Showing posts with label armendariz. Show all posts
Showing posts with label armendariz. Show all posts

Monday, March 28, 2016

California Supreme Court Upholds Arbitration Agreement Against Unconscionability Claim

Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. is one of the older employment cases on the California Supreme Court's docket. It has now been put to rest. And the employer came out the winner via a unanimous Court.  Justice Kruger wrote the opinion.

This is another arbitration case, focusing on whether an employer's agreement to arbitrate was "unconscionable" because it included certain provisions.  First, the Court does a nice job of summarizing its recent arbitration cases so that practitioners can one-stop shop  for case law. Thank you Supreme Court. 

When evaluating arbitration agreements, the courts look for procedural and substantive unconscionability. The more procedural unconsionability they find, the less substantive unconscionability they need to discern.  And vice versa.  They call this the "sliding scale."

Procedural Unconscionability

So, the first piece of business the Court addressed is the issue of "procedural unconscionability." That is, whether the arbitration agreement was "take it or leave it" and whether it was obtained via trick or surprise.

Now, as a practical matter, nearly every employment arbitration agreement has some degree of "procedural" unconscionability, because they are almost always "take it or leave it," or "contracts of adhesion."  And here's where the court explained that it will not count an "adhesion" contract as a significant amount of procedural unconscionability unless there is something more - evidence that the employer hid the agreement, or lied to the employee.   

In this case, Baltazar knew about the agreement And she even tried to refuse to sign it.  The employer told her if she did not sign, she would have no job.  The agreement was presented to her in a straight-forward way. Therefore, the court said it was a plain-old adhesion contract. 

The Court also addressed the argument that the employer did not attache the AAA rules to the arbitration contract as evidence of procedural unconscionability. The Court said that there was nothing Baltazar pointed to in the rules that affected her rights. Therefore, there was nothing in the rules that created more procedural unconscionability because they were not given to her.  

Substantive Unconscionability

The Court then turned to Baltazar's substantive unconscionability arguments.  Her first argument was that the arbitration agreement stated that either party could seek injunctive relief in accordance with the California Civil Procedure Code's section 1281.8.   Yes, she argued that the agreement was illegal because it included a statute's provision within it.   Bad argument?  Not when you consider that a previous court of appeal (Trivedi v. Curexo Technology Corp. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 387) had held just that.  The court in Trivedi held that a provision that simply stated that either party could seek injunctive relief was unconscionable because employers were more likely to use it.   Goodbye Trivedi.  The Supreme Court disapproved it.  It was on the books for 6 years too long.  


Baltazar also argued that the list of covered claims in the arbitration agreement was unconscionable because only employee-type claims were specifically mentioned.  Here's what the agreement said, as described by the Court:
The parties “mutually agree” to arbitrate “any claim or action arising out of or in any way related to the hire, employment, remuneration, separation or termination of Employee.” The agreement specifies that the disputes subject to arbitration “include but are not limited to: claims for wages or other compensation due; claims for breach of any employment contract or covenant (express or implied); claims for unlawful discrimination, retaliation or harassment . . . , and Disputes arising out of or relating to the termination of the employment relationship between the parties, whether based on common law or statute, regulation, or ordinance.”
The Court had no trouble finding that this language included all claims whether brought by the employer or employee:
The illustrative list of claims subject to the agreement is just that; the agreement specifically states that such claims “include but are not limited to” the enumerated claims, thus making clear that the list is not intended to be exhaustive. It thus casts no doubt on the comprehensive reach of the arbitration agreement. It is not particularly remarkable that the agreement’s list of examples might highlight certain types of claims that employees often bring, since part of the purpose of the agreement is to put employees such as Baltazar on notice regarding the scope of the agreement, thus eliminating any possible surprise.
Finally, Baltazar tried to argue that the agreement's provision protecting trade secrets and confidential information rendered the agreement unconscionable.  Again, the Court was not having it.

