Showing posts with label sex discrimination. Show all posts
Showing posts with label sex discrimination. Show all posts

Wednesday, October 07, 2015

CA Governor Signs New Equal Pay Law

The California Legislature has turned its attention to anti-discrimination law: equal pay.  Now, who is against equal pay?  If you raised your hand, you violated at least four laws that already existed before Jerry Brown signed SB 358 (text is here).  Four laws?   At least.

1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not allow employers to set pay based on sex (or race or other protected criteria). So, if a restaurant employer paid female servers  $0.50 per hour less than male servers, that would violate Title VII absent a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reason."  The workers must be "similarly situated."

2. The California Fair Employment and Housing Act is analogous to Title VII.

3.  The federal Equal Pay Act of 1963 (here)  (yes, enacted a year earlier than Title VII) provides:
(1) No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex: Provided, That an employer who is paying a wage rate differential in violation of this subsection shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of this subsection, reduce the wage rate of any employee.
4. And the California Labor Code, section 1197.5  already says:

1197.5. (a) No employer shall pay any individual in the employer's employ at wage rates less than the rates paid to employees of the opposite sex in the same establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except where the payment is made pursuant to a seniority system, a merit system, a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production, or a differential based on any bona fide factor other than sex.
That said, and dissatisfied with the "wage gap" that exists between the wages earned by all men and all women in all jobs (which has nothing to do with the equal pay laws), the Legislature has  modified section 1197.5, intending to strengthen it.

Here is the text of the new law's equal pay provisions:
1197.5. (a) An employer shall not pay any of its employees at wage rates less than the rates paid to employees of the opposite sex for substantially similar work, when viewed as a composite of skill, effort, and responsibility, and performed under similar working conditions, except where the employer demonstrates: 
(1) The wage differential is based upon one or more of the following factors:
  (A) A seniority system.
  (B) A merit system.
  (C) A system that measures earnings by quantity or quality of production.
  (D) A bona fide factor other than sex, such as education, training, or experience. This factor shall apply only if the employer demonstrates that the factor is not based on or derived from a sex-based differential in compensation, is job related with respect to the position in question, and is consistent with a business necessity. For purposes of this subparagraph, “business necessity” means an overriding legitimate business purpose such that the factor relied upon effectively fulfills the business purpose it is supposed to serve. This defense shall not apply if the employee demonstrates that an alternative business practice exists that would serve the same business purpose without producing the wage differential.
(2) Each factor relied upon is applied reasonably.
(3) The one or more factors relied upon account for the entire wage differential.
The key changes are:
- "substantially similar" work rather than equal work.  What does "views as a composite of skill, effort, and responsibility" mean?  This will be the subject of litigation. 
- the employee need not compare herself to others only within the same location, but may look to other job sites.  This change likely expands the new law beyond all four laws discussed above. When employers have multiple facilities and pay different rates based on location, this section could result in claims of pay disparity.  It is still lawful to do pay geographic differentials as far as I know. But employers will have to ensure that wage differentials based on geography are applied equally and do not create sex-based disparities.
-  the employer has to prove that wage disparities based on factors "other than sex, such as education, training or experience" are job-related, consistent with business necessity, and that the employee cannot prove a less discriminatory alternative.
- the court / jury gets to decide if the employer's reason for wage disparities are "reasonable."  
- the employer must prove the entire wage disparity is due to one or more of the defenses.
Other major changes:
 - Recordkeeping under this section goes from 2 years to 3.
-  It is already the law (in the Labor Code, even) that an employer cannot prohibit an employee from disclosing her own wages or discussing wages at work.  But this new law prohibits employers from preventing employees from "inquiring about another employee's wages" or "aiding or encouraging any other employee to exercise his or her rights under this section."  However, the new law says that it does not require anyone, including the employer, to disclose others' wages.  There is no exception for payroll or HR workers who may "discuss the wages of others" under this new law.  So, can the payroll manager chat with Sally about Bob's pay?  It also will be interesting to see if this law is preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, which also covers this area. 
- New private rights of action and remedies for violations. However, these existed in one form or another under the old laws as well.
Effective date and final thoughts:

This law takes effect on January 1, 2016.

Employers will have to revise payroll and confidentiality policies before then. It will also serve employers well do analyze compensation systems to ensure that wage disparities are justified in accordance with the defenses stated above.

Oh, and this law will do little to nothing to address the "wage gap" that you may have read about, or heard Patricia Arquette discuss at the Oscars.  That wage gap is a function of the average wage paid to women for all jobs compared with the average wage paid to men.   It's not a comparison of men and women doing the same job for the same employer.

