Thursday, June 20, 2013

Supreme Court Upholds Express Class Action Waivers Regardless of Individual Claim's Value

Italian Colors restaurant challenged American Express's fees as violating anti-trust laws by filing a class action. But Colors signed an arbitration clause excluding class claims.   Colors argued that the cost of proving its case would be multiples of whatever it might recover.  Therefore, Colors contended, the class waiver impermissibly interfered with its ability to sue under federal law.  The Second Circuit court of appeals agreed with this premise, citing what is known as the "effective vindication" rule.  Under that rule, courts have held that arbitration agreements are invalid under the Federal Arbitration Act unless they permit "effective vindication" of federal statutory rights.

The Supreme Court, 5-3 with Justice Sotomayor recused, held that Colors is bound by its agreement to arbitrate, regardless of whether it is economically feasible to arbitrate its individual claim.  The majority's point is that Congress did not say in the anti-trust laws that a litigant must be able to bring a class action, or that litigation must be economically feasible.  Nothing in the arbitration agreement precluded or limited Colors' rights under the anti-trust law.  Further, anti-trust lawsuits and the Sherman Act predated the class action device.

The Court wrote:
Respondents argue that requiring them to litigate their claims individually—as they contracted to do—would contravene the policies of the antitrust laws. But the antitrust laws do not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim.


The dissent (penned by Justice Kagan, with Ginsburg and Breyer concurring) essentially wrote that when the cost of bringing a claim under a federal statute significantly outweighs the potential recovery, then a class action right must be preserved as well.  The dissent stated that the majority opinion all but doomed Colors' case by rendering it prohibitively expensive to arbitrate.  Justice Kagan characterized the majority's response to that contention as, "Too darn bad."

This decision addresses class action waivers under federal law, not state law.  However, the majority does not appear to consider it a big difference whether the issue is if the FAA preempts state law or conflicts with federal law:

In dismissing AT&T Mobility [v. Concepcion] as a case involving pre-emption and not the effective-vindication exception, the dissent ignores what that case established—that the FAA’s command to enforce arbitration agreements trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution of low value claims. The latter interest, we said, is “unrelated” to the FAA. 563 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 17). Accordingly, the FAA does, contrary to the dissent’s assertion, see post, at 5, favor the absence of litigation when that is the consequence of a class-action waiver, since its “ ‘principal purpose’ ” is the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms.
This last point undermines the California Supreme Court's focus on "low value" claims (like wage-hour matters) as a factor in determining if a class action waiver is valid.   We are waiting to see what the California high court plans to do with its decision in Gentry v. Superior Court, which the court is reconsidering.

This decision is American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest.  and the opinion is here.