Baltazar argues that the arbitration agreement here is unduly one-sided because it provides that, in the course of arbitration, “all necessary steps will be taken to protect from public disclosure [Forever 21’s] trade secrets and proprietary and confidential information.” Baltazar contends that because the agreement neither defines “all necessary steps” nor specifies what constitutes “proprietary and confidential information,” the agreement unfairly demands that employees take whatever steps the employer deems “necessary” to protect whatever information the employer claims to be “proprietary and confidential.”
Baltazar misreads the confidentiality provision. Nothing in the agreement indicates that an employee must accede to any and all demands Forever 21 might make for the protection of confidential and proprietary information. As defendants explain: “This provision contemplates that if trade secret, confidential and proprietary information need[s] to be introduced into the arbitration that the parties [will] work with the arbitrator to make sure that such information is not disclosed to the public.” The agreement does not restrict the use of such information in the proceeding, nor does it pretermit any determination of whether a particular piece of information is a trade secret or otherwise qualifies as proprietary and confidential. Agreements to protect sensitive information are a regular feature of modern litigation, and they carry with them no inherent unfairness.
To the extent that Baltazar’s complaint is instead that the agreement calls for the protection of an employer’s confidential information without similarly calling for the protection of the confidential information of employees, we disagree with the suggestion that this omission renders the arbitration agreement unduly harsh or one-sided. As we stated in Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at page 117: “ ‘[A] contract can provide a “margin of safety” that provides the party with superior bargaining strength a type of extra protection for which it has a legitimate commercial need without being unconscionable. [Citation.]’ ” Here, the basis for the extra measure of protection is a legitimate commercial need to protect Forever 21’s “valuable trade secrets and proprietary and confidential information” from public disclosure. Although Baltazar may dislike the wording of the confidentiality provision, she does not dispute that it is based on a legitimate commercial need. Moreover, nothing in the agreement precludes employees from seeking comparable protection for their personal information during arbitration proceedings, as circumstances may warrant.
So, this case is another one that will make it easier to draft arbitration agreements without worrying about excessive false mutuality.   You know what I mean.

This case is Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. and the opinion is here. 

Tuesday, August 04, 2015

California Supreme Court Upholds California's Tough Arbitration Jurisprudence Again, Mostly

In a non-employment decision, the California Supreme Court held the following:

1.  The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion requires the Court to uphold a waiver of class actions in a consumer arbitration agreement (this one within an auto-sales contract). This is not news, as the California Supreme Court already recognized this rule in a prior case, which was decided while this one was pending.

2.  SCOTUS's Concepcion case permits California to continue to apply an "unconscionability" defense to arbitration agreements under state law, provided the courts do not single out arbitration contracts for disfavored treatment.  However, the Court, perhaps subtly, is putting some brakes on how courts may apply the doctrine of "unconscionability" to invalidate arbitration agreements.

This case involved a contract between a consumer and car dealership over the sale of a luxury car. So,  not an employment case. We will have to wait some more for the courts of appeal to apply this decision, Sanchez v. Valencia Holdings LLC, to employment agreements. I think there will be a relaxation of the unconscionability standard, but not enough to allow significant changes to employers' arbitration contracts.

The language of the arbitration agreement is not entirely transferable to employment agreements. But some of the provisions may allow employers to include provisions that previously had been struck down as "unconscionable."

Justice Liu penned the 6-1 opinion.  Justice Liu does not provide a lot of concrete standards for what is going to be considered "unconscionable."  For example, as Justice Chin, concurring and dissenting, points out, the majority simply refuses to announce one formal standard for what counts as "unconscionable."  Does a contract have to "shock the conscience" or must it be simply too one-sided that it's too unfair to the other side?

The standard the court distills is quite mushy and guarantees continued litigation over unconscionability:
The ultimate issue in every case is whether the terms of the contract are sufficiently unfair, in view of all relevant circumstances, that a court should withhold enforcement.
Nevertheless, the Court set forth a definition of unconscionable that appears to signal that courts should not be too eager to strike down terms that they feel are simply unfair:
that unconscionability doctrine is concerned not with ‗a simple old-fashioned bad bargain‘ (Schnuerle v. Insight Communications Co. (Ky. 2012) 376 S.W.3d 561, 575 (Schnuerle)), but with terms that are ‗unreasonably favorable to the more powerful party‘ (8 Williston on Contracts (4th ed. 2010) § 18.10, p. 91). These include ‗terms that impair the integrity of the bargaining process or otherwise contravene the public interest or public policy; terms (usually of an adhesion or boilerplate nature) that attempt to alter in an impermissible manner fundamental duties otherwise imposed by the law, fine-print terms, or provisions that seek to negate the reasonable expectations of the nondrafting party, or unreasonably and unexpectedly harsh terms having to do with price or other central aspects of the transaction.‘ (Ibid.)‖ (Sonic II, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1145.) Because unconscionability is a contract defense, the party asserting the defense bears the burden of proof. (Id. at p. 1148.
* * *
unconscionability requires a substantial degree of unfairness beyond ‘a simple old-fashioned bad bargain.’ (Id. at p. 1160, italics added.) This latter qualification is important. Commerce depends on the enforceability, in most instances, of a duly executed written contract. A party cannot avoid a contractual obligation merely by complaining that the deal, in retrospect, was unfair or a bad bargain. Not all one-sided contract provisions are unconscionable; hence the various intensifiers in our formulations: ―overly harsh,―unduly oppressive,―unreasonably favorable. (See Pinnacle, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 246 [―A contract term is not substantively unconscionable when it merely gives one side a greater benefit . . . .].)