If the politicians want to pass a law to address the overall wage gap and stop using it as a political talking point, they can do so.  But they will have to pass a law that sets wages for male-dominated occupations lower, set wages for female-dominated occupations higher,  and/or somehow balance the mix of males and females in each job category.  I have to go now.  I have an appointment in Room 101.

Finally finally, I think the law actually has a typo in it.  The usual way one refers to the commencement of the statute of limitations is when the cause of action "accrues."   This law reads, at least on the internet, and as of right now:
A civil action to recover wages under subdivision (a) may be commenced no later than two years after the cause of action occurs.
(emphasis mine).  I make typos too.  But I don't pass landmark legislation that affects millions of Californians.

Wednesday, March 25, 2015

U.S. Supreme Court Explains Burdens in Pregnancy Discrimination Cases

The Supreme Court analyzed the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  The Court in an opinion written by Justice Breyer on behalf of himself and five more justices, analyzed how pregnant employees can prove discrimination in cases where they cannot do their jobs, but claim other employees were provided accommodations not afforded to the pregnant workers.

The facts are as follows, per the Court:
Peggy Young, worked as a part-time driver for the respondent, United Parcel Service (UPS). Her responsibilities included pickup and delivery of packages that had arrived by air carrier the previous night. In 2006, after suffering several miscarriages, she became pregnant. Her doctor told her that she should not lift more than 20 pounds during the first 20 weeks of her pregnancy or more than 10 pounds thereafter. App. 580. UPS required drivers like Young to be able to lift parcels weighing up to 70 pounds (and up to 150 pounds with assistance). Id., at 578. UPS told Young she could not work while under a lifting restriction. Young consequently stayed home with- out pay during most of the time she was pregnant and eventually lost her employee medical coverage.

Young's theory of discrimination was
that her co-workers were willing to help her with heavy packages. She also said that UPS accommodated other drivers who were “similar in their . . . inability to work.” She accordingly concluded that UPS must accommodate her as well.

UPS, on the other hand, 
responded that the “other persons” whom it had accommodated were (1) drivers who had become disabled on the job, (2) those who had lost their Department of Transportation (DOT) certifications, and (3) those who suffered from a disability covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 104 Stat. 327, 42 U. S. C. §12101 et seq. UPS said that, since Young did not fall within any of those categories, it had not discriminated against Young on the basis of pregnancy but had treated her just as it treated all “other” relevant “persons.”
So, Young sued. Her federal claim under the Pregnancy Disability Act required the Court to interpret this language:
“women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work....”
The Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the employer must provide pregnant employees the same accommodations it provides to any other worker, even if some nonpregnant workers would not receive that accommodation. For example, the plaintiff sought to invalidate policies that provide accommodations only to employees with industrial injuries. Here's what the court wrote:
We doubt that Congress intended to grant pregnant workers an unconditional most-favored-nation status. The language of the statute does not require that unqualified reading. The second clause, when referring to nonpregnant persons with similar disabilities, uses the open-ended term “other persons.” It does not say that the employer must treat pregnant employees the “same” as “any other persons” (who are similar in their ability or inability to work), nor does it otherwise specify which other persons Congress had in mind.
So, how can a plaintiff prevail in a pregnancy discrimination lawsuit involving denial of accommodation?  The Court answered.  First -
plaintiff alleging that the denial of an accommodation constituted disparate treatment under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s second clause may make out a prima facie case by showing, as in McDonnell Douglas, that she belongs to the protected class, that she sought accommodation, that the employer did not accommodate her, and that the employer did accommodate others “Similar in their ability or inability to work.”
Then it's the employer's turn - 
The employer may then seek to justify its refusal to accommodate the plaintiff by relying on “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reasons for denying her accommodation. 411 U. S., at 802. But, consistent with the Act’s basic objective, that reason normally cannot consist simply of a claim that it is more expensive or less convenient to add pregnant women to the category of those (“similar in their ability or inability to work”) whom the employer accommodates. 

