U.S. Supreme Court: Retaliation Causation

University of Tex. Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar (opinion here) is the Supreme Court opinion setting forth the "causation" standards that apply to retaliation cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Nassar was a doctor and professor at Univ. of Texas. He also worked at the University's medical center.  He  complained of harassment and discrimination by Dr. Levine. He tried to work only at the hospital to avoid Dr. Levine's harassment at the University. But the University blocked his effort, claiming that University policy required attending doctors also to be professors at the medical school.

So, Nassar sued for retaliation, claiming discrimination / constructive discharge, and retaliation in that the University blocked his hiring at the hospital.  After Nassar won a verdict, the Supreme Court accepted review to determine whether the retaliation claim was decided under the correct "causation" framework.

The Court decided that in Title VII cases, the causation standard is "but for," which means that the employer would not have taken negative action against the employee "but for" the employee's engaging in protected activity. Put another way, the harm would not have occurred if the employee had not complained.

Along the way, the Supreme Court majority explained the causation standard that applies to Title VII discrimination cases.  This is known as the "motivating factor" standard:

An employee who alleges status-based discrimination under Title VII need not show that the causal link between injury and wrong is so close that the injury would not have occurred but for the act. So-called but-for causation is not the test. It suffices instead to show that the motive to discriminate was one of the employer’s motives, even if the employer also had other, lawful motives that were causative in the employer’s decision. This principle is the result of an earlier case from this Court, Price Water­house v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228 (1989), and an ensuing statutory amendment by Congress that codified in part and abrogated in part the holding in Price Waterhouse, see §§2000e–2(m), 2000e–5(g)(2)(B). 

Why the separate standards, you ask?  Because in Title VII, the discrimination provisions are covered by a specific statute, and that statute was amended to include the motivating reason standard.    The anti-retaliation section is in another part of Title VII.  So, what the Court really decided was that the 1991 amendment to Title VII's causation provision did not apply to the retaliation piece. 

It remains to be seen whether this decision will influence California courts' interpretation of the causation standard. Earlier this year, the California Supreme Court examined causation standards in "mixed motive" cases (discussed here). We will see what the lower courts do with Nassar in the coming months. 

DGV

 

US Supreme Court: Who Is a Supervisor for Determining Title VII Liability Standards?

Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the law regards harassment by a supervisor as different from harassment by a co-worker.  The employer is liable for harassment by a co-worker if the employer is negligent: the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take appropriate corrective action.  That is true as well in California under the Fair Employment and Housing Act.

For supervisor harassment, though, the employer is "strictly liable" - regardless of what it knew or should have known, and regardless of what action it takes - if the harassment includes a "tangible employment action" such as firing, demotion, loss of pay.  But if there is no tangible employment action, the employer may escape liability by proving that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent harassment and the harassment victim did not take advantage of the employer's preventive or corrective opportunities.  That is known as the "Faragher-Ellerth" defense.  

Under California law, there is no escape from liability.  Employers are strictly liable for supervisor harassment, regardless of whether there is a tangible employment action. The employer may assert as a defense, though, that the employee's damages should be reduced because of the employee's failure to avail herself of opportunities to avoid the harassment (avoidable consequences defense.)

So, the issue of who is a supervisor matters under both schemes.  California law defines supervisor in its statute (Govt. Code Section 12926(s): "'Supervisor' means any individual having the authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or the responsibility to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend that action, if, in connection with the foregoing, the exercise of that authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment."

Title VII does not define supervisor.  Some lower courts said that supervisors had to have the power to take tangible actions like firing, reassignment, etc.  The EEOC said supervisors merely have to have the power to direct the victim's work. Enter the Supreme Court.

Maetta Vance worked for Ball State University as a server in the catering department.  She complained that a co-worker, Saundra Davis, was her supervisor and harassed her over a period of time on the basis of her race.  Davis was a catering specialist, but she had no power to hire, fire, promote, demote, etc. Vance.  The lower courts threw out Vance's harassment claim because they found that Davis was not a supervisor and that Ball State was not negligent.

