with an interest in the action. While Chang argues such a rationale, and presumably could have offered evidence to support it, she offered none. Absent such a showing, we agree with the trial court's finding that Chang‟s comments to co-workers were not “in connection with” the issues in her subsequent lawsuit against Cho and, therefore, are not protected activity pursuant to section 425.16.

So, this means that if Chang had demonstrated a closer connection between her formal complaints and her discussions with co-workers, the communications might have been protected.  Because she did not do so, Cho's cross-claim against her could proceed.   Therefore, if this case stands, individual defendants in some cases may get away with cross-claims against plaintiffs who accuse them of sexual harassment.  This does not mean individuals should do so. There is a risk that they will be viewed as vengeful or motivated to deny bad conduct to win the cross-claim.

The trial court and the Court of Appeal had little trouble finding that the administrative charges themselves were covered by the anti-SLAPP statute, as was the letter that Chang wrote to management to complain about sexual harassment.  

The internal complaint was covered because as the court put it: "Where the protected activity is a complaint to management or a government agency, or a lawsuit concerning workplace sexual harassment, it must have a demonstrated nexus with that activity, such as an effort to find witnesses to the same or similar conduct."

So the Court of Appeal decided the anti-SLAPP law barred part of Cho's claims for defamation and IIED. Did that mean the entire cause of action should be struck?  No.  The Court decided that the trial court may stike portions of a claim, and is not required to let the whole case continue.  

Then the Court turned to Chang's request for attorneys' fees, since she prevailed on her motion.  Although the winner of an anti-SLAPP motion is entitled to fees, the trial court denied Chang's claim for them, because she had not "accomplished" enough by striking part of Cho's cross-complaint.  The Court of Appeal allowed this ruling to stand.

This ruling encourages anti-SLAPP motions directed to portions of a cause of action, but then creates a disincentive by denying attorney's fees.  We will see if the parties attempt California Supreme Court review.

This decision is Cho v. Chang and the opinion is here. 

California Court of Appeal: Applying New Post-Harris v. L.A. Standard in FEHA Discrimination Cases

Alamo worked for a small company called PMIC as a collections clerk. She took pregnancy leave.  PMIC hired a pregnant temp to replace her during the leave.  The temp, named Moran, intended to stop working once Alamo returned.

Stop me if you've heard this before. While Alamo was on leave, her manager discovered performance problems with Alamo's work, including problems that cost the Company money.  And - again stop me - the manager had noticed performance problems before the leave, but had not disciplined Alamo previously.

So, Alamo is getting ready to come back to work. She comes into the office one day to have lunch with a co-worker.  She runs into Moran and gets into a heated argument about Moran's alleged treatment of Alamo's co-worker (with whom she had just had lunch).  Moran tells Alamo she's about to be fired.  Sure enough, when Alamo returned, she was fired for poor performance and insubordination.

Alamo sued for pregnancy discrimination. After trial, a jury awarded her $10,000.00 in compensatory damages, and 0 for punitive damages.  The court awarded about $50K in attorney's fees.

PMIC appealed.  It argued that the court should have instructed the jury that the plaintiff has to prove discrimination was a "substantial motivating reason" for the termination, rather than just "a motivating reason."  PMIC also argued that it was entitled to put on evidence of a "mixed motive" defense,
following Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203 (discussed here).

The Court of Appeal ageed that PMIC was entitled to an instruction that says discrimination must be a "substantial" motivating reason. The form civil jury instructions ("CACI") have been amended to incorporate Harris.  Practitioners should ensure they have the most current version of the instructions.

But PMIC was not so lucky on the mixed motive defense. PMIC offered a defective mixed motive instruction that was not a proper statement of the law. And the Court also found that "mixed motive" is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded in the defendant's answer.  Therefore, employers seeking to limit damages with the mixed motive defense must plead it or amend their answers.

Frankly, I don't know why the employer lost, or why it wanted a "mixed motive" defense.  There was scant evidence of discrimination described in the court of appeal's opinion.   Alamo argued that this was not a mixed motive case at all, and I think I agree with her.  We shall see if the employer can assert the mixed motive defense without admitting there is evidence of a discriminatory and non-discriminatory motive for taking action.

This case is Alamo v. Practice Management Information Corp. and the opinion is here.

WebRep

currentVote

noRating

noWeight

Court of Appeal: Exhaust Administrative Remedies Before Filing Whistleblower Claims under Labor Code Section 1102.5

Everyone's suing for retaliation lately.  Labor Code Section 1102.5 provides an expansive vehicle for doing so.  You don't have to complain to the government; internal complaints are covered. And you don't have to be correct in your assessment that there's a legal violation; you merely have to have a reasonable / good faith belief in what you're saying.   Here's a new wrinkle that will affect these claims (if this decision remains on the books and is not depublished or taken up for review by the California Supreme Court.)

So, Aaron MacDonald worked for the California State Assembly.  He complained to supervisors that co-workers were smoking in violation of statutes regulating smoking in the workplace (or within 20 feet of the entrance to a public building).  Not sure where the employee was smoking.

Anyway, two weeks after complaining, MacDonald was fired. He sued, claiming retaliation under Section 1102.5 and Section 6310 of the Labor Code, both of which prohibit retaliation against employees who make complaints about workplace safety.

The Assembly demurred and won, claiming MacDonald did not exhaust administrative remedies by filing with the Labor Commissioner.  The employee appealed, arguing he did not have to exhaust.