And finally - the employee will have to prove pretext to prevail. The Court offered some advice for plaintiffs -
If the employer offers an apparently “legitimate, non- discriminatory” reason for its actions, the plaintiff may in turn show that the employer’s proffered reasons are in fact pretextual. We believe that the plaintiff may reach a jury on this issue by providing sufficient evidence that the employer’s policies impose a significant burden on pregnant workers, and that the employer’s “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify the burden, but rather—when considered along with the burden imposed—give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.
The plaintiff can create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a significant burden exists by providing evidence that the employer accommodates a large percentage of nonpregnant workers while failing to accommodate a large percentage of pregnant workers. Here, for example, if the facts are as Young says they are, she can show that UPS accommodates most nonpregnant employees with lifting limitations while categorically failing to accommodate pregnant employees with lifting limitations. Young might also add that the fact that UPS has multiple policies that accommodate nonpregnant employees with lifting restrictions suggests that its reasons for failing to accommodate pregnant employees with lifting restrictions are not sufficiently strong—to the point that a jury could find that its reasons for failing to accommodate pregnant employees give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.
So, this case calls into question light duty and other accommodation policies that would categorically exclude pregnant employees.  But it does not outright invalidate them.  The Court's explanation of pretext is strange.  The Court wants a jury to decide whether the employer's explanation for a policy is not "sufficiently strong" to justify the burden on pregnant employees.  So, the Court IS sitting as a "super-personnel department" now?

Finally, in 2014, the EEOC issued Enforcement Guidance broadly interpreting the Pregnancy Disability Act's provisions.  The EEOC apparently issued these regulations after the Court granted review of this case.   The Court was not amused:


we have long held that “the rulings, interpretations and opinions” of an agency charged with the mission of enforcing a particular statute, “while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.” Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944). See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 26.
But we have also held that the “weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors that give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” Skidmore, supra, at 140. These qualifications are relevant here and severely limit the EEOC’s July 2014 guidance’s special power to persuade. 
We come to this conclusion not because of any agency lack of “experience” or “informed judgment.” Rather, the difficulties are those of timing, “consistency,” and “thoroughness” of “consideration.” The EEOC promulgated its 2014 guidelines only recently, after this Court had granted certiorari in this case. In these circumstances, it is fair to say that the EEOC’s current guidelines take a position about which the EEOC’s previous guidelines were silent. And that position is inconsistent with positions for which the Government has long advocated. . . . Nor does the EEOC explain the basis of its latest guidance.  Does it read the statute, for example, as embodying a most-favored-nation status? Why has it now taken a position contrary to the litigation position the Government previously took? Without further explanation, we cannot rely significantly on the EEOC’s determination. 
Ouch.

So, the Court sent the case down to the circuit court for examination of its decision upholding summary judgment in favor of UPS.

In dissent, Justice Scalia, along with Thomas and Kennedy, argued that the pregnancy discrimination provision is the same as the prohibition of sex discrimination.  The dissent accused the majority of making up a mushy test that had no basis in the text of the law. And the dissent writes that the majority conflated the concept of disparate treatment and disparate impact. 

This case is Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. and the opinion is here.











Friday, February 22, 2013

Court of Appeal: Statutory PDL Maximum Isn't

In California, employees disabled by pregnancy are entitled to up to four months of job-protected leave during any period in which they are disabled.  The leave has not length of service requirement.  There is no employer job-site requirement either.  And those employees eligible for California Family Rights Act leave may have up to 12 weeks of that for baby bonding.   The California Family Rights Act does not include pregnancy disability as a "serious health condition."   So, time under that law does not run during pregnancy disability.  Get it?  If not, don't feel like you're the Lone Ranger. It's one of California's most confusing sets of laws.

So, what happens when an employee is disabled by pregnancy and uses up all four months of PDL before delivering the baby, or before  she is able to return to work?  We know the 12 weeeks of FMLA leave (if employee is eligible) are exhausted, because FMLA does run during pregnancy disability.  The CFRA time did not start to run yet unless the employer and employee agree, because pregnancy disability is not a covered condition under CFRA.  Can it be that a worker in California could run out of medical leave and be denied reinstatement?

Nah. The PDL statute's four months of leave, and the potential for seven months of combined PDL/CFRA, are not the last word on leaves for those with long periods of pregnancy disability.  How can this be?

Swissport gave its employee, Ana Sanchez, nineteen weeks of leave. That's all the four months of PDL and then tacked on her unused vacation time.  But Fuentes had not yet given birth.  She was due in October. But, her leave exhausted in July, Swissport terminated her employment. Sanchez sued, claiming, among other things, that Swissport owed her more leave as a form of "reasonable accommodation" under California's anti-disability discrimination provisions contained in the Fair Employment and Housing Act.  The trial court dismissed her case because Swissport had provided her with all statutory leave to which she was entitled.

