Monday, October 24, 2011

AB 469 - Read Our Article

We've summarized AB 469 - California's Wage Theft Prevention Act in an article here. This one will require employers' attention soon.

DGV

Friday, October 14, 2011

Employer Who Sues Ex-Employee Does Not Have to "Indemnify" Ex-Employee for His Attorney Fees

Nicholas Laboratories, LLC sued its former employee, Chen.  Ultimately, the parties resolved the case. Chen sought reimbursement of his fees under Labor Code Section 2802.

Section 2802, subdivision (a), states: "An employer shall indemnify his or her employee for all necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the employee in direct consequence of the discharge of his or her duties, or of his or her obedience to the directions of the employer, even though unlawful, unless the employee, at the time of obeying the directions, believed them to be unlawful."
Chen's claim was that the fees he incurred defending himsel was a business expense that arose because of my work for my former employer.

No sale.
Thus, we conclude the attorney fees incurred by Chen do not fall within the domain of section 2802. We are not persuaded that the Legislature, in drafting section 2802, intended to depart from the usual meaning of the word "indemnify" to address "first party" disputes between employers and employees. The Legislature could have specifically provided in section 2802 that attorney fees incurred defending an action by the employer were recoverable by a prevailing employee. The fact that the Legislature did not do so suggests disputes between employers and employees are subject to the ordinary rules applying to the recovery of attorney fees in California litigation.
The court also decided Corporations Code Section 317, containing another indeminification provision, does not apply to LLCs.

The case is Nichols Laboratories, LLC v. Chen and the opinion is here.

DGV

Thursday, October 13, 2011

AB 469 -California Adopts NY "Wage Theft" Law

When I covered some of Governor Jerry Brown's last minute bill signings, I left out perhaps the most obnoxious new law.  That's what I get for hurrying. 

Effective 1/1/12, employers are going to have to begin complying with Labor Code Section 2810.5.  This law requires employers to provide new hires with a written notice of various items of information:

(A) The rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or otherwise,including any rates for overtime, as applicable.
(B) Allowances, if any, claimed as part of the minimum wage, including meal or lodging allowances.
(C) The regular payday designated by the employer in accordance with the requirements of this code.
(D) The name of the employer, including any "doing business as" names used by the employer.
(E) The physical address of the employer's main office or principal place of business, and a mailing address, if different.
(F) The telephone number of the employer.
(G) The name, address, and telephone number of the employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier.
(H) Any other information the Labor Commissioner deems material and necessary.

The good news is that the law requires the Labor Commissioner to prepare a template and make it available.
More good news - this provision does not apply to exempt employees (although if someone claims to be "misclassified" then there will be a dispute over whether this notice was due.) So, employers may want to provide the notice to exempt employees anyway.

Mostly bad news though - If an employer makes changes to the above listed information, the employer must provide notice of the change within seven days either by providing a written amendment, a whole new notice, or via paycheck stub if that information is contained in the paycheck stub.

Naturally, even though items C and G are already covered by required posters, the law does not repeal the poster requirement.

Public employers need not worry about this because they are exempt from the requirement!
Most employees covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement also are not entitled to the notice (if they make more than 30% more than minimum wage).

This provision is contained in AB 469. This new law contains other provisions, such as increasing a variety of penalties.  It also imposes more disclosure requirements on Farm Labor Contractors.

Of significance, it increases the statute of limitations for the DLSE to collect penalties from 1-3 years. That new statute of limitations does not appear to apply to private enforcement actions, though.

Again, this applies only to new hires, but it takes effect on 1/1/12. Employers will have to put in place procedures very quickly.  However, employers already operating in New York will recognize that this new law is quite similar to a NY law enacted a year or two ago.

Yep, I can smell the number of jobs this one is going to create. At the DLSE and law firms!  OK, I kid, I kid. ::cough:::

We will have more information about this as it becomes available...

AB 469 is here.

