Showing posts with label dukes. Show all posts
Showing posts with label dukes. Show all posts

Saturday, December 07, 2013

Court of Appeal Reverses Order Decertifying Class

Allstate employs auto insurance field adjusters. They track work  time via a computerized system. The system "assumes" that the arrival at the first job site for the day is the beginning of the work day. Therefore, there is the potential that adjusters performing work for the company before the arrival is "work off the clock."
Among the overtime tasks those adjusters declared they performed outside their eight-hour shifts were (1) logging onto their work computers, (2) downloading their assignments, (3) making courtesy calls to auto repair shops and car owners to confirm appointments, (4) checking their voice mail, and (5) traveling to and from their first and last appointments of the day.
Allstate claimed it had a policy prohibiting work off the clock.  It had a policy requiring approval for overtime.  If an adjuster worked before the start of the day, there was a means to claim the work time.

The Allstate workers filed a class action, in part alleging that Allstate's timekeeping system was illegal because Allstate permitted off the clock work.  The trial court initially granted certification.  After Wal-Mart v. Dukes came out, though, the company filed a motion to "decertify" the class.  The trial court granted decertification, which prompted the plaintiff to appeal.

The Court of Appeal here reversed the trial court and decided that the class should have been certified.  Here are the key points:

-  A motion to "decertify" a previously certified class action can be brought only when there has been a significant change - newly discovered facts or new law.

- On review of a motion to decertify, the court of appeal evaluates the trial court's stated rationale.  If the trial court's stated rationale is wrong, the appellate court will reverse.

- The court will ignore individual issues regarding how to calculate damages for individual employees if there is a common question applicable to all class members regarding liability:

Damage calculations have little, if any, relevance at the certification stage before the trial court and parties have reached the merits of the class claims. At the certification stage, the concern is whether class members have raised a justiciable question applicable to all class members. Although Allstate may have presented evidence that its official policies are lawful, “this showing does not end the inquiry.” (Jimenez, supra, 2012 WL 1366052, *8.) Here, the question is whether Allstate had a practice of not paying adjusters for off-the-clock time. (Ibid.) The answer to that question will apply to the entire class of adjusters. If the answer to that question is “yes” – which is the answer the trial court initially assumed when it first certified the Off-the-Clock class, and is the answer we must presume in reviewing decertification (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1023) – then, in Duke’s phrase, that answer is the “glue” that binds all the class members. (Dukes, supra, 131 S.Ct. at p. 2552 [a class requires the “glue” of a single answer for a question applicable to all class members].) If some adjusters had more uncompensated time off the clock than other adjusters, that difference goes to damages.
- The court's analysis of whether common questions predominate - usually the central issue on a motion for class certification is notable because it is part of a recent trend of holding that the absence of commonality does not preclude a finding of commonality:

Commonality exists when the class claim poses a question for which the answer advances the litigation. As Dukes explained, class “claims must depend upon a common contention . . . . That common contention, moreover, must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution – which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” (Dukes, supra, 131 S.Ct. at p. 2551.) * * *

* * * *
Allstate disputes whether a company-wide practice existed of adjusters working off the clock. According to Allstate, it instructs adjusters not to begin work before they arrive at their first appointment. Allstate asserts that at most “the evidence shows that reactions differed from manager to manager and from employee to employee, purportedly leading some adjusters to work off-the-clock, while others did not.” Allstate also asserts its policy is to pay for all overtime that adjusters work, and indeed, appellant concedes he received overtime pay 70 times.
But the Court of Appeal wasn't hearing it:

We need not, however, address the accuracy of Allstate’s assertions because doing so goes to the merits of the class claims. As our Supreme Court said in Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at page 1024, inquiries into the merits as part of a certification motion are “closely circumscribed.” We instead assume based on the evidence appellant and other adjusters put to the trial court that Allstate had a company-wide practice of adjusters working off-the-clock. (Id. at p. 1023 [court assumes claims have merit].) An unlawful practice may create commonality even if the practice affects class members differently. “[C]lass treatment does not require that all class members have been equally affected by the challenged practices—it suffices that the issue of whether the practice itself was unlawful is common to all.”