Leave in excess of statute, however, can be a form of "reasonable accommodation" under disability discrimination law.  Under California law it has to be reasonably definite in duration and effective, meaning that it is likely that at the end of a reasonably definite leave, the employee will be able to perform her essential job functions, with or without accommodation.

So, stautes collide; judges have to sort out the wreckage.  Here, the Court of Appeal decided that the limiting language in the PDL statute does not "supplant" the general obligation to grant reasonable accommodation to an employee with a disability.  That also means that the employee is not entitled to indefinite leave, or additional leave that would cause undue hardship.  In this case, however, the employer discharged the employee for exceeding four months of leave, without any "interactive process" or attempt to accommodate.

The bottom line, then, is that most employees disabled by pregnancy will be entitled to leave until they recover from childbirth, unless the period of leave sought is indefinite, or undue hardship would result.

This case is Sanchez v. Swissport and the opinion is here.



Saturday, September 17, 2011

Dukes v. Walmart Fallout

Eveyone knows about the Dukes v. Walmart case (post is here). Well, Ellis v. Costco is another "big box" retailer case, in which female managers challenged Costco's promotion practices.

According to the opinion, Costco does not document or set concrete standards re promotion to General Manager and it always promotes from within the ranks of its AGMs.  Several female Costco employees brought a nationwide class action, claiming Costco's promotion practices discriminated against women.

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of class certification.  The opinion finds many errors with the district court's reasoning, mainly because of Dukes' interpretation of the class action standards in federal court (Rule 23).   For example, the district court failed to conduct a "rigorous analysis" regarding whether a common question of law or fact would affect the entire proposed class's rights to recovery. The court of appeals also held the district court did not consider whether individual circumstances rendered the plaintiffs incapable of proving the "typicality" element.  Costco put forward evidence regarding the named plaintiffs that appeared to explain individualized reasons why each plaintiff did not succeed.

The court of appeals also rejected certification under Rule 23(b), which permits class certification in cases where the relief sought is primarily an injunction rather than damages.  Again, relying on Dukes, the court of appeals noted Walmart precludes certification under Rule 23(b)(2) when each class member would be entitled to an award of money damages. Moreover, former employees cannot bring claims for injunctive relief, as injunctions operate prospectively and former employees will have no stake in them.

There is more. But this case places into focus that Dukes will have a profound effect on large employment law class actions in federal court. It remains to be seen how California courts deal with Dukes, but the state's courts do rely on federal law when evaluating class actions.

The case is Ellis v. Costco and the opinion is here.

Monday, June 20, 2011

Supreme Court Rules on Dukes v. Walmart

The U.S. Supreme Court issues its opinion in Dukes v. Walmart.  Here is the opinion.

Wal-Mart, the country's largest employer, faces the largest employment law class action ever.  We've posted about it a number of times as it made its way through the courts.  The U.S. Supreme Court decided to review the case to see if the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a class action under the facts presented.  

The facts that give rise to the discrimination claims are as follows:

Pay and promotion decisions at Wal-Mart are generally committed to local managers’ broad discretion, which is exercised “in a largely subjective manner.” 222 F. R. D. 137, 145 (ND Cal. 2004). Local store managers may increase the wages of hourly employees (within limits) with only limited corporate oversight. As for salaried employees, such as store managers and their deputies, higher corporate authorities have discretion to set their pay within preestablished ranges. 

Promotions work in a similar fashion. Wal-Mart permits store managers to apply their own subjective criteria when selecting candidates as “support managers,” which isthe first step on the path to management. Admission to Wal-Mart’s management training program, however, does require that a candidate meet certain objective criteria,including an above-average performance rating, at least one year’s tenure in the applicant’s current position, and a willingness to relocate. But except for those requirements, regional and district managers have discretion to use their own judgment when selecting candidates for management training. Promotion to higher office—e.g., assistant manager, co-manager, or store manager—is similarly at the discretion of the employee’s superiors after prescribed objective factors are satisfied.

Thus, there is no "corporate wide" policy of intentional or even unintentional discrimination. Rather, the plaintiffs asserted the following theory regarding class-wide discrimination on behalf of hundreds of thousands of store level employees and supervisors:

local managers’ discretion over pay and promotions is exercised disproportionately in favor of men, leading to anunlawful disparate impact on female employees, see 42 U. S. C. §2000e–2(k). And, respondents say, because Wal-Mart is aware of this effect, its refusal to cabin its managers’ authority amounts to disparate treatment, see §2000e–2(a). . . . [T}the discrimination to which they have been subjected is common to all Wal-Mart’s female employees. The basic theory of their case is that a strong and uniform “corporate culture” permits bias against women to infect, perhaps subconsciously, the discretionary decisionmaking of each one of Wal-Mart’s thousands of managers—thereby making every woman at the company the victim of one common discriminatory practice.