Tuesday, October 11, 2011

Governor Jerry Brown's Actions on Pending Workers' Compensation Legislation

Our friends at the California Chamber of Commerce prepared a nice summary of what became of the proposed workers' compensation bills this year:  Your can find the roundup here. 

Monday, October 10, 2011

California Governor Brown Signs Employment Bills at Last Minute

In my last post, I said that Governor Jerry Brown vetoed a bunch of ill-conceived laws.  Well, I posted too soon, and I take that back.

On October 9, the final day he could do so, Governor  Brown signed some employment law bills that make significant changes to employment law for California employers -

AB 22 - available here.  This new law bans most employers (not financial institutions or businesses required by law to perform credit checks) from obtaining credit information about applicants or employees, except in limited circumstances.  The law does not preclude criminal background checks, references, etc. - only credit information.  It does not apply to managers covered by the executive exemption (creating another basis for liability where there is a dispute / lawsuit over misclassification).  There are a few other exceptions as well. This is a huge issue for many employers who will have to change their practices.

AB 592 - available here.  This law adds an express prohibition of  "interference" with California Family Rights Act leave, similar to what is contained in the FMLA's text.  This is not a big change.

SB 299 - available here.  This provision seems to overlap AB 592, but also requires employers to extend group health coverage to employees taking PDL for the entire four month duration of PDL.  The extension of health coverage will apply even if there is no FMLA entitlement.  Between 592 and 299, it appears that the 12-week cap on employer paid benefits that applied to combined PDL/CFRA leave is gone.  Will ERISA preempt this provision?  Does the health care reform law affect it?  Stay tuned.  If this provision holds, get ready to modify all your policies again.

 AB 1236 - available here - allows employers to choose to use E-Verify, but prohibits cities or counties from requiring private employers to do so.  So, this is not a ban on E-Verify.  Breathe. 

AB 887 - available here - further defines "gender" in a variety of laws, including the Fair Employment and Housing Act.  Here's new Section 12940(p) - which already prohibited discrimination and harassment based on "gender."  This law specifically defines "gender" some more.
(p) "Sex" includes, but is not limited to, pregnancy, childbirth, or medical conditions related to pregnancy or childbirth. "Sex" also includes, but is not limited to, a person's gender. "Gender" means sex, and includes a person's gender identity and gender expression. "Gender expression" means a person's gender-related appearance and behavior whether or not stereotypically associated with the person's assigned sex at birth.
SB 459 - Available here - This new law imposes a fine of between $5000 and $25,000, for "willfully" misclassifying someone as an independent contractor, and makes it a crime and imposes joint liability for a non-attorney consultant to advise an employer to do so.  Employers also will not be able to make deductions from contractors' pay that they would not have been able to make had the contractors been employees.  What's "willful" misclassification? 
"Willful misclassification" means avoiding employee status for an individual by voluntarily and knowingly misclassifying that individual as an independent contractor.
This is going to be big.  I wish I had one of those Drudge Report siren thingies. 
 



OK, that's all the valuable information I can impart for now. (There may be more bills that I missed, which I will cover later.) But I have to go to work and get ready for all these laws! 



DGV

Friday, October 07, 2011

New CA Law Requires Written Commission Agreement

Governor Brown has mercifully vetoed many of the loony ill-conceived employment law bills that the legislature passed this term. But he signed AB 1396, which is going to impose a serious burden on employers who pay employees via commission.

The new law requires employers who pay employees via commission to (1) have a written contract with the employee regarding commissions (2) include the method for calculating the commissions (3) require the employee to sign a "receipt" retained by the employer. 

Also, the contract remains in effect until a new commission plan has superseded it or employment terminates, even if the old plan expires.

Finally, the law attempts to define commission and excludes bonuses, but then includes bonuses that are a percentage of sales or profits. Now, commissions aren't percentages of profits. So, some bonuses will be included in this provision.

I predict a lot of work for SV drafting commission plans in 2012.

The law takes effect 1/1/13. The text is here. 