After reviewing precedent and the different supervisor formulations, the Court 5-4 decided

We hold that an employer may be vicariously liable for an employee’s unlawful harassment only when the employer has empowered that employee to take tangible employment actions against the victim, i.e., to effect a “significant change in employment status, such as hiring,firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Ellerth, supra, at 761. We reject the nebulous definition of a “supervisor” advocated in the EEOC Guidance and substantially adopted by several courts of appeals.

It is unclear whether this decision will affect California law.  As stated above, California has a statutory definition of "supervisor."  In fact, that definition is taken from the National Labor Relations Act, Section 2(11).  And the majority in the Vance case said the NLRA definition was too broad and did not apply to Title VII harassment cases.  So, it appears that California's supervisor definition is broader than  the Court's definition in Vance.

In dissent, Justice Ginsburg, writing for four, argued that the majority's definition is too narrow and that Congress should define supervisor.

This case is Vance v. Ball St. University and the opinion is here.

Supreme Court Upholds Express Class Action Waivers Regardless of Individual Claim's Value

Italian Colors restaurant challenged American Express's fees as violating anti-trust laws by filing a class action. But Colors signed an arbitration clause excluding class claims.   Colors argued that the cost of proving its case would be multiples of whatever it might recover.  Therefore, Colors contended, the class waiver impermissibly interfered with its ability to sue under federal law.  The Second Circuit court of appeals agreed with this premise, citing what is known as the "effective vindication" rule.  Under that rule, courts have held that arbitration agreements are invalid under the Federal Arbitration Act unless they permit "effective vindication" of federal statutory rights.

The Supreme Court, 5-3 with Justice Sotomayor recused, held that Colors is bound by its agreement to arbitrate, regardless of whether it is economically feasible to arbitrate its individual claim.  The majority's point is that Congress did not say in the anti-trust laws that a litigant must be able to bring a class action, or that litigation must be economically feasible.  Nothing in the arbitration agreement precluded or limited Colors' rights under the anti-trust law.  Further, anti-trust lawsuits and the Sherman Act predated the class action device.

The Court wrote:

Respondents argue that requiring them to litigate their claims individually—as they contracted to do—would contravene the policies of the antitrust laws. But the antitrust laws do not guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim.

The dissent (penned by Justice Kagan, with Ginsburg and Breyer concurring) essentially wrote that when the cost of bringing a claim under a federal statute significantly outweighs the potential recovery, then a class action right must be preserved as well.  The dissent stated that the majority opinion all but doomed Colors' case by rendering it prohibitively expensive to arbitrate.  Justice Kagan characterized the majority's response to that contention as, "Too darn bad."

This decision addresses class action waivers under federal law, not state law.  However, the majority does not appear to consider it a big difference whether the issue is if the FAA preempts state law or conflicts with federal law:

In dismissing AT&T Mobility [v. Concepcion] as a case involving pre-emption and not the effective-vindication exception, the dissent ignores what that case established—that the FAA’s command to enforce arbitration agreements trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution of low value claims. The latter interest, we said, is “unrelated” to the FAA. 563 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 17). Accordingly, the FAA does, contrary to the dissent’s assertion, see post, at 5, favor the absence of litigation when that is the consequence of a class-action waiver, since its “ ‘principal purpose’ ” is the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms.

This last point undermines the California Supreme Court's focus on "low value" claims (like wage-hour matters) as a factor in determining if a class action waiver is valid.   We are waiting to see what the California high court plans to do with its decision in Gentry v. Superior Court, which the court is reconsidering.

This decision is American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest.  and the opinion is here.

American Medical Association Creates Millions of New "Individuals With Disabilities"

At its June 18, 2013 annual meeting, the American Medical Association decided a new "policy":

Obesity as a Disease 

Today, the AMA adopted policy that recognizes obesity as a disease requiring a range of medical interventions to advance obesity treatment and prevention.
“Recognizing obesity as a disease will help change the way the medical community tackles this complex issue that affects approximately one in three Americans,” said AMA board member Patrice Harris, M.D. “The AMA is committed to improving health outcomes and is working to reduce the incidence of cardiovascular disease and type 2 diabetes, which are often linked to obesity.