So, per the Court of Appeal, Labor Code Section 98.7 says:

“Any person who believes that he or she has been discharged or otherwise discriminated against in violation of any law under the jurisdiction of the Labor Commissioner may file a complaint with the division within six months after the occurrence of the violation.”3 Section 98.7 outlines a process of investigation and decision by the Labor Commissioner. (Id., subds. (b)-(e).) Subdivision (f) of that section states: “The rights and remedies provided by this section do not preclude an employee from pursuing any other rights and remedies under any other law.” (Id., subd. (f).) Moreover, section 6312 provides: “Any employee who believes that he or she has been discharged or otherwise discriminated against by any person in violation of Section 6310 or 6311 may file a complaint with the Labor Commissioner pursuant to Section 98.7.”

Because Sections 1102.5 and 6310 are "laws under the jurisdiction of the Labor Commissioner," the Court of Appeal held that Section 98.7 was applicable.  The Court then held:

Although sections 1102.5 and 6310 are silent regarding administrative remedies, section 98.7, subdivision (a), provides in pertinent part: “Any person who believes that he or she has been discharged or otherwise discriminated against in violation of any law under the jurisdiction of the Labor Commissioner may file a complaint with the division within six months after the occurrence of the violation.”3 Section 98.7 outlines a process of investigation and decision by the Labor Commissioner. (Id., subds. (b)-(e).) Subdivision (f) of that section states: “The rights and remedies provided by this section do not preclude an employee from pursuing any other rights and remedies under any other law.” (Id., subd. (f).) Moreover, section 6312 provides: “Any employee who believes that he or she has been discharged or otherwise discriminated against by any person in violation of Section 6310 or 6311 may file a complaint with the Labor Commissioner pursuant to Section 98.7.”

The Court relied on Campbell v. Regents of University of California (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311, in which the California Supreme Court reaffirmed (albeit in another context) that when the Legislature provides an administrative remedy, an employee must exhaust it.

A few notes of caution:

1. This decision creates a split with Lloyd v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 320.  There, the Court held a plaintiff was not required to exhaust.  The Court here disagreed with Lloyd. So, the California Supreme Court may get involved and nullify this decision pending review.
2. The statute of limitations for filing a charge with the Labor Commissioner is 6 months.  So, if this case stays on the books, it could kill a bunch of statutory causes of action.  
3. The Legislature may overrule this case, although that would be supremely ironic, given the Assembly (acting as an employer) won this case.    
4. This case does not affect common law claims for "wrongful termination in violation of public policy."  This was a public-sector case and no such claim was available to the plaintiff here. 

This decision is MacDonald v.  California and the opinion is here.

Court of Appeal: Some Wage Claims Tolled; Some Time Barred and More

This case is the poster child for needless litigation over a pretty simple issue, which was a loser for the employer from the jump. (And I say that in the most respectful way).

Harold Bain worked for Tax Reducers, Inc. (TRI) and its predecessor as a tax preparation consultant. He also performed other duties.  It's pretty clear from the facts that he was an employee, not an independent contractor. So, that part of the case is not breaking new ground.  However, the court of appeal allowed the trial court to consider a "presumption" of employee status, because the trial court also underwent the normal analysis of independent contractor. The evidence was overwhelmingly in favor of employee status, presumption or no.

After TRI bought the predecessor, Bain got into a dispute with the new owner of TRI about his compensation.  He worked for TRI for just seven weeks or so, but with the predecessor for several years.  However, because of the dispute, TRI didn't pay Bain at all for his seven weeks of work.

Bain filed a claim with the Labor Commissioner at the DLSE.  TRI argued that Bain was an independent contractor, but even if he wasn't, there was no agreed upon rate. As a result, TRI argued, Bain should recover only minimum wage.  Bain sought the $1100 per week he was earning before the take-over.  And that's what the DLSE awarded him, plus waiting time and interest, for about $15K.

When in a hole, stop digging?  Nah. TRI appealed the DLSE's ruling.  The parties then reached a settlement for the wages and interest, plus some attorney's fees, but no waiting time penalties.  The deal fell through when the parties could not agree on the scope of the release.

The court then re-set the case for trial.  The parties then settled again for $17,700, higher than the DLSE's award.  The settlement was supposed to include releases, but the parties again could not agree on the language, or even who was to prepare them.

Massive amounts of litigation ensued over the breached settlement agreement, including discovery motions, demurrers, summary judgment motions, anti-SLAPP motions, an appeal, too.  Bain even named TRI's president, Griffin, as an individual defendant, which typically is a no-go in a wage claim.
Guess who ended up getting rich here?  (Not Bain's lawyer; stay tuned).

The trial court conducted a four-day bench trial, after which it awarded Bain just over $25,000 plus attorney's fees on the wage claims.  (Bain had a choice of electing recovery on the breach of settlement agreement or recovery on the wage claims. He chose wisely, because the latter includes an award of attorney's fees).  How much attorney's fees did Bain seek?  Bain sought over $400,000 in fees, including a 1.5 multiplier.

Unfortunately for Bain's lawyer, he filed the motion for attorney's fees late and received nothing from the trial court, and nothing from the court of appeal, either.  I believe this clip from Willie Wonka captures the court's holding well.

TRI President Griffin, though, successfully obtained an award of fees for his individual claim, but only for $4225 (the fees for his summary judgment motion).  Continuing his losing streak, the court of appeal reversed Griffin's award, because he sought fees under the wrong statute (Lab. Code Section 218.5).  Because Bain won under the unpaid minimum wage law, the right statute is a one-way law that awards fees to employees only.  See, supra, Willie Wonka clip.  218.5 is becoming a one-way statute next year, so no one will make that mistake again.  Sigh.