The Court also made clear that it wants to avoid federal intervention be emphasizing that courts may not single out arbitration agreements for more scrutiny than other contracts.
our unconscionability standard is, as it must be, the same for arbitration and nonarbitration agreements. (Concepcion, supra, 563 U.S. at p. __ [131 S.Ct. at p. 1747].) Of course, unconscionability can manifest itself in different ways, depending on the contract term at issue. (See, e.g., Washington Mutual Bank v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 906, 916–917 [choice of law clause]); City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 747, 777 [waivers of liability provision]); Moreno v. Sanchez (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1434 [statutes of limitation provision]; Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 491, 495–496 [forum selection clause].) But the application of unconscionability doctrine to an arbitration clause must proceed from general principles that apply to any contract clause. In particular, the standard for substantive unconscionability — the requisite degree of unfairness beyond merely a bad bargain — must be as rigorous and demanding for arbitration clauses as for any contract clause.

Here are a few issues the Court addressed that can help employers' arbitration agreements:

1. The Court made clear that there is no obligation to set an arbitration provision apart from other contractual provisions or call it to the consumer's attention.

2. The Court also does not have lot of sympathy for the argument that the consumer did not read the contract or that it was buried under a lot of other papers, which employees often argue.

3. The Court upheld a provision where the plaintiff could appeal a $0 award to a panel of 3 arbitrators, and the defendant could appeal if the award exceeded $100,000.  Therefore, provisions do not have to be 100% mirror image, which some lower courts have insisted on.

4.  Along the same lines, the Court said that requiring the plaintiff to bear the expenses of the appeal was not unconscionable because the plaintiff did not prove he was unable to bear that cost.  However, this case arose under a different statutory scheme than applies to employment disputes.  So, employers should continue to bear any "type" of cost that is not incurred in court.

5. On the mirror-image "mutuality" issue, the Court said that a provision exempting "self help" such as repossession was OK because of the car dealer's legitimate business needs to repossess cars, and because the agreement exempted small claims cases, which benefited the consumer. Trade-offs, therefore, may save unconscionable provisions.  Caution, though, because the Court in part based its decision on the fact that "self-help" itself is outside of litigation, so it was naturally something that need not be arbitrated.   If the lower courts run with this, employers may be able to "carve out" some issues from arbitration - like intellectual property - if they carve out other claims that favor employees - like expense reimbursements maybe, for example?  We shall see.

To sum up, the Supreme Court upheld the business's agreement. But it did not set forth clear standards on unconscionability. It may have relaxed the law of unconscionability a bit, but it did not hold that Concepcion guts California's (de facto) tough stance on arbitration agreements.

This case is not a blockbuster for employers or employees.  It remains to be seen whether the employer or employee will try for U.S. Supreme Court review.

The court system in California is still under water. It can take a long time to get to trial. Judges are worked hard, and may not give your case the attention you think it deserves.  So, arbitration can be quicker, which can cut down on defense costs.  On the other hand, the cost of the arbitrator and administration can be expensive.  And arbitrators are not afraid to issue large awards when they find cause to do so.  So, arbitration is a yellow light, before and after Sanchez.  Nothing in this case changes that view for me.   Just my 0.02. YMMV.  YOLO.  [Insert cliche].

Sanchez v. Valencia Holdings LLC is here.



Sunday, November 03, 2013

Ninth Circuit Issues Two More Arbitration Rulings


The Ninth Circuit issued two arbitration decisions a day apart. Both opinions were written by Circuit Judge Richard Clifton.  But the court came down in favor of arbitration in one and against in the other.

Ferguson
Kevin Ferguson sued Corinthian Colleges, Inc. claiming he was deceived by the college's methods of recruiting students to apply.  He signed an arbitration agreement.  The district court refused to enforce it in part, because Ferguson's claims included "public injunctive" relief.  California law held that it was unconscionable to require arbitration of these claims.  Corinthian argued that California's rule precluding arbitration of "public" injunctive relief claims (such as under the Unfair Competition Law and Consumer Legal Remedies Act) was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act.

The court of appeals held that the FAA indeed preempts California law on this point.  The court held that exempting UCL or CLRA injunction claims from arbitration was inconsistent with U.S. Supreme Court decisions.  Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that two California Supreme Court decisions exempting from arbitration claims seeking public injunctions are preempted. (Broughton v. Cigna Healthplans of California, 988 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999). Cruz v. PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc., 66 P.3d 1157, 1164–65 (Cal. 2003).