So, this means that to defeat class certification, it is necessary to establish through evidence the absence of an unlawful practice. Yet, the court says that the employer's evidence that a practice is not unlawful as to all potential class members is part of the "merits" and, therefore, not part of the certification inquiry. That seems like a rather one-sided ruling, says Captain Obvious.

Anyway, this case is an important warning to employers with timekeeping systems that "assume" that hours worked start at a given time.  Employers should ensure timekeeping systems are not based on automatic punching and allow a worker to clock in or out based on when the work day (or meal breaks) actually starts and stops.

This case is Williams v. Superior Court and the opinion is here.


Saturday, September 14, 2013

9th Circuit Taketh Away in an Amended Opinion

We posted about the Ninth Circuit's post-Wal-Mart v. Dukes decision in Wang v. Chinese Daily News here.   This was an overtime class action involving newspaper employees. The Court of Appeals in the earlier opinion remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration of its class certification decision after Wal-Mart v. Dukes.

The plaintiffs apparently sought a rehearing. The Court issued an amended opinion instead.  The Court softened some of its language in the first opinion.  For example, it removed this line, quoted from its own precedent, addressing the plaintiffs' burden of proof on a motion for class certification:
Plaintiffs must show “significant proof that [CDN] operated under a general policy of [violating California labor laws].” Ellis, 657 F.3d at 983 (quoting Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553 (alteration omitted)).

The Court in the first opinion foreclosed class certification for injunctive relief Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23(b)(2)

Further, it appears that none of the named plaintiffs has standing to pursue injunctive relief on behalf of the class, as none of them is a current CDN employee. See Wang, 623 F.3d at 756. We therefore reverse the district court’s class certification under Rule 23(b)(2).

In the new opinion, the Court opened the door to injunctive relief:

It appears that none of the named  plaintiffs has standing to pursue injunctive relief on behalf of the class, as none of them is a current CDN employee. See Wang, 623 F.3d at 756. However, because the Rule 23(b)(2) class was certified by the district court while they were current employees, the class certification with respect to injunctive relief may survive if there are identifiable class members who are still employed by CDN.

The Court's new opinion also deletes the section of the prior opinion called "Damages."  In the first opinion the Court wrote this, which could have been helpful to defense lawyers in class action cases:
in Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court disapproved what it called “Trial by Formula,” wherein damages are determined for a sample set of class members and then applied by extrapolation to the rest of the class “without further individualized proceedings.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561. Employers are “entitled to individualized determinations of each employee’s eligibility” for monetary relief. Id. at 2560. Employers are also entitled to litigate any individual affirmative defenses they may have to class members’ claims. Id. at 2561. 
Poof. That language is gone from the amended opinion. The Court mentions in the new opinion that it expresses no opinion regarding damages.
The case is Wang v. Chinese Daily News and the amended opinion is here. 



Monday, March 04, 2013

Ninth Circuit: Class Action Erroneously Certified Given Wal-Mart v. Dukes

Back in 2004, employees of the Chinese Daily News started a class action, claiming mis-classification, unpaid overtime and denied meals and breaks.  The trial court eventually certified a class, and the employees won summary judgment on whether reporters for the newspaper qualified under the professional exemption.  The employees won millions of dollars after trial, which the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

Not so fast, said the Supreme Court.  Following the Supreme Court's Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes decision (discussed here), the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision in this case.  The Ninth Circuit decided that Wal-Mart requires reconsideration of the decision and sent it back to the district court.

Why? The trial court did not apply the proper analysis (after Wal-Mart) to determine whether there is sufficient commonality to certify the class.  As explained by the Court:

On remand, the district court must determine whether the  claims of the proposed class “depend upon a common contention . . . of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution — which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.
So, it's not enough that there are "common questions" in the abstract, because, as the Ninth Circuit stated (quoting Wal-Mart and its own later decision in Ellis v. Costco):

"any competently crafted class complaint literally raises common questions.” Wang [sic], 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). “What matters to class certification is not the raising of common questions — even in droves — but, rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Dissimilarities within the proposed class may “impede the generation of common answers.” Id. “If there is no evidence that the entire class was subject to the same allegedly
discriminatory practice, there is no question common to the class.” Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 983 (9th Cir. 2011).