Annnywayyyyyy, now that the discussion of litigation excess is over, here's the wage-hour issue that the court decided.

First, the Court set out the relevant statutes of limitations in wage claims:

1. Final pay - 3 years per Labor Code Section 201 and Code of Civil Procedure 338(a).
2. Waiting time - runs with the limitations period of the underlying wages sought - here 3 years, per Labor Code Section 203.
3. Liquidated damages for failing to pay minimum wage per Labor Code 1194.2 - one year per  Code of Civil Procedure 340(a).

Second, the Court had to decide whether Bain's claims were untimely.  He left on February 18, 2005, but did not sue until May of 2008.  That's more than three years and could have time-barred all his claims.

But the Court held that Bain's filing his DLSE claim "tolled" or suspended the statute of limitations. during the period is pursued his DLSE claim until the first DLSE proceeding was final. Once that time was added to the Bain's claims were timely, except for the 1194.2 liquidated damages penalty.  The court held the "equitable tolling" doctrine applied even though Bain was not required to go to the DLSE in the first place.  This decision, therefore, could extend limitations period in wage cases that involve administrative proceedings followed by litigation.

Even the tolled claims did not save the liquidated damages penalty, which was subject to the one-year statute. The court held that claim was barred and deduced those penalties.

So, Bain won about $18,000 bucks plus more interest... his lawyer lost out on at least $200K in fees.  And who knows how much TRI spent to obtain its lousy result.  Just sayin'.

This case is Bain v. Tax Reducers, Inc. and the decision is here.

New California Law re Attorney's Fees in Wage Cases

Governor Jerry Brown signed SB 462 (here). This law amends Labor Code Section 218.5, which allows attorney's fees to be awarded to the prevailing party in lawsuits over unpaid wages, fringe benefits, or pension fund contributions.  The law previously permitted either the employee or employer to seek attorney's fees as the prevailing party. The revised statute authorizes attorney's fees to employers (or any other party that is not the "employee") only if the court determines the lawsuit was brought in "bad faith."   So, employers, say goodbye to attorney's fees in wage cases.

Ninth Circuit: Public Sector Independent Contractor Has No Property Interest and No Section 1983 Claim

42 U.S.C. Section 1983 allows public sector workers to challenge certain government employer action against public sector workers. The law permits state employees to challenge deprivations of due process or equal protection that amount to violations of the constitution.  But to use Section 1983, the employee must demonstrate a property right or liberty interest that the government employer deprived.  Many civil service workers are employed under conditions that virtually guarantee them a job that cannot end without sufficient cause.  Section 1983 lawsuits involving employment actions often are predicated on that sort of employment relationship.

The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in Blantz v. California Dept. of Corr. and Rehab. considered Blantz's claim that the 14th Amendment protected her engagement as an independent contractor.  Here are the facts as stated by the court:

In July 2006, Blantz entered into a written agreement with Newport Oncology and Healthcare, Inc. (NOAH) to work as a nurse practitioner for the CDCR. The CDCR contracts with NOAH to identify available healthcare professionals and refer them to the CDCR to work in medical facilities owned by the CDCR throughout California. Blantz agreed with NOAH to provide medical services to the CDCR as an independent contractor. Pursuant to the agreement, Blantz’s wages would be paid by NOAH, not by the CDCR.

The CDCR ended the engagement without explanation.  Blantz then tried to obtain a new job with CDCR, but her references did not pan out.  So, she sued CDCR and officials under Section 1983, claiming that her independent contractor arrangement could not be ended without due process (e.g., a hearing and notice of the reasons etc.).

Blantz claimed that CDCR conferred a property right to her independent contractor arrangement by documents that CDCR gave her at orientation. But CDCR's contract with NOAH said CDCR could request her removal essentially at will.

The district court dismissed her case, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.  The court would not decide whether an independent contractor - rather than an employee - could every have a 14th amendment interest in due process related to her engagement.  The court explained why Blantz's claim failed:

We hold that a state agency does not create constitutionally protected property interests for its independent contractors simply by instituting performance review procedures. Even assuming independent contractors can ever have constitutionally protected property interests in their positions, something more is required: either an affirmative grant of tenure or a guarantee from the government that termination can occur only for cause. Absent such assurances, there is no cognizable basis for an independent contractor to assert an entitlement to her continued position that is constitutionally protected. Because Blantz’s orientation documents did not contain such assurances, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Blantz’s federal deprivation of property claim.

The court then rejected Blantz's claim that a poor reference deprived her of "liberty" when she was unable to obtain a new position with CDCR. 

the defendants here are not alleged to have precluded Blantz from all government employment, only employment with the CDCR. Blantz allegedly has been barred from employment with one division of the state government; but she is free to seek other nursing positions with the state. Thus, she has not alleged an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty.  See Llamas, 238 F.3d at 1128 (holding that the government had not deprived plaintiff of liberty when plaintiff was barred from future employment with one community college district, but was  free to pursue employment elsewhere).

This case is Blantz v. California Dept. of Corr. and Rehab. and the opinion is here.

 

Court of Appeal: No Post-Lawsuit Change to Arbitration Policy

The court of appeal's decision in  Avery v. Integrated Healthcare Holdings Inc. contains a number of lessons about administering policies and litigating.   So, yes, it's another arbitration decision, but more interesting.