DGV

Wednesday, October 05, 2011

NLRB Poster Implementation Delayed Until 1/31/12.

Poor poster companies!  The NLRB has decided to delay implementation of the new poster. (See post here).  The new implementation date is 1/31/12.  The NLRB says the delay is due to the Whitehouse freaking out about the 2012 election? the abysmal jobless economy? lawsuits? its desire to conduct outreach and education among members of the business community.
See the press release here.

H/T Ross Runkel
DGV

Tuesday, October 04, 2011

Brinker!! Argument is 11/08/11

The California Supreme Court will hear arguments in Brinker v. Superior Court (see a bunch of posts here) regarding employers' obligations to provide meal periods.  Argument is November 8 in San Francisco.  I'm so excited, I need a rest period.  Docket is here.

DGV

Monday, September 26, 2011

Ninth Circuit - Inconsistency Costs Employer Summary Judgment

So, the Ninth Circuit in Earl v. Nielsen Media Research reversed summary judgment in an age discrimination case.  Earl violated several company policies over time. She was placed on a Development Improvement Plan and ultimately was fired.  As she was nearly 60, she claimed age discrimination motivated her discharge.

The Ninth Circuit reversed summary judgment.  Earl showed that younger employees violated the same policies without getting fired.  Because they were sufficiently similar employees (same positions, same policy violations), they were adequate to satisfy the "similarly situated" requirement for comparing employees.  When you read this case, you will know why we management side lawyers always preach consistency.

The court's second point was that the employer did not apply a performance improvement plan to plaintiff Earl, which they had done for other employees. The court rejected the company's argument that it employed people "at will" and could deviate from the progressive discipline system.

Earl was terminated after receiving a single DIP. She never received a PIP, a much more serious warning. Earl has presented evidence that in terminating her without first issuing a PIP, Nielsen deviated from its normal internal disciplinary procedure. In May 2006, Nielsen did not terminate employee 46432, a younger recruiter, even though he had extremely serious performance issues, because he had received only a DIP. In an email exchange with other company officials, Bob Burns wrote: “As much as it sounds reasonable to terminate him without a PIP, it would not be consistent with our procedure.” Employee 46432 was eventually terminated, but only after issuance of a PIP.
Thus, the court found that the company's insistence on a PIP for a younger employee in the name of consistency raised a factual question regarding the company's willingness to forgo the PIP re Earl. It is unclear whether the company tried to show the court there were a variety of employees of a variety of ages who had received and not received PIPs.  If so, perhaps the employer would not have lost this point.

If your organization uses PIPs and other progressive discipline, it is important to understand that if you make an exception, you risk a claim of disparate treatment unless you can explain why employees who receive different treatment are not similarly situated. It also is important to ensure that progressive discipline is not applied differently to different protected individuals.

The opinion is Earl v. Nielsen Media Research, Inc. and the opinion is here.

DGV

Saturday, September 17, 2011

Dukes v. Walmart Fallout

Eveyone knows about the Dukes v. Walmart case (post is here). Well, Ellis v. Costco is another "big box" retailer case, in which female managers challenged Costco's promotion practices.

According to the opinion, Costco does not document or set concrete standards re promotion to General Manager and it always promotes from within the ranks of its AGMs.  Several female Costco employees brought a nationwide class action, claiming Costco's promotion practices discriminated against women.

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of class certification.  The opinion finds many errors with the district court's reasoning, mainly because of Dukes' interpretation of the class action standards in federal court (Rule 23).   For example, the district court failed to conduct a "rigorous analysis" regarding whether a common question of law or fact would affect the entire proposed class's rights to recovery. The court of appeals also held the district court did not consider whether individual circumstances rendered the plaintiffs incapable of proving the "typicality" element.  Costco put forward evidence regarding the named plaintiffs that appeared to explain individualized reasons why each plaintiff did not succeed.

