The Supreme Court infrequently issues unanimous decisions in matters that concern employers and employees. So, it was a bit of a surprise to see Oxford Health Plans v. Sutter, the Court's 9-0 decision today. Then I noticed that the substantive claims are not employment law-related. Still, this opinion will affect class action arbitration, employment law and otherwise.
Sutter was a doctor. He and a class of doctors sued Oxford for failing to reimburse adequately under the insurance reimbursement contract. Oxford required Sutter to arbitrated his claim under this arbitration clause:
Sutter was a doctor. He and a class of doctors sued Oxford for failing to reimburse adequately under the insurance reimbursement contract. Oxford required Sutter to arbitrated his claim under this arbitration clause:
No civil action concerning any dispute arising under this Agreement shall be instituted before any court, and all such disputes shall be submitted to final and binding arbitration in New Jersey, pursuant to the rules of the American Arbitration Association with one arbitrator.Once in arbitration, the parties agreed to let the arbitrator decide whether the above language authorized classwide arbitration. The arbitrator held that it did. When the Supreme Court issued Stolt Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds (when arbitration agreement is silent regarding class action arbitration, the default is to hold individual arbitrations), Oxford asked the arbitrator again to exclude class claims. The arbitrator again refused.
So, for a second time Oxford moved to vacate that finding under the Federal Arbitration Act. The trial court, the court of appeals and the Supreme Court unanimously said, no can do:
Here, the arbitrator did construe the contract (focusing, per usual, on its language), and did find an agreement to permit class arbitration. So to overturn his decision, we would have to rely on a finding that he misapprehended the parties’ intent. But [Federal Arbitration Act] §10(a)(4) bars that course: It permits courts to vacate an arbitral decision only when the arbitrator strayed from his delegated task of interpreting a contract, not when he performed that task poorly.As in other cases, the Court's decision in part turned on the litigation strategy of one of the parties. Possibly to garner more votes, Justice Kagan was pretty negative about the arbitrator's decision. She suggested that a court might well have ruled a different way if Oxford had chosen to ask the district court to interpret the agreement instead of the arbitrator:
We would face a different issue if Oxford had argued below that the availability of class arbitration is a so-called “question of arbitrability.” Those questions—which “include certain gateway matters, such as whether parties have a valid arbitration agreement at all or whether a concededly binding arbitration clause applies to a certain type of controversy”—are presumptively for courts to decide. Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U. S. 444, 452 (2003) (plurality opinion). A court may therefore review an arbitrator’s determination of such a matter de novo absent “clear[] and unmistakabl[e]” evidence that the parties wanted an arbitrator to resolve the dispute. AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U. S. 643, 649 (1986). StoltNielsen made clear that this Court has not yet decided whether theSo, lesson learned. If you think a court will follow Stolt-Nielsen more faithfully than an arbitrator, seek construction of your arbitration clause in court.
availability of class arbitration is a question of arbitrability. See 559 U. S., at 680. But this case gives us no opportunity to do so because Oxford agreed that the arbitrator should determine whether its contract with Sutter authorized class procedures. See Brief for Petitioner 38, n. 9 (conceding this point). Indeed, Oxford submitted that issue to the arbitrator not once, but twice—and the second time after StoltNielsen flagged that it might be a question of arbitrability.
Bonus - the Court said this right up front: "Class arbitration is a matter of consent: An arbitrator
may employ class procedures only if the parties have authorized them." That does not bode well for those who would like the California Supreme Court to hold that class action waivers are illegal.
This case Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter and the opinion is here.