First, Tenet owned some hospitals that it later sold to Integrated. Tenet had in place a “Fair Treatment Process,” which included arbitration.  Applicants and employees signed off on this process at a number of different points in their employment relationship. Integrated maintained the arbitration program after the purchase, but made some changes and called it the Alternative Dispute Resolution Process. 

Avery brought a class action for unfair competition, failure to pay appropriate overtime wages, failure to provide meal and rest periods, failure to pay wages when due, and failure to provide accurate wage statements. 

While the lawsuit was pending, Integrated unilaterally changed the arbitration clause by adding a class arbitration waiver.  Integrated posted the change on its intranet page.  But it did not provide employees with a copy of the new employee handbook containing the arbitration provision change, instruct employees to review the new handbook on the intranet, or even notify employees of the existence of the new handbook.

Integrated tried to compel arbitration of each individual plaintiff's claim. The trial court denied its motion to compel. The Court of Appeal affirmed.

The court made two important decisions.  First, the court held that Integrated's class action waiver was unenforceable, but not because of the ongoing war about class action waivers.  Rather, the court held that it was invalid because it was issued after the claims arose, and Integrated failed to notify employees about the new employee handbook. As a result, Integrated was required to rely on the arbitration clause in the Tenet Employee Handbook, the Fair Treatment Process.

 

an employer may not make unilateral changes to an arbitration agreement that apply retroactively to “accrued or known” claims because doing so would unreasonably interfere with the employee’s expectations regarding how the agreement applied to those claims.  (Peleg v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1465 (Peleg).)  Similarly, the employer must give the employee reasonable notice regarding changes the employer makes so the employee is aware of his or her rights under the agreement.  (Serpa v. California Surety Investigations, Inc. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 695, 706-708 (Serpa).)  Both of these rules prevent Integrated from applying the Alternative Dispute Resolution Process to Plaintiffs’ claims.

Of note, although there are cases disfavoring "policy" based arbitration provisions, the court emphasized that it is ok to have an arbitration agreement in a policy, and even to make changes. But those changes have to be prospective in application only, and the employer must ensure the employees receive reasonable and actual notice of the changes.

Second, the court decided that the trial court correctly denied the motion to compel arbitration, even under the Tenet policy.  Why?  Because the Integrated could not prove that employees had agreed to the Fair Treatment Process that it attached to its motion.  So, the employees signed off on the application and other forms stating they had received the Fair Treatment Process, but there was evidence that there was more than one of those in existence.  The court had no way of knowing if the Fair Treatment Process that was attached to the motion was the one employees agreed to.

Integrated contends the trial court erred in denying its motions to compel arbitration because Plaintiffs each agreed to arbitrate their claims under the Fair Treatment Process set forth in the Tenet Employee Handbook. According to Integrated, the Employee Acknowledgment Form, Application for Employment, and Transition Letter Plaintiffs signed incorporated the Fair Treatment Process and established its binding arbitration provisions as the exclusive means for resolving all claims regarding Plaintiffs’ employment. Although we agree Plaintiffs (except Cade) generally agreed to a Fair Treatment Process by signing one or more of these documents, we nonetheless affirm the trial court’s order denying the motions to compel arbitration because Integrated failed to present sufficient evidence establishing the specific Fair Treatment Process it presented to the trial court was the Fair Treatment Process to which Plaintiffs agreed.

The lesson here?  Ensure that there is a way of identifying handbooks and other documents (such as a control number, version, etc.).  In this case, the application and other documents "incorporated by reference" the full text of the Fair Treatment Process, but there was no way of knowing which version the employee agreed to.  It is critical to have a way of matching the receipt to the policy document.

This case is Avery v. Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc. and the opinion is here.

Court of Appeal: Volunteer Reserve Cop Has No Discrimination Claim

L.A. has a corps of volunteer, reservist police in addition to the regular police force.  They grant these volunteers workers' compensation benefits and a $50 per shift expense reimbursement, but no salary. 

Frank Estrada was a volunteer for some 17 years.  The police force ended his engagement after he was investigated for some misconduct related to his regular job.  

He sued for disability discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act.  The court had to decide whether Estrada was an "employee."   (Only applicants/employees can sue under FEHA for disability discrimination).

Agreeing with the trial court, the Court of Appeal said that Estrada was not an employee.  The city did not "appoint" him to an employee position.  That the city chose to extend workers' compensation benefits to its volunteers was a policy decision, the court said.  Here is the punchline:

Estrada was a volunteer who served without remuneration. He was appointed to a volunteer position, rather than to a position in the classified civil service. Accordingly, Estrada was not an employee of the City. (Board Civil Service Rules,§ 1.17.) Therefore, Estrada is incapable of maintaining a cause of action against the City for disability discrimination pursuant to the FEHA.

So, employers may be able to argue that it is possible to cover volunteers with workers' compensation insurance and yet maintain non-employee, volunteer status. But, this case was decided in great part based on Los Angeles' status as a charter city.  So, a private sector employer could come out with a different result. Be careful.

This case is Estrada v. City of Los Angeles and the opinion is here.

Court of Appeal: Statute of Limitations Bars Claims Based on Stale Administrative Charges

When an employee files a series of discrimination charges with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing, may she wait to sue until years later, even if she received "right to sue" letters long before she filed her lawsuit? No.