The court of appeals also rejected certification under Rule 23(b), which permits class certification in cases where the relief sought is primarily an injunction rather than damages.  Again, relying on Dukes, the court of appeals noted Walmart precludes certification under Rule 23(b)(2) when each class member would be entitled to an award of money damages. Moreover, former employees cannot bring claims for injunctive relief, as injunctions operate prospectively and former employees will have no stake in them.

There is more. But this case places into focus that Dukes will have a profound effect on large employment law class actions in federal court. It remains to be seen how California courts deal with Dukes, but the state's courts do rely on federal law when evaluating class actions.

The case is Ellis v. Costco and the opinion is here.

Ninth Circuit Interprets Learned Professional Exemption

The State of Washington's Department of Social and Health Services employ social workers, whom the agency classifies as exempt under the Fair Labor Standards Act.  The state relies on the "learned professional exemption," which means "an employee whose primary duties require 'knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction.'” 29 C.F.R. § 541.300(a)(2)(I).

The state's requirements for social worker positions included:
at least a “[b]achelor’s degree or higher in social services, human services, behavioral sciences, or an allied field,” as well as eighteen months as a Social Worker 1 or two years’ experience in an equivalent position. Candidates for Social Worker 3 must meet the same educational requirements and have additional work experience. Within one year of their appointment, new employees in these positions must complete a formal training program that includes four weeks of classroom instruction and two weeks of field instruction.
The state also had guidance regarding when equivalent work experience could substitute for specialized degrees.

Reversing the district court, the court of appeals decided that the social worker position was not "exempt" automatically and required a trial to find out the facts.  The court explained:
while social workers no doubt have diverse jobs that benefit from a multi-disciplinary background, 6 the “learned professional” exemption applies to positionsthat require “a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction,” not positions that draw from many varied fields. While particular coursework in each of the acceptable fields may be related to social work, DSHS admits that it does not examine an applicant’s coursework once it determines that the applicant’s degree is within one of those fields. For the “learned professional” exemption to apply, the knowledge required to perform the duties of a position must come from “advanced specialized intellectual instruction” rather than practical experience. 29 C.F.R. § 541.301(d). The requirement of a degree or sufficient coursework in any of several fields broadly related to a position suggests that only general academic training is necessary, with the employer relying upon apprenticeship and experience to develop the advanced skills necessary for effective performance as a social worker.
So, the issue is not whether a job requires a college degree generally.  The issue is whether the job requires a college degree in a particulars skill that is directly related to the job.

The case is Solis v. State DSHS and the opinion is here.

Monday, August 29, 2011

California Supreme Court Limits Employer Liability to IC's Employees

Typically, when an organization hires a vendor / independent contractor, the hiring organization is not liable to the vendor's employees when something goes wrong. The vendor/contractor is the "employer" responsible to its own employees.

As explained by the California  Supreme Court:


Defendant US Airways uses a conveyor to move luggage at San Francisco International Airport. The airport is the actual owner of the conveyor, but US Airways uses it under a permit and has responsibility for its maintenance. US Airways hired independent contractor Lloyd W. Aubry Co. to maintain and repair the conveyor; the airline neither directed nor had its employees participate in Aubry‘s work.

The conveyor lacked certain safety guards required by applicable regulations. Anthony Verdon Lujan, who goes by the name Verdon, was inspecting the conveyor as an employee of Aubry, and his arm got caught in its moving parts.

Plaintiff SeaBright Insurance Company, Aubry‘s workers‘ compensation insurer, paid Verdon benefits based on the injury and then sued defendant US Airways, claiming the airline caused Verdon‘s injury and seeking to recover what it paid in benefits. Verdon intervened as a plaintiff in the action, alleging causes of action for negligence and premises liability.

Of special relevance to this case, the insurance company argued that US Airways was liable because of its obligations under CalOSHA to provide a "safe workplace." The issue was whether US Airways could delegate the duty to provide a safe workplace to its contractor, with respect to the safety of the contractor's employees.