The Ninth Circuit also decided that the district court would have to reconsider whether certification is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).  That rule permits monetary recovery in class action cases when

the court finds that the questions of law or fact  common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual  members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.
First, the district court over-relied on the employer's policies applicable to all employees, but without considering whether issues pertaining to individual claims and defenses would "predominate" over the common policy.  Second, the district court did not have the California Supreme Court's Brinker decision (you've heard of it, right?) to assess whether certification of a meal / rest claim was appropriate. 

Of note, the Ninth Circuit also wrote this, which will likely be of interest to class action litigators:

In Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court disapproved what it called “Trial by Formula,” wherein damages are determined for a sample set of class members and then applied by extrapolation to the rest of the class “without further individualized proceedings.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561. Employers are “entitled to individualized determinations of each employee’s eligibility” for monetary relief. Id. at 2560.
Employers are also entitled to litigate any individual affirmative defenses they may have to class members’ claims. Id. at 2561. 

The case is Wang v. Chinese Daily News and the opinion is here.

Saturday, September 17, 2011

Dukes v. Walmart Fallout

Eveyone knows about the Dukes v. Walmart case (post is here). Well, Ellis v. Costco is another "big box" retailer case, in which female managers challenged Costco's promotion practices.

According to the opinion, Costco does not document or set concrete standards re promotion to General Manager and it always promotes from within the ranks of its AGMs.  Several female Costco employees brought a nationwide class action, claiming Costco's promotion practices discriminated against women.

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of class certification.  The opinion finds many errors with the district court's reasoning, mainly because of Dukes' interpretation of the class action standards in federal court (Rule 23).   For example, the district court failed to conduct a "rigorous analysis" regarding whether a common question of law or fact would affect the entire proposed class's rights to recovery. The court of appeals also held the district court did not consider whether individual circumstances rendered the plaintiffs incapable of proving the "typicality" element.  Costco put forward evidence regarding the named plaintiffs that appeared to explain individualized reasons why each plaintiff did not succeed.

The court of appeals also rejected certification under Rule 23(b), which permits class certification in cases where the relief sought is primarily an injunction rather than damages.  Again, relying on Dukes, the court of appeals noted Walmart precludes certification under Rule 23(b)(2) when each class member would be entitled to an award of money damages. Moreover, former employees cannot bring claims for injunctive relief, as injunctions operate prospectively and former employees will have no stake in them.

There is more. But this case places into focus that Dukes will have a profound effect on large employment law class actions in federal court. It remains to be seen how California courts deal with Dukes, but the state's courts do rely on federal law when evaluating class actions.

The case is Ellis v. Costco and the opinion is here.

Monday, June 20, 2011

Supreme Court Rules on Dukes v. Walmart

The U.S. Supreme Court issues its opinion in Dukes v. Walmart.  Here is the opinion.

Wal-Mart, the country's largest employer, faces the largest employment law class action ever.  We've posted about it a number of times as it made its way through the courts.  The U.S. Supreme Court decided to review the case to see if the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a class action under the facts presented.  

The facts that give rise to the discrimination claims are as follows:

Pay and promotion decisions at Wal-Mart are generally committed to local managers’ broad discretion, which is exercised “in a largely subjective manner.” 222 F. R. D. 137, 145 (ND Cal. 2004). Local store managers may increase the wages of hourly employees (within limits) with only limited corporate oversight. As for salaried employees, such as store managers and their deputies, higher corporate authorities have discretion to set their pay within preestablished ranges. 