Esperanza Acuna was employed with San Diego Gas and Electric.  Over a course of several years, she claimed harassment and discrimination by a supervisor, and failure to accommodate  a work-related stress disability.   The court of appeal set out this timeline:

On March 16, 2006, Acuna filed her first DFEH complaint, alleging racial discrimination and harassment, and retaliation for having filed a worker's compensation claim. On March 27, 2006, the DFEH issued a right to sue notice on this first DFEH complaint.

On February 23, 2007, Acuna filed her second DFEH complaint, alleging disability discrimination (failure to accommodate her claimed disability). On February 19, 2008, the DFEH filed a right-to-sue notice on this second DFEH complaint.

On July 11, 2008, SDG&E terminated Acuna's employment.

On October 23, 2008, Acuna filed her third DFEH administrative complaint, alleging various wrongful acts, including her alleged retaliatory termination. On November 7, 2008, the DFEH issued a right-to-sue letter based on this third DFEH complaint.

On November 5, 2009, Acuna filed her lawsuit.

The Court of Appeal decided the statute of limitations barred any claims based on the first two DFEH complaints.  She had until March 2007 to file a lawsuit based on the first charge; she did not.  She had until February 19, 2009 to file the lawsuit based on the second "right to sue" notice.  But she did not file until November 5, 2009.

The Court rejected Acuna's attempt to argue that the "continuing violation" doctrine saved her claims based on the first two "right to sue" letters:

As discussed above, in California the continuing violations doctrine applies to toll section 12960's one-year period for filing a DFEH claim during the time the employee and employer are engaged in informal efforts to resolve the employer's claimed wrongful conduct. (Richards, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 822-823.) The California Supreme Court held this tolling period ends when the employer's determination achieves a level of permanence, i.e., when a reasonable employee would understand that "further efforts to end the unlawful conduct will be in vain." (Id. at p. 823.)

Acuna's allegations establish that a reasonable person would have understood that SDG&E had denied her requests for accommodation no later than February 2007. According to Acuna's allegations, beginning in late 2005, SDG&E repeatedly declined to permit Acuna to return to her job and refused to permit her to work for a supervisor other than Valentine. In response to this conduct, Acuna retained counsel and filed a DFEH complaint. After SDG&E continued to refuse to accommodate her claimed disability, Acuna filed her second DFEH complaint in February 2007. In this complaint, Acuna specifically alleged that SDG&E was refusing to accommodate her disability. By retaining counsel and filing a DFEH complaint, Acuna manifested an understanding that further attempts at informal, rather than formal, resolution of the disability accommodation process would not be successful and were futile. Under these circumstances, the continuing violations doctrine is inapplicable.

The Court also held that the doctrine of "equitable tolling" did not save her stale claims either. 

The equitable tolling doctrine generally requires a showing that the plaintiff is seeking an alternate remedy in an established procedural context. (See McDonald, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 102-104; Schifando v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1082.) Informal negotiations or discussions between an employer and employee do not toll a statute of limitations under the equitable tolling doctrine. (See 65 Butterfield v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1063.) Acuna does not allege any facts showing she was pursuing an alternate remedy that excused her from timely filing her administrative claim and/or from filing her lawsuit.

Moreover, the equitable tolling doctrine is inapplicable once the employee is on notice that his or her rights had been violated and that her alternate remedies will be unsuccessful. (Richards, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 814.) As discussed above, Acuna acknowledged that by February 2007 she understood that SDG&E was refusing to accommodate her disability and was not interested in informally resolving her claims.

So, the Court held that Ms. Acuna can proceed on her timely claims for wrongful termination and her FEHA-based retaliation claim concerning her discharge.

The case is Acuna v. San Diego Gas & Elec. and the opinion is here.

Court of Appeal: Nail Salon Independent Contractors

Happy Nails owns a number of nail salons.  Their workers were independent contractors.  The EDD sought to classify them as employees and lost before the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board.

The Division of Labor Standards Enforcement was not convinced and instituted proceedings against Happy Nails for not providing itemized wage statements, predicated on the theory that the cosmetologists were really employees.   Happy Nails argued that it already had litigated this issue and that the DLSE should not proceed based on the legal principle known as collateral estoppel.
The DLSE hearing officer ignored Happy's arguments and the prior decisions and held that the workers were employees.

Happy Nails sued the DLSE, claiming violation of due process, and seeking a writ of administrative mandate overturning the DLSE's findings.  The superior court denied Happy's motion for summary judgment on this claim and denied the writ.

The Court of Appeal decided that the trial court should have issued the writ and precluded re-litigation of the independent contractor question, based on collateral estoppel:

For an issue to be precluded from relitigation, the following requirements must be satisfied: (1) the issue must be identical to an issue decided in a prior proceeding; (2) the issue must have been actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the issue must have been necessarily decided in the prior proceeding; (4) the decision in the prior proceeding must be final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom preclusion is sought must have been a party to or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. (People v. Garcia (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1070, 1077; Castillo v. City of Los Angeles (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 477, 481 (Castillo).) As we explain below, each requirement is satisfied in this case.

The court analyzed each factor and decided that Happy Nails established them.  Therefore, the DLSE should have respected the UIAB's decision.