The link is here.

Although the effect of this "policy" will have on employment law is unclear, the move could significantly increase ADA / disability discrimination and impose huge new reasonable accommodation obligations on employers. Why? Courts in the past generally have found that obesity in and of itself is not a covered "disability," but its effects (like high blood pressure, type 2 diabetes, heart disease) could be.  (We wrote about this some time ago here.)  If obesity itself is not a disability, the employer would not have a duty to accommodate an obese worker merely because the employee desired adjustments to the work area, for example. It should be noted, though, that some courts more recently have begun to recognize that significantly overweight people might have disabilities or at least be "regarded" as disabled.  The ADA Amendments Act's looser definition of "disability" is making it easier for courts to hold that an employee with nearly any impairment has a disability.

Anyway, if the AMA's recent policy results in more protection for the overweight as "disabled," without a showing of medical complications, then there could be a significant expansion of the duty to accommodate. Employers may have to take into account the obese in office space planning, ergonomics, etc.  What about physical job requirements?  And what of employers who do not hire the obese, or who require / encourage "wellness" plans for the heavyset?  Obese applicants, too, may be able to claim they were not selected due to their disability without any showing that the employer was aware of a latent disability.  

Of course "obesity" is a medical term and does not apply to all overweight people.  And it's too early to know what the AMA's policy statement will mean. But it's worth keeping an eye on this issue and planning for the future.

EEOC Again Goes After Criminal Background Checks

The EEOC is still filing lawsuits against employers who conduct criminal background checks as shown in this June 11 press release.  States are limiting criminal background checks too.  Based on the government's current hostility, it is important to review your background check policies and procedures frequently in all states in which you do business.

Happy 7th Anniversary to Shaw Valenza LLP

It seems like only yesterday that Jennifer Shaw and your humble correspondent started our firm.  (Of course, some days it feels like our 80th anniversary.)   Thank you to everyone who made it possible for us to be here for seven years!

The blog's about 7 years old too.  574 posts and at least that many page views.  We hope the information has been helpful, Dad. I kid, I know there are at least four non-relatives who read the blog too.  And thank you as well.

Greg

U.S. Supreme Court: Arbitrator Had Power to Interpret Whether Arbitration Agreement Allowed Class Actions

The Supreme Court infrequently issues unanimous decisions in matters that concern employers and employees. So, it was a bit of a surprise to see Oxford Health Plans v. Sutter, the Court's 9-0 decision today.  Then I noticed that the substantive claims are not employment law-related.  Still, this opinion  will affect class action arbitration, employment law and otherwise.

Sutter was a doctor. He and a class of doctors sued Oxford for failing to reimburse adequately under the insurance reimbursement contract. Oxford required Sutter to arbitrated his claim under this arbitration clause:

No civil action concerning any dispute arising under this Agreement shall be instituted before any court, and all such disputes shall be submitted to final and binding arbitration in New Jersey, pursuant to the rules of the American Arbitration Association with one arbitrator.

Once in arbitration, the parties agreed to let the arbitrator  decide whether the above language authorized classwide arbitration. The arbitrator held that it did.  When the Supreme Court issued Stolt Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds (when arbitration agreement is silent regarding class action arbitration, the default is to hold individual arbitrations), Oxford asked the arbitrator again to exclude class claims. The arbitrator again refused.

So, for a second time Oxford moved to vacate that finding under the Federal Arbitration Act.  The trial court, the court of appeals and the Supreme Court unanimously said, no can do:

Here, the arbitrator did construe the contract (focusing, per usual, on its language), and did find an agreement to permit class arbitration. So to overturn his decision, we would have to rely on a finding that he misapprehended the parties’ intent. But [Federal Arbitration Act] §10(a)(4) bars that course: It permits courts to vacate an arbitral decision only when the arbitrator strayed from his delegated task of interpreting a contract, not when he performed that task poorly.