Was US Airways liable for the injury to Verdon, even though Aubry was Verdon's employer and Verdon was covered by Workers' Compensation Insurance?  Hmmm?  Heck I don't know, I was asking you.

Oh, right the California Supreme Court knows. And the Court said:
plaintiffs here cannot recover in tort from defendant US Airways on a theory that employee Verdon‘s workplace injury resulted from defendant‘s breach of what plaintiffs describe as a nondelegable duty under Cal-OSHA regulations to provide safety guards on the conveyor. Hence, the Court of Appeal erred in reversing the trial court‘s grant of summary judgment for defendant.
The court emphasized that US Airways owed its own employees a non-delegable duty to provide a safe workplace. But Verdon, an employee of Aubry, could not look to US Airways for relief.

The decision is Seabright Ins. Co. v. US Airways and the opinion is here.

Saturday, August 27, 2011

NLRB Soon to Require Poster!

Effective this November, Non-union employers will have to post a new poster explaining to employees their rights under the National Labor Relations Act.  For a simple posting regulation, there sure are a lot of rules.

- Multiple languages if more than 20% of employers speak a language other than English
- posting on intranets
- size of the poster, placement, etc.

The poster's content basically is a short seminar on the National Labor Relations Act, the right to unionize, what unfair labor practices are, how to file a charge, etc.  Handy!

The good news is that the NLRB will let you download the poster free from its website, or you can order paper copies gratis from the Agency. So, printing costs will be minimal.

The regulations are at the bottom of this long long website page, which includes the "comments" to the final proposed rules and the NLRB's response to them.
DGV

Saturday, August 20, 2011

Court of Appeal: No Reinstatement after 12 weeks of CFRA Leave

After taking 19 weeks of leave, the first 12 of which was covered under the California Family Rights Act, LA County reinstated Katrina Rogers, but then transferred her to a new job as a business decision. Rogers did not take the transfer well and sued under various causes of action, including the CFRA.  A jury awarded her damages and the county appealed.

The court first rejected Rogers' argument that the transfer amounted to "interference" with her rights under the CFRA:


Here, the following is undisputed—the County accorded Rogers the full 12 workweeks of leave to which she was entitled under the CFRA; Rogers did not return to work at the end of this period, but instead remained on leave for 19 weeks; and the decision to transfer her was made within the 12-week leave period, but never communicated to Rogers during her leave. Rogers nevertheless argues that she suffered interference with her CFRA rights because the transfer decision was made during her protected CFRA leave. But she cites no authority to support her position, which we therefore disregard. (Perez v. Grajales (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 580, 591–592.) Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Rogers’s right to reinstatement expired when the 12-week protected CFRA leave expired. Her CFRA interference claim therefore fails as a matter of law, and should never have been submitted to the jury.
 
Then the court turned to Rogers' claim that the transfer was "retaliation" for her exercising her rights. The court could not find any evidence that the county took its action because Rogers took leave, other than the fact that she took it and the transfer occurred thereafter:


In short, Rogers “failed to establish the requisite causal connection between her protected actions in taking a CFRA medical leave” and the decision to transfer her to another position. (Neisendorf, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 519.) “The unchallenged finding that [the County] had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to [transfer Rogers], which had nothing to do with her CFRA leave, bars [Rogers] from articulating a cognizable cause of action for the jury’s consideration based on [the County’s] alleged refusal to honor the CFRA’s right to reinstatement.” (Id. at p. 520.) The Neisendorf court cited to several federal courts interpreting the FMLA that endorse this principle. (See e.g. Throneberry v. McGehee Desha County Hosp. (8th Cir. 2005) 403 F.3d 972, 979 [“‘As long as an employer can show a lawful reason, i.e., a reason unrelated to an employee’s exercise of FMLA rights, for not restoring an employee on FMLA leave to her position, the employer will be justified to interfere with an employee’s FMLA leave rights’”].) Like the Neisendorf court, we conclude that because the County’s “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the decision to transfer Rogers eliminated any obligation the County might have had to reinstate her, Rogers “could not state a valid claim under the CFRA.” (Neisendorf, supra, at p. 520.)
The decision is important regarding CFRA/FMLA leave, but it does not address reasonable accommodation obligations under the ADA/Fair Employment and Housing Act.  So, employers still need to consider reinstatement following extended leave when an employee has a covered disability and takes more leave than allowed under CFRA / FMLA.