The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, monetary relief that is considered "equitable" such as back pay, and punitive damages. They did not seek individual compensatory damages for emotional distress or front pay, because doing so would be unauthorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,  contains a number of requirements.  The plaintiff must satisfy all of the 23(a) provisions:

“(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,“(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, “(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and “(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class”

The Supreme Court held that there was insufficient common law or fact questions.  5-4, the Court explained what "common questions of law or fact" means:

Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members “have suffered the same injury,” Falcon, supra, at 157. This does not mean merely that they have all suffered a violation of the same provision of law. Title VII, for example, can be violated in many ways—by intentional discrimination, or by hiring and promotion criteria that result in disparate impact, and by the use of these practices on the part of many different superiors in a single company. Quite obviously,the mere claim by employees of the same company that they have suffered a Title VII injury, or even a disparate impact Title VII injury, gives no cause to believe that all their claims can productively be litigated at once. Their claims must depend upon a common contention—for example, the assertion of discriminatory bias on the part of the same supervisor. That common contention, moreover, must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwideresolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.
The  Court, 5-4, squarely rejected that a common policy of decentralized decisions can support a class action where the standard requries proof of common issues of fact:

The only corporate policy that the plaintiffs’ evidence convincingly establishes is Wal-Mart’s “policy” of allowing discretion by local supervisors over employment matters.On its face, of course, that is just the opposite of a uniform employment practice that would provide the commonality needed for a class action; it is a policy against having uniform employment practices.
To sustain a class action under the federal rules, the plaintiff must establish one of the elements under Rule 23(b).  The plaintiffs in Dukes relied on Rule 23(b)(2):

Rule 23(b)(2) allows class treatment when “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” 

Therefore, Dukes did not rely on (b)(3), which is the familiar standard permitting damages when "common issues" predominate.  This is the basis for most class actions seeking money.  Unlike (b)(2), classes under (b)(3) are entitled to "opt out," and must receive adequate notice.  Rule 23(b)(2) is more concerned with injunctive and declaratory relief.

The question was whether the monetary relief that the plaintiffs sought was authorized under  Rule 23(b)(2). The Court (9-0) held that it was not:

Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member of the class. It does not authorize class certification when each individual class member would be entitled to a different injunction or declaratory judgment against the defendant.
The Supreme Court held that "backpay" was not authorized generally by Rule 23(b)(2), and the only monetary relief available would be when it was intertwined with a particular injunction.  In Dukes' case, the injunction would not be common to each member of the class, anyway, so there could be no common monetary relief either.

So, we'll have an article, and you'll be hearing a lot about this case in the coming days.  I hope this brief summary was helpful.  It will result in less blockbuster class actions in federal court.  However, it does not necessarily mean that smaller class actions will be limited when there is a common practice causing a common injury.

Sunday, September 19, 2010

Ninth Circuit Explains "BFOQ" Defense in Sex Discrimination Case

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination based on sex and other criteria. But there are some defenses to discrimination. One of these is the "BFOQ" or bona fide occupational qualification.

As the court of appeals explained in Breiner v. Nevada Dept. of Corrections, the BFOQ defense is "an 'extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of sex' that may be invoked 'only when the essence of the business operation would be undermined' by hiring individuals of both sexes."

So, the Nevada prison system was beset by a number of instances of male corrections officers engaging in sexual conduct with female inmates. A guard impregnated an inmate, which came to the attention of administration. The inmates purposely traded favors for better treatment.

Nevada's response, in part, was to exclude males from certain jobs, including "Corrections Lieutenant" at women's prisons. The thought was that hiring only female lieutenants would cut down corruption caused by female inmates' solicitations. Some male corrections officers sued, saying they were denied promotional opportunities at the female prisons.

The Ninth Circuit reversed the prison systems' summary judgment victory. The court did not believe that Nevada adequately supported its justification for discriminating against male candidates for hiring at women's prisons.

This opinion explains in detail the BFOQ defense and the employer's difficulty proving it. Much of the opinion focuses on prison cases, but the BFOQ defense and its burdens will be applicable to all businesses seeking to establish a sufficient justification for hiring women or men exclusively in a particular setting.

The case is Breiner v. Department of Corrections and the opinion is here.