As in other cases, the Court's decision in part turned on the litigation strategy of one of the parties. Possibly to garner more votes, Justice Kagan was pretty negative about the arbitrator's decision.  She suggested that a court might well have ruled a different way if Oxford had chosen to ask the district court to interpret the agreement instead of the arbitrator:

We would face a different issue if Oxford had argued below that the availability of class arbitration is a so-called “question of arbitrability.” Those questions—which “include certain gateway matters, such as whether parties have a valid arbitration agreement at all or whether a concededly binding arbitration clause applies to a certain type of controversy”—are presumptively for courts to decide. Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U. S. 444, 452 (2003) (plurality opinion). A court may therefore review an arbitrator’s determination of such a matter de novo absent “clear[] and unmistakabl[e]” evidence that the parties wanted an arbitrator to resolve the dispute. AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U. S. 643, 649 (1986). StoltNielsen made clear that this Court has not yet decided whether the
availability of class arbitration is a question of arbitrability. See 559 U. S., at 680. But this case gives us no opportunity to do so because Oxford agreed that the arbitrator should determine whether its contract with Sutter authorized class procedures. See Brief for Petitioner 38, n. 9 (conceding this point). Indeed, Oxford submitted that issue to the arbitrator not once, but twice—and the second time after StoltNielsen flagged that it might be a question of arbitrability.

So, lesson learned.  If you think a court will follow Stolt-Nielsen more faithfully than an arbitrator, seek construction of your arbitration clause in court.

Bonus - the Court said this right up front:  "Class arbitration is a matter of consent: An arbitrator
may employ class procedures only if the parties have authorized them."  That does not bode well for those who would like the California Supreme Court to hold that class action waivers are illegal.

This case Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter and the opinion is here.

9th Circuit: California Wage Hour Class Action Should Be Certified

Employees of Medline Industries brought a wage and hour class actions, which Medline removed to federal court.  The claims included "rounding," improper calculation of the "regular rate" for overtime purposes, waiting time penalties, and inadequate wage statements. 

The district court refused to certify the class because, although there were common questions, the individualized assessments of which employees were entitled to damages, and how much, outweighed the common issues.

The Ninth Circuit held the district court abused its discretion.  The court explained that individual damage assessments do not defeat class certification if liability can be determined via common proof.

Of note, the court distinguished the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Comcast Corp. v.Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1435 (2013):

In Comcast, the Supreme Court reversed an order granting class certification because the plaintiffs relied on a regression model that “did not isolate damages resulting from any one theory of antitrust impact.” Id. at 1431. The Court concluded that “a model purporting to serve as evidence of damages in this class action must measure only those damages attributable to that theory.” Id. at 1433.

Here, unlike in Comcast, if putative class members prove Medline’s liability, damages will be calculated based on the wages each employee lost due to Medline’s unlawful testimony of Medline’s director of payroll operations, andMedline’s Notice of Removal. Those documents show that

Medline’s computerized payroll and time-keeping database would enable the court to accurately calculate damages and related penalties for each claim.

So, this case will proceed as a class action, and the Comcast decision does not preclude class certification when there are individual damages issues, when there is a reliable way of establishing each class member's damages.

This case is Leyva v. Medline Industries, Inc. and the opinion is here.

CA Supreme Court: LA County Union Entitled to Home Addresses and Phone Numbers of Non-Union Employees

The California Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion addressed employees' privacy rights in the public sector union context. The decision has implications for non-union, private sector employers as well, so read on.

The Service Employees International Union, Local 721, represents Los Angeles County's employees.  However, employees within the union's collective bargaining unit may choose not to join the SEIU as a member. Here's how it works per the CA Supreme Court.

Each of the County‟s bargaining units has a memorandum of understanding (MOU), with SEIU. Most of these MOUs have an agency shop provision that gives County employees four options: (1) join SEIU and pay dues; (2) decline to join and pay a fair share fee; (3) decline to join, object to the fair share fee, and instead pay an agency shop fee; or (4) decline to join, claim a religious exemption, and pay the agency shop fee to a nonreligious, nonlabor charitable fund. A recognized bargaining agent acts on behalf of
all employees in a bargaining unit, whether the employees are union members or not.