The case is Rogers v. County of LA and the opinion is here.

Pre-Bar Admission Law Grads Can Be Exempt

Matthew Zelasko-Barrett graduated law school and obtained a job with Brayton-Purcell, a large, Marin County firm. Before passing the bar and becoming a licensed lawyer, he was designated a Law Clerk II; after admission he became an associate.  After quitting, he decided to sue Brayton-Purcell, claiming he was "mis-classified" as exempt during his time as a Law Clerk II.

Although licensed, salaried lawyers qualify as exempt, so do "learned" professionals.  The associate's principal argument was that because licensed professionals qualify as exempt under one part of the definition, unlicensed lawyers cannot.  The court of appeal rejected that argument.

It bears noting that the Law Clerk II's duties practically mirrored  a licensed associate's, with the exception of signing documents as a lawyer, court appearances, etc.  Had the Law Clerk II's duties been more clerical, this case might have come out another way.

The court here also heavily relied on a 9th Circuit decision, in which the Court of Appeals held that certain accountants were exempt, even though they were not licensed as CPAs.  CPA is another category of licensed professional. See Campbell v. Pricewaterhouse Coopers, LLP (E.D.CA 2009) 602 F.Supp.2d 1163, 1172, revd. (2011) 642 F. 3d 820.  The district court held that the accountants were non-exempt, but the court of appeals reversed and held they were. 

That means this case has more applicability than just to law firms.  The other licensed professionals are: "medicine, dentistry, optometry, architecture, engineering, teaching, or accounting."  Again, unlicensed professionals will have to pass the duties test of the exemption and receive the required salary.

The case is Zelasko-Barrett v. Brayton-Purcell LLP and the opinion is here.

Sunday, August 14, 2011

Court of Appeal: "Me Too" Evidence of Harassment Admissible to Prove "Intent"

So, a plaintiff in a sexual harassment case attempts to introduce evidence that the harasser harassed other employees, but not in the plaintiff's presence, and that the conduct was not directed to the plaintiff. 
Can the plaintiff use that information to prove she was harassed?  Basically, the plaintiff wants to say, "the defendant is a bad person because he mistreated others; therefore, it is more likely that he harassed me even though he denied doing so."  That's what's called "character evidence," and it's usually inadmissible.

Except when it's admissible. The Evidence Code allows for admission of "character" evidence if used to prove intent, motivation, common plan, and other things. 

Thomas Anton was a lawyer. Lorraine Pantoja was a member of the staff. Pantoja alleged Anton touched her inappropriately, used slurs and profanity, and engaged in other conduct amounting to sexual harassment. Anton denied engaging in those behaviors.

Pantoja's lawyers attempted to introduce other female employees' testimony that Anton engaged in similar conduct towards them.  Anton successfully had that conduct excluded as character evidence. But Pantoja's lawyers argued that evidence was necessary to prove Anton's intent.  A jury decided in favor of Anton. Pantoja appealed.

The court of appeal reversed the defense verdict and judgment. The court decided that the trial court erroneously did not permit "me too" evidence to prove Anton's anti-female intent. The evidence also was admissible to impeach Anton's denials. A significant issue was whether Anton used profanity "at the situation" or directed towards females.

This case is significant for a few reasons:

1.  The appellate court's discussion of intent suggests that the plaintiff must prove intent to win in a sexual harassment case. I think the court meant that the harassment must be "based on" the plaintiff's sex, race, etc.  But intent to harm or to discriminate actually is not an element of a harassment case.  If conduct has the "effect" of creating an objectively hostile work environment in the eyes of a reasonable victim, that's supposed to be enough.