Although this is a procedure-based decision, there is some interesting law discussed in the opinion.  For example, the DLSE argued that the Happy Nails cosmetologists were once classified as employees until the company restructured its relationship with them.  Therefore, the DLSE argued, they could not be re-classified as contractors.  Not so, said the court:

The law[] does not require private parties to share the Commissioner's "once an employee, always an employee" mindset. Rather, private parties are free to change the nature of their business relationship in accordance with the "long-standing established public policy in California which respects and promotes the freedom of private parties to contract" (Brisbane Lodging, L.P. v. Webcor Builders, Inc. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1262) and which allows them "the widest latitude in this regard" (Stephens v. Southern Pacific Co. (1895) 109 Cal. 86, 89). Our adoption of the position advocated by the Commissioner's counsel at oral argument would effectively nullify the Board's determination and would impermissibly deny Happy Nails and the cosmetologists "their freedom to contract as they please" (Rosen v. State Farm General Ins. Co. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1070, 1080), which they exercised by restructuring their business relationship.

It also bears noting that this decision holds that different government agencies are considered the same for collateral estoppel purposes when their interests are similar.  Here, the Employment Development Department and DLSE share the common purpose of protecting workers from mis-classification.

Finally, the court sent the case back to the trial court so that it could consider Happy's request for an injunction against the DLSE, prohibiting future claims unless it showed there was a material change, and for attorney's fees.

The case is Happy Nails and Spa of Fashion Valley L.P. v. Su and the opinion is here.

Court of Appeal: On-Call and Sleep Time

CPS guards construction sites.  Some of the security guard employees sleep in on-site trailers.  CPS compensated them for the time they were required to investigate potential problems at the sites, such as break ins.  Otherwise, the employees were considered "on call," but were uncompensated.

On weekday shifts, employees actively worked 8 hours and were "on-call" for eight hours.  On weekends, employees worked 16 hours and were "on call" for eight.  During weekday periods when the construction crews were working, the live-in employees were free to do as they pleased, leave the facility, etc.

The employees who lived in trailers could keep personal items and could have visitors as the client permitted. But families were not permitted to live within the trailers. The trailers were basically small, self-contained, mobile apartments with cleaning facilities, etc.

The live-in employees signed on-call agreements, which provided for circumstances under which the employees could leave the trailers during on-call time:

if a trailer guard wished to leave the jobsite during on-call hours, he or she was required to (1) notify a dispatcher, (2) provide information as to where the guard would be and for how long, and (3) wait for the reliever to arrive.6 After leaving the jobsite, the guard was required to remain within a 30-minute radius and carry a pager or radio telephone. If called during that time, the guard was required to respond immediately. The trailer guards were not allowed to leave a jobsite before a reliever arrived. If no reliever was available, CPS had the right to order a trailer guard to remain at the jobsite, even if the trailer guard had an emergency.

The company did not consider on-call time to be hours worked, but paid employees for time they waited for a reliever or were denied a reliever, as well as when they have to investigate alarms or noises.

Employees sued, claiming they should have been paid for all on-call time, not just the time actually working. The parties agreed that Wage Order 4-2001 applied.

The trial court issued a preliminary injunction, ordering CPS to pay for on-call time pending the resolution of the lawsuit. CPS appealed.  Interestingly, one of the class reps lost a DLSE hearing on the same issue.  Additionally, CPS had sought guidance from the DLSE and U.S. DOL, and conformed its practices based on the opinions received.  Nevertheless, the lawsuits continued and the trial court granted summary adjudication in favor of the plaintiff, holding that the employees should be paid for all on-call time.

So, the issue on review was whether the time employees spent in their trailers should count as "hours worked" under Wage Order 4.  "Hours worked" are “the time during which an employee is subject to the control of an employer, and includes all the time the employee is suffered or permitted to work, whether or not required to do so.” 

The court thoroughly reviewed what it means to be subject to the employer's control, and cited this seven-factor test for on-call situations:

In resolving the degree to which employees are able to engage in private pursuits during on-call time, courts generally apply seven factors: “„(1) whether there was an on-premises living requirement; (2) whether there were excessive geographical restrictions on [the] employee‟s movements; (3) whether the frequency of calls was unduly restrictive; (4) whether a fixed time limit for response was unduly restrictive; (5) whether the on-call employee could easily trade on-call responsibilities; (6) whether use of a pager could ease restrictions; and (7) whether the employee had actually engaged in personal activities during call-in time.‟”

Applying this and other legal principles discussed in the opinion, the court concluded that the weekday on call time should have been paid as hours worked:

By their presence on site during the on-call hours, the guards perform an important function for their employer and its clients: they deter theft and vandalism. CPS promises its clients security services throughout the night and for 24 hours on Saturday and Sunday, and would be in breach if no security guards were present between 9:00 p.m. and 5:00 a.m. The parties‟ On-Call Agreements designate that period as “free time,” but it is clear from the Agreements and the stipulated facts that trailer guards are not free to leave at will. A guard may leave only when and if a reliever is available. From this, it can reasonably be said that the restrictions on the on-call time are “primarily directed toward the fulfillment of the employer‟s requirements,” and the guards are “substantially restricted” in their ability to engage in private pursuits.



* * *


They are required to live on the jobsite. They are expected to respond immediately, in uniform, when an alarm sounds or they hear suspicious noise or activity. During the relevant hours, they are geographically limited to the trailer and/or the jobsite unless a reliever arrives; even then, they are required to take a pager or radio telephone so they may be called back; and they are required to remain within 30 minutes of the site unless other arrangements have been made. They may not easily trade their responsibilities, but can only call for a reliever and hope one will be found.24

Most important, the trailer guards do not enjoy the normal freedoms of a typical off-duty worker, as they are forbidden to have children, pets or alcohol in the trailers and cannot entertain or visit with adult friends or family without special permission. On this record, we conclude the degree of control exercised by the employer compels the conclusion that the trailer guards‟ on-call time falls under the definition of “hours worked” under California law.