Promotions work in a similar fashion. Wal-Mart permits store managers to apply their own subjective criteria when selecting candidates as “support managers,” which isthe first step on the path to management. Admission to Wal-Mart’s management training program, however, does require that a candidate meet certain objective criteria,including an above-average performance rating, at least one year’s tenure in the applicant’s current position, and a willingness to relocate. But except for those requirements, regional and district managers have discretion to use their own judgment when selecting candidates for management training. Promotion to higher office—e.g., assistant manager, co-manager, or store manager—is similarly at the discretion of the employee’s superiors after prescribed objective factors are satisfied.

Thus, there is no "corporate wide" policy of intentional or even unintentional discrimination. Rather, the plaintiffs asserted the following theory regarding class-wide discrimination on behalf of hundreds of thousands of store level employees and supervisors:

local managers’ discretion over pay and promotions is exercised disproportionately in favor of men, leading to anunlawful disparate impact on female employees, see 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(k). And, respondents say, because Wal-Mart is aware of this effect, its refusal to cabin its managers’ authority amounts to disparate treatment, see §2000e–2(a). . . . [T}the discrimination to which they have been subjected is common to all Wal-Mart’s female employees. The basic theory of their case is that a strong and uniform “corporate culture” permits bias against women to infect, perhaps subconsciously, the discretionary decisionmaking of each one of Wal-Mart’s thousands of managers—thereby making every woman at the company the victim of one common discriminatory practice.

The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, monetary relief that is considered "equitable" such as back pay, and punitive damages. They did not seek individual compensatory damages for emotional distress or front pay, because doing so would be unauthorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,  contains a number of requirements.  The plaintiff must satisfy all of the 23(a) provisions:

“(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,“(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, “(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and “(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class”

The Supreme Court held that there was insufficient common law or fact questions.  5-4, the Court explained what "common questions of law or fact" means:

Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members “have suffered the same injury,” Falcon, supra, at 157. This does not mean merely that they have all suffered a violation of the same provision of law. Title VII, for example, can be violated in many ways—by intentional discrimination, or by hiring and promotion criteria that result in disparate impact, and by the use of these practices on the part of many different superiors in a single company. Quite obviously,the mere claim by employees of the same company that they have suffered a Title VII injury, or even a disparate impact Title VII injury, gives no cause to believe that all their claims can productively be litigated at once. Their claims must depend upon a common contention—for example, the assertion of discriminatory bias on the part of the same supervisor. That common contention, moreover, must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwideresolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.
The  Court, 5-4, squarely rejected that a common policy of decentralized decisions can support a class action where the standard requries proof of common issues of fact:

The only corporate policy that the plaintiffs’ evidence convincingly establishes is Wal-Mart’s “policy” of allowing discretion by local supervisors over employment matters.On its face, of course, that is just the opposite of a uniform employment practice that would provide the commonality needed for a class action; it is a policy against having uniform employment practices.
To sustain a class action under the federal rules, the plaintiff must establish one of the elements under Rule 23(b).  The plaintiffs in Dukes relied on Rule 23(b)(2):

Rule 23(b)(2) allows class treatment when “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” 

Therefore, Dukes did not rely on (b)(3), which is the familiar standard permitting damages when "common issues" predominate.  This is the basis for most class actions seeking money.  Unlike (b)(2), classes under (b)(3) are entitled to "opt out," and must receive adequate notice.  Rule 23(b)(2) is more concerned with injunctive and declaratory relief.

The question was whether the monetary relief that the plaintiffs sought was authorized under  Rule 23(b)(2). The Court (9-0) held that it was not:

Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member of the class. It does not authorize class certification when each individual class member would be entitled to a different injunction or declaratory judgment against the defendant.
The Supreme Court held that "backpay" was not authorized generally by Rule 23(b)(2), and the only monetary relief available would be when it was intertwined with a particular injunction.  In Dukes' case, the injunction would not be common to each member of the class, anyway, so there could be no common monetary relief either.

So, we'll have an article, and you'll be hearing a lot about this case in the coming days.  I hope this brief summary was helpful.  It will result in less blockbuster class actions in federal court.  However, it does not necessarily mean that smaller class actions will be limited when there is a common practice causing a common injury.