2.. The court did not mention whether a defendant would be entitled to a special jury instruction explaining that the purpose of the testimony is not to establish the plaintiff's claim of a hostile environment or damages. Defendants certainly should request such an instruction, or the jury may be confused into thinking that the plaintiff can prove her own work environment was hostile because of the way others were treated, even outside of her presence.

3.  The court does not take into account the possibility that if a bunch of people testify about the defendant, the jury will find in the plaintiff's favor just to punish the defendant, even if the evidence of conduct against the plaintiff is thin.  The court did not draw the line at all - allowing evidence by employees who did not even work at the same time as the plaintiff.

4.  This case makes it highly dangerous to retain an employee who has previously been found to violate an anti-harassment policy. If all evidence of harassment conduct against other employees is admissible, even offered by employees who did not work at the same time as the plaintiff, then it will be a big risk to permit an employee previously identified as a  "harasser" to stay employed..

The case is Pantoja v. Anton and the opinion is here.

Court of Appeal: False Social Security Number = Unclean Hands = No Case

Vicente Salas worked for Sierra Chemical Company. He was seasonal, and was repeatedly laid off and re-hired.  Along the way, he injured himself.  The company allegedly denied him re-hire after he did not produce a release from his doctor. Salas claimed he was told he had to be 100% healed, which is one of those ADA no-nos.  He sued for a variety of employment based claims, including disability discrimination, failure to provide reasonable accommodation, etc.

But Sierra found out that Salas used a false social security number and obtained summary judgment because of the "unclean hands" / after acquired evidence defenses.  (The trial court actually denied the motion, but the court of appeal issued an order to show cause in response to a petition for a writ, resulting in the trial court's changing its mind.)

Salas's use of another person's Social Security number to obtain employment with Sierra Chemical went to the heart of the employment relationship and related directly to his claims that Sierra Chemical wrongfully failed to hire him following his seasonal lay off and discriminated against him by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation for his back injury. Because Salas was not lawfully qualified for the job, he cannot be heard to complain that he was not hired. This is so even though he alleges that one reason for the failure to hire was Sierra Chemical's unwillingness to accommodate his disability.
In light of the nature of the misrepresentation, the fact that it exposed Sierra Chemical to penalties for submitting false statements to several federal agencies, and the fact that Salas was disqualified from employment by means of governmental requirements, we conclude that Salas‟s claims are also barred by the doctrine of unclean hands.

The court also rejected Salas' claim that the Legislature foreclosed the unclean hands/ after acquired evidence defense by passing SB 1818, which provides in pertinent part:
"The Legislature finds and declares the following: [¶] (a) All protections, rights, and remedies available under state law, except any reinstatement remedy prohibited by federal law, are available to all individuals regardless of immigration status who have applied for employment, or who are or who have been employed, in this state. [¶]
(b) For purposes of enforcing state labor, employment, civil rights and employee housing laws, a person‟s immigration status is irrelevant to the issue of liability...
The court noted that SB 1818 was intended to be "declarative of existing law," and so it did not abrogate existing defenses to employment law actions.

The upshot is that this case denies relief to employees who falsify their employment credentials, resulting in a violation of law if the employer continues to employ the employee.  The employer will have to show as well that the employer's settled policy is to discharge / refuse to hire employees who commit the type of violation at issue.

The case is Salas v. Sierra Chemical Co. and the opinion is here.

DGV

Court of Appeal Raps Employee Appellant

This one is mainly for the practitioners.


Richard Foust lost at court trial, in which he sued his former employer, San Jose Construction Company, for breach of contract.  He appealed from the judgment. The court of appeal not only affirmed, but also held the appeal was frivolous and imposed sanctions. Foust apparently failed to provide an adequate record, made arguments for the first time in his reply, and generally made it impossible for the appellate court to adequately consider his appeal.

The court sanctioned Foust $6000, payable to the court, for the frivolous appeal, and awarded sanctions to San Jose in the amount of $8743. 