Every year, the union sends out a packet of information.  Those who do not respond are deemed "fair share" fee payers.  The vast majority of non-members are "fair share" fee payers.  The "fair share" fee covers activities related to collective bargaining, but does not include contributions for the union's non-bargaining related activities, such as political activity.

The County historically did not disclose non-members' addresses and phone numbers. Instead, the union would send the packets to a third party, the LA County Employee Relations Commission, for distribution to the non-members.

In 2006, the union sought to amend the collective bargaining agreements to require the County to turn over the addresses and phone numbers of non-members. After the County refused, the union filed an administrative charge with the County ERC. The ERC held the County's refusal was an unfair labor practice.  The County filed a writ proceeding in Superior Court, which held that the non-members' privacy interests would have to yield to the union's need to discharge its duties as bargaining representatives of the non-members.

The Court of Appeal also held the union was entitled to the information, but for different reasons than the superior court.  The appellate court decided that the non-members had a right to notice and the opportunity to opt-out of disclosure, similar to the rights courts have fashioned in the context of class action litigation.

The California Supreme Court accepted the County's request for review.  First, the Court noted that the National Labor Relations Act does not apply to the County's union relationship.  The County's relationship is governed by state law, the MMBA.  LA County's ERCOM (rather than the NLRB in the private sector or the PERB that covers state workers and counties other than LA) enforces the MMBA.  I know, lots of acronyms.  Bottom line, though, is that PERB interpretations of the MMBA and the NLRB's decisions under the NLRA are persuasive authority.

The Court analyzed the PERB and NLRA decisions as well as the statute and other authorities. The Court concluded that the union is entitled to the names and addresses of the employees it represents, even when the employees do not sign up as "members" of the union and pay only the agency fee.

The Court then considered whether California's right to privacy outweighed the union's right to the information. The Court first decided that applicants and employees had a reasonable expectation that employers would keep personal contact information private.  The Court noted:

A job applicant who provides personal information to a prospective employer can reasonably expect that the employer will not divulge the information outside the entity except in very limited circumstances. For example, various laws require employers to disclose information to governmental agencies, such as the Internal Revenue Service and Social Security Administration, and disclosure may also be necessary for banks or insurance companies to provide employee benefits. (See Belaire-West Landscape, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 554, 561 (Belaire-West).) But beyond these required disclosures, it is reasonable for employees to expect that their home contact information will remain private "in light of employers‟ usual confidentiality customs and practices."

This conclusion is important to private sector, non-union employers, because it means that employees should be notified and should consent to disclosure to third parties, such as customers or vendors.  These notices and consents usually occur when employees sign up for benefits and the like.  Employee handbooks can contain a policy notifying employees that sometimes names and addresses will be disclosed to customers, vendors, etc. if that is a concern.

The Court next decided that disclosure of names and addresses amounted to a serious intrusion, another essential element of an invasion of privacy claim.

So, the County having established a reasonable expectation of privacy and a serious intrusion, the union had to show its legitimate interest in the information outweighed the employees' privacy interest.  The Court agreed that the union's interest was sufficiently important to justify the intrusion. 

The Court noted that employees and the County could put into place procedural safeguards themselves that would limit or preclude disclosure of non-members' information such as via collective bargaining: 
 

Employers like the County remain free to bargain for a notice and opt-out procedure in negotiating collective bargaining agreements with employee unions. Public employers can also draft employment contracts that will notify employees their home contact information is subject to disclosure to the union and permit employees to request nondisclosure. Finally, nothing in the relevant statutes or case law appears to prohibit agencies such as PERB or ERCOM from developing notice and opt-out procedures that would allow employees to preserve the confidentiality of their home addresses and telephone numbers

The decision is LA County v. Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commission and the opinion is here.

DGV