However, the court then decided that the on-call time during the weekend, 24-hour shifts was not hours worked. The court relied on decisions holding that employers may deduct 8 hours of sleep time from employees' work time when they are engaged in 24-hour shifts.  The ruled the following standard would apply to 24-hour shifts:

There are sound reasons for permitting an employer who engages an employee to work a 24-hour shift and compensates him or her for 16 of those hours to exclude the remaining eight hours for sleep time, as long as the time is uninterrupted, a comfortable place is provided, and the parties enter into an agreement covering the period. Most employees would be sleeping for a similar period every day, whether on duty or not, and the compensation provided for the other 16 hours, which should generally include considerable overtime, ensures that the employees receive an adequate wage

So, employers seeking to avoid payment for 24-hour "live in" shifts under Wage Order 4 should ensure: there is an agreement to exclude sleep time, there is a comfortable place to sleep, and the sleep time generally is interrupted.  If the sleep period is interrupted, the agreement should provide for compensation for time worked, and for the entire period if there are frequent or considerable interruptions.


The case is Mendiola v. CPS Security Solutions, Inc. and the opinion is here.

U.S. Supreme Court: Retaliation Causation

University of Tex. Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar (opinion here) is the Supreme Court opinion setting forth the "causation" standards that apply to retaliation cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Nassar was a doctor and professor at Univ. of Texas. He also worked at the University's medical center.  He  complained of harassment and discrimination by Dr. Levine. He tried to work only at the hospital to avoid Dr. Levine's harassment at the University. But the University blocked his effort, claiming that University policy required attending doctors also to be professors at the medical school.

So, Nassar sued for retaliation, claiming discrimination / constructive discharge, and retaliation in that the University blocked his hiring at the hospital.  After Nassar won a verdict, the Supreme Court accepted review to determine whether the retaliation claim was decided under the correct "causation" framework.

The Court decided that in Title VII cases, the causation standard is "but for," which means that the employer would not have taken negative action against the employee "but for" the employee's engaging in protected activity. Put another way, the harm would not have occurred if the employee had not complained.

Along the way, the Supreme Court majority explained the causation standard that applies to Title VII discrimination cases.  This is known as the "motivating factor" standard:

An employee who alleges status-based discrimination under Title VII need not show that the causal link between injury and wrong is so close that the injury would not have occurred but for the act. So-called but-for causation is not the test. It suffices instead to show that the motive to discriminate was one of the employer’s motives, even if the employer also had other, lawful motives that were causative in the employer’s decision. This principle is the result of an earlier case from this Court, Price Water­house v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228 (1989), and an ensuing statutory amendment by Congress that codified in part and abrogated in part the holding in Price Waterhouse, see §§2000e–2(m), 2000e–5(g)(2)(B). 

Why the separate standards, you ask?  Because in Title VII, the discrimination provisions are covered by a specific statute, and that statute was amended to include the motivating reason standard.    The anti-retaliation section is in another part of Title VII.  So, what the Court really decided was that the 1991 amendment to Title VII's causation provision did not apply to the retaliation piece. 

It remains to be seen whether this decision will influence California courts' interpretation of the causation standard. Earlier this year, the California Supreme Court examined causation standards in "mixed motive" cases (discussed here). We will see what the lower courts do with Nassar in the coming months. 

DGV

 

US Supreme Court: Who Is a Supervisor for Determining Title VII Liability Standards?

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the law regards harassment by a supervisor as different from harassment by a co-worker.  The employer is liable for harassment by a co-worker if the employer is negligent: the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take appropriate corrective action.  That is true as well in California under the Fair Employment and Housing Act.

For supervisor harassment, though, the employer is "strictly liable" - regardless of what it knew or should have known, and regardless of what action it takes - if the harassment includes a "tangible employment action" such as firing, demotion, loss of pay.  But if there is no tangible employment action, the employer may escape liability by proving that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent harassment and the harassment victim did not take advantage of the employer's preventive or corrective opportunities.  That is known as the "Faragher-Ellerth" defense.  

Under California law, there is no escape from liability.  Employers are strictly liable for supervisor harassment, regardless of whether there is a tangible employment action. The employer may assert as a defense, though, that the employee's damages should be reduced because of the employee's failure to avail herself of opportunities to avoid the harassment (avoidable consequences defense.)

So, the issue of who is a supervisor matters under both schemes.  California law defines supervisor in its statute (Govt. Code Section 12926(s): "'Supervisor' means any individual having the authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or the responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend that action, if, in connection with the foregoing, the exercise of that authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment."

Title VII does not define supervisor.  Some lower courts said that supervisors had to have the power to take tangible actions like firing, reassignment, etc.  The EEOC said supervisors merely have to have the power to direct the victim's work. Enter the Supreme Court.

Maetta Vance worked for Ball State University as a server in the catering department.  She complained that a co-worker, Saundra Davis, was her supervisor and harassed her over a period of time on the basis of her race.  Davis was a catering specialist, but she had no power to hire, fire, promote, demote, etc. Vance.  The lower courts threw out Vance's harassment claim because they found that Davis was not a supervisor and that Ball State was not negligent.