The obvious takeaway - If you're going to appeal, it's best to designate an adequate record or the appellate court may make losing more expensive.

The opinion is Foust v. San Jose Construction Company, Inc. and the opinion is here.

Saturday, August 06, 2011

Court of Appeal: What's a Vacation?

Some companies give paid "sabbaticals" to long term employees. I am jealous of people who work for those companies.

Eric Paton worked for Advanced Micro Devices for seven years before he resigned.  He then sued AMD, claiming the sabbatical that he had not yet earned had "vested" during his entire employment, like vacation.  Therefore, he claimed, he was entitled to a proportional amount of sabbatical pay upon his termination of employment.  His lawsuit is a class action, brought on behalf of some 1400 former employees who had earned portions of their sabbaticals.

Preposterous, you say? Not so fast, said the court of appeal.

To figure out whether the sabbatical is vested vacation, which must be paid out upon termination under Labor Code Section 227.3, the court came up with a definition of "vacation:"
It is paid time off that accrues in proportion to the length of the employee's service, is not conditioned upon the occurrence of any event or condition, and usually does not impose conditions upon the employee's use of the time away from work.
Thus, consistent with the employment lawyer's understanding of vacation, holidays and sick days are not vacation because they are "conditioned upon the occurrence" of sickness or holidays.  Paid days off that do not require a condition to occur (like PTO and floating holidays) tend to fit within this definition.

The court then considered what is a true sabbatical.  The court borrowed from a test the state Division of Labor Standards Enforcement developed, and added an additional criterion:
First, leave that is granted infrequently tends to support the assertion that the leave is intended to retain experienced employees who have devoted a significant period of service to the employer. Every seven years is the traditional frequency and it seems an appropriate starting point for assessing corporate sabbaticals, as well. In many cases, an interval of seven years would be long enough for an employee to gain experience and demonstrate expertise that an employer might want to retain. Greater or lesser frequency could be appropriate depending upon the industry or particular company involved.

Second, the length of the leave should be adequate to achieve the employer's purpose. Since we are concerned here with unconditional sabbaticals given for the purpose of reenergizing the employee then, as the Labor Commissioner suggested, the length of the leave should be longer than that “normally” offered as vacation. Since regular vacation time may be used for rest, a sabbatical ought to provide the extended time off work that regular vacation does not.

Third, a legitimate sabbatical will always be granted in addition to regular vacation. . . .Because an employer could offer a minimal vacation plan and reward senior staff with sabbaticals as a way to avoid the financial liability of a more generous vacation plan, the employer's regular vacation policy should be comparable to the average vacation benefit offered in the relevant market.

A fourth factor is one that is implicit in the DLSE test but is not called out specifically. Since a sabbatical is designed to retain valued employees, then a legitimate sabbatical program should incorporate some feature that demonstrates that the employee taking the sabbatical is expected to return to work for the employer after the leave is over.
Applying this test, the court decided that AMD's plan raised a triable issue of fact regarding whether it was a true sabbatical or deferred vacation. The court's central concern was the purpose of establishing the program:  is it just added vacation for long term employees, or is it an incentive for employees to remain employed with AMD and improve their productivity upon return to work (sabbatical).  So, the court remanded the case for trial.

The decision is Paton v. Advanced Micro Devices and the opinion is here.

Friday, August 05, 2011

California Legislature Clarifies Paid Bone Marrow Leave

Governor Brown just signed SB 272, which clarifies last year's paid bone marrow /organ donation leave law.  That law requires employers to grant up to five days' paid leave for bone marrow donation and up to 30 days' paid leave for organ donation.

Key changes: The new bill clarifies a few thing: the time off for bone marrow / organ donation leave is measured in "business days" rather than calendar days.  The employer may require the employee to use up to five days of PTO for bone marrow leave and up to two weeks of PTO for organ donation leave. The 12 month period for measuring entitlement is "rolling" based on the date of the leave request.

The new bill is here.