The significance of this decision to employment law is that this case will affect the analysis of claims brought under the Private Attorney Generals Act or PAGA.  For example in Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 197 Cal. App. 4th 489 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2011), the Court of Appeal held that the FAA did not require employees to arbitrate PAGA claims. The Court in part relied on Broughton. This case calls into question the Brown court's analysis. The California Supreme Court is considering a host of arbitration law issues, likely including whether PAGA claims are preempted.

This case is Ferguson v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc. and the opinion is here.

Chavarria

Zenia Chavarria was a Ralphs Grocery deli clerk for a short time. She brought a wage-hour class action.

Chavarria had signed the employment application, in which she acknowledged she would be bound by Ralphs arbitration agreement.  The district court held the agreement was unenforceable. The Ninth Circuit agreed.

First, the court of appeals decided that the agreement was unconscionable under California law.  Second, the court held that federal law did not preempt California's unconscionability analysis.

Here are the main provisions:

The arbitration agreement

  • - required the parties to use a retired judge 
  • - expressly excluded JAMS and AAA from the administration of the arbitration
  • - provided that if the parties did not agree on an arbitrator, each side would submit three arbitrators and alternate striking names.  The first "strike" would be by the party that did not demand arbitration (almost always the employer)

The last point factored into the court's decision that Ralphs agreement was unconscionable. The court remarked: "In practice, the arbitrator selected through this process will invariably be one of the three candidates nominated by the party that did not demand arbitration."  Although Ralphs did not make the argument, this statement would not be true if either party did not strike one of the other party's arbitrators.  (For example, the employer picks a retired judge that the employee prefers over the three retired judges she proposed).

The court merely assumed that each side would always pick three arbitrators unacceptable to the other side, and that each side would automatically strike the other side's judges. That is not always the case in my experience.  In any event, the court held this scheme was unconscionable.  Perhaps if Ralphs had provided for a coin-flip for deciding who makes the first strike, it would have passed muster.

Ralphs apparently excluded JAMS and AAA because of their employee-friendly arbitration rules, designed to comply with California law.  In particular, the agreement gave the arbitrator the power to apportion the arbitration costs up front, contrary to California's arbitration jurisprudence and the above rules. To remove the issue from a judge's review, the agreement provided the arbitrator must decide disputes over the arbitrator fees.  And the agreement provided that the arbitrator could consider only U.S. Supreme Court authority in deciding how to apportion the fees (thereby ignoring California law and lower federal court decisions).  The court of appeals held that provision was illegal too.

The agreement also expressly said that it could be modified by Ralphs and that no signature would be required to accept a change. Rather, the employee's continued employment would be acceptance.  The court did not reach this issue, as it found that the above terms, plus procedural unconscionability (because it was take-it-or-leave-it), invalidated the agreement under California law.

Ralphs was trying to avoid California arbitration case law, because California courts find arbitration agreements unconscionable for many reasons that seem unique to arbitration agreements.  That being the case, Ralphs argued that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts California's arbitration jurisprudence.

No sale, said the court of appeals.  The court held that the FAA did not preempt the court's holding that Ralphs' cost allocation provision was unconscionable.  The Supreme Court's recent Italian Colors decision was inapplicable, the court found, because that decision said that the high cost of proving the claim did not preclude a class-action waiver.  This case, on the other hand, involved the high cost of arbitration itself.

The court of appeals also rejected Ralphs argument that special unconscionability rules that could apply only to arbitration contracts -- such as the finding that the arbitrator selection procedures were unconscionable --  were preempted. The court held
The Supreme Court’s holding that the FAA preempts state laws having a “disproportionate impact” on arbitration cannot be read to immunize all arbitration agreements from invalidation no matter how unconscionable they may be, so long as they invoke the shield of arbitration. Our court has recently explained the nuance: “Concepcion outlaws discrimination in state policy that is unfavorable to
arbitration.” Mortensen v. Bresnan Commc’ns, LLC, 722 F.3d 1151, 1160 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added). We think this is a sensible reading of Concepcion.
The panel did not believe that the arbitration selection issue was "unfavorable" to arbitration.  Therefore, it would not be preempted.

The Supreme Court one day will resolve the tension between Concepcion and Armendariz once and for all. Until then, it will be difficult to implement arbitration agreements in California that will pass judicial review for unconscionability.  Not impossible - just difficult.  

That said, it's still legal to include class action waivers in arbitration agreements. That could make arbitration worthwhile, assuming the employer is ready to bear the costs / arbitrator fees for individual claims.

This case is Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Company and the opinion is here.