After reviewing precedent and the different supervisor formulations, the Court 5-4 decided

We hold that an employer may be vicariously liable for an employee’s unlawful harassment only when the employer has empowered that employee to take tangible employment actions against the victim, i.e., to effect a “significant change in employment status, such as hiring,firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Ellerth, supra, at 761. We reject the nebulous definition of a “supervisor” advocated in the EEOC Guidance and substantially adopted by several courts of appeals.

It is unclear whether this decision will affect California law.  As stated above, California has a statutory definition of "supervisor."  In fact, that definition is taken from the National Labor Relations Act, Section 2(11).  And the majority in the Vance case said the NLRA definition was too broad and did not apply to Title VII harassment cases.  So, it appears that California's supervisor definition is broader than  the Court's definition in Vance.

In dissent, Justice Ginsburg, writing for four, argued that the majority's definition is too narrow and that Congress should define supervisor.

This case is Vance v. Ball St. University and the opinion is here.

Supreme Court Upholds Express Class Action Waivers Regardless of Individual Claim's Value

Italian Colors restaurant challenged American Express's fees as violating anti-trust laws by filing a class action. But Colors signed an arbitration clause excluding class claims.   Colors argued that the cost of proving its case would be multiples of whatever it might recover.  Therefore, Colors contended, the class waiver impermissibly interfered with its ability to sue under federal law.  The Second Circuit court of appeals agreed with this premise, citing what is known as the "effective vindication" rule.  Under that rule, courts have held that arbitration agreements are invalid under the Federal Arbitration Act unless they permit "effective vindication" of federal statutory rights.

The Supreme Court, 5-3 with Justice Sotomayor recused, held that Colors is bound by its agreement to arbitrate, regardless of whether it is economically feasible to arbitrate its individual claim.  The majority's point is that Congress did not say in the anti-trust laws that a litigant must be able to bring a class action, or that litigation must be economically feasible.  Nothing in the arbitration agreement precluded or limited Colors' rights under the anti-trust law.  Further, anti-trust lawsuits and the Sherman Act predated the class action device.

The Court wrote:

Respondents argue that requiring them to litigate their claims individually—as they contracted to do—would contravene the policies of the antitrust laws. But the antitrust laws do not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim.

The dissent (penned by Justice Kagan, with Ginsburg and Breyer concurring) essentially wrote that when the cost of bringing a claim under a federal statute significantly outweighs the potential recovery, then a class action right must be preserved as well.  The dissent stated that the majority opinion all but doomed Colors' case by rendering it prohibitively expensive to arbitrate.  Justice Kagan characterized the majority's response to that contention as, "Too darn bad."

This decision addresses class action waivers under federal law, not state law.  However, the majority does not appear to consider it a big difference whether the issue is if the FAA preempts state law or conflicts with federal law:

In dismissing AT&T Mobility [v. Concepcion] as a case involving pre-emption and not the effective-vindication exception, the dissent ignores what that case established—that the FAA’s command to enforce arbitration agreements trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution of low value claims. The latter interest, we said, is “unrelated” to the FAA. 563 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 17). Accordingly, the FAA does, contrary to the dissent’s assertion, see post, at 5, favor the absence of litigation when that is the consequence of a class-action waiver, since its “ ‘principal purpose’ ” is the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms.

This last point undermines the California Supreme Court's focus on "low value" claims (like wage-hour matters) as a factor in determining if a class action waiver is valid.   We are waiting to see what the California high court plans to do with its decision in Gentry v. Superior Court, which the court is reconsidering.

This decision is American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest.  and the opinion is here.

American Medical Association Creates Millions of New "Individuals With Disabilities"

At its June 18, 2013 annual meeting, the American Medical Association decided a new "policy":

Obesity as a Disease 

Today, the AMA adopted policy that recognizes obesity as a disease requiring a range of medical interventions to advance obesity treatment and prevention.
“Recognizing obesity as a disease will help change the way the medical community tackles this complex issue that affects approximately one in three Americans,” said AMA board member Patrice Harris, M.D. “The AMA is committed to improving health outcomes and is working to reduce the incidence of cardiovascular disease and type 2 diabetes, which are often linked to obesity.

The link is here.

Although the effect of this "policy" will have on employment law is unclear, the move could significantly increase ADA / disability discrimination and impose huge new reasonable accommodation obligations on employers. Why? Courts in the past generally have found that obesity in and of itself is not a covered "disability," but its effects (like high blood pressure, type 2 diabetes, heart disease) could be.  (We wrote about this some time ago here.)  If obesity itself is not a disability, the employer would not have a duty to accommodate an obese worker merely because the employee desired adjustments to the work area, for example. It should be noted, though, that some courts more recently have begun to recognize that significantly overweight people might have disabilities or at least be "regarded" as disabled.  The ADA Amendments Act's looser definition of "disability" is making it easier for courts to hold that an employee with nearly any impairment has a disability.

Anyway, if the AMA's recent policy results in more protection for the overweight as "disabled," without a showing of medical complications, then there could be a significant expansion of the duty to accommodate. Employers may have to take into account the obese in office space planning, ergonomics, etc.  What about physical job requirements?  And what of employers who do not hire the obese, or who require / encourage "wellness" plans for the heavyset?  Obese applicants, too, may be able to claim they were not selected due to their disability without any showing that the employer was aware of a latent disability.  

Of course "obesity" is a medical term and does not apply to all overweight people.  And it's too early to know what the AMA's policy statement will mean. But it's worth keeping an eye on this issue and planning for the future.