WHAT'S NEW IN EMPLOYMENT LAW? Welcome to Shaw Law Group, PC's law blog. We will focus on employment law developments, particularly in California. Nothing in this forum should be construed as legal advice, 'cause it isn't. So, please consult your lawyer or hire us! (We typically represent employers, not employees). Also - this is a public website, so communications are not privileged. Copyright Shaw Law Group, PC © 2017. All rights reserved.
Wednesday, May 09, 2007
A Pot Pourri of Shaw Valenza's Articles Published in 2007
EMPLOYERS MUST COMPLY WITH STATE LAWS ON MEAL BREAKS, REST PERIODS
By D. Gregory Valenza, published in the San Francisco Daily Journal 4 May 2007
California employers must furnish employees with both rest periods, which are paid, and meal periods, which are not paid. These requirements first appeared in the Industrial Welfare Commission's Wage Orders in 1916. But in 2000, the Legislature imposed on employers significant financial consequences for failure to comply with rest and meal period laws.
THE EVOLUTION OF CALIFORNIA LABOR CODE SECTION 132A
By Jennifer Brown Shaw and Becki Graham, published in The Daily Recorder 25 April 2007
The California Constitution mandates a form of workers’ compensation outside of the common law remedies available in civil lawsuits. The Legislature has implemented this public policy so the workers’ compensation system is the preferred means to remedy employees’ work-related injuries.
POTENTIAL LIABILITY FOR EMPLOYER-SPONSORED SOCIAL EVENTS
By Jennifer Brown Shaw and Carolyn Burnette, published in The Daily Recorder 11 April 2007
In general, an employer may be liable for employee conduct at a social event (both negligent and intentional) whenever such conduct is “within the course and scope of employment.”
ALTERNATIVE WORKWEEKS
By D. Gregory Valenza and Matthew J. Norfleet, published in the San Francisco Daily Journal 6 April 2007
The eight-hour workday is a founding principle of organized labor in the United States. The famous Haymarket Square riots in Chicago in 1886 resulted in the deaths of seven police officers when one of the attendees threw a bomb at the advancing riot squad. Although there was no evidence that union leaders threw the bomb or even knew of its existence, they were executed for inciting the riot by holding a rally for an eight-hour day...
"EXEMPT" STATUS UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW: AVOID THE PITFALLS"
By Jennifer Brown Shaw, published in The Daily Recorder, 28 March 2007
In the past several years, California employers have struggled to understand which of their employees may be properly classified as “exempt” under California law. Those employees are “exempt” from minimum wage and overtime (and other compensation, such as reporting time and call back pay), and required to take rest breaks and meal periods. Part of the confusion stems from the fact that the requirements for exempt status under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) are different in many ways from the California requirements. While these differences are not new, the recent flood of class action litigation regarding which employees are properly due overtime necessarily has generated keen interest in compliance.
A NEW LOOK AT PAID LEAVE UNDER THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT
By Jennifer Brown Shaw, published in The Daily Recorder 14 March 2007
In a nutshell, the FMLA provides up to 12 weeks of job-protected leave to eligible employees. Eligible employees are those who have been employed for at least a year, have 1250 hours of service with the employer, and are employed at a worksite where 50 or more employees work within a 75-mile radius. The California Family Rights Act (“CFRA”) provides similar leave. In general, the laws are considered parallel. But there are significant exceptions, particularly with respect to the treatment of leave due to pregnancy disability.
A CHECKLIST FOR PREVENTING HUMAN RESOURCES PROBLEMS
By Jennifer Brown Shaw, published in The Daily Recorder, 28 February 2007
Management concerned with employment law liability should be focused on prevention: preventing lawsuits, preventing employee morale problems, and preventing the day-to-day hassles personnel issues can create. The road to success in this area is not paved with good intentions, however. Employers must understand basic human resources principles to avoid the employment law pitfalls that await.
MILITARY PERSONNEL HAVE JOB PROTECTION RIGHTS WHEN CALLED TO DUTY
By Jennifer Brown Shaw, published in The Daily Recorder, 13 February 2007
With the still unresolved political question of whether to “escalate” or “withdraw” from the Iraq war, America’s service men and women continue to be called away from their civil jobs to assist with the war effort. At least one source reports that, since September 11, 2001, approximately 550,000 reservists and members of the National Guard have been called to active duty. Of those, 475,000 have returned to the civilian work force.
EFFECTIVE EMPLOYEE TRAINING PROGRAMS: MONEY IN THE BANK
By Jennifer Brown Shaw, published in The Daily Recorder, 30 January 2007
What can employers do to reduce their potential exposure for workplace related claims? Adopting and fairly administering lawful policies and procedures is a good start, of course. However, employers also must take the next step to train employees about what is expected of them and the options available for resolving workplace issues within the organization.
Happy reading!
DGV
Thursday, May 03, 2007
California Supreme Court Upcoming Hearings
PRACHASAISORADEJ v. RALPHS GROCERY will be heard on June 6. This case is critically important to all employers who provide employees with bonuses based on profitability. The Court is deciding if a bonus based on profits is illegal because it takes into account workers' compensation costs by necessity because such costs are included in profit calculations.
GENTRY v. S.C. (CIRCUIT CITY STORES) will be heard on June 5. This case examines whether class action waivers in employment agreements are enforceable. The court already has held in another case that class action waivers in consumer class actions are not. This case is different because of the value of the claims at issue, whcih are much higher than in the credit card fee case previously decided.
GREEN v. CALIFORNIA will be heard on May 31. This case addresses who the burden of proof in disability discrimination cases. Does the plaintiff have to prove that he or she could perform the essential functions of the job as part of the prima facie case? Or does the employer have to prove that the plaintiff could not do so as an affirmative defense?
The Court must issue an opinion within 90 days of oral argument. So, this summer will be full of opportunities for celebration or misery, depending on the opinions issued. And we will be there with blog postings, articles, and legal updates. But you knew that.
DGV
Thursday, April 19, 2007
California Arbitration Agreements Do Not Always Have to Comply with Armendariz
Armendariz requires, among other things, "neutral arbitrators, more than minimal discovery, a written award, and all of the types of relief that would otherwise be available in court and, in addition, "'do[] not require employees to pay either unreasonable costs or any arbitrators’ fees or expenses as a condition of access to the arbitration forum.'"
Many an arbitration agreement has been invalidated under Armendariz, either because the arbitration agreement shifted costs to the employee, did not provide for discovery, or unduly limited remedies. There also is the argument that Armendariz requires "mutuality," which means that if an agreement is not entirely mutual, it is invalid as unconscionable.
Well, in Giuliano v. Inland Empire Personnel, the plaintiff sued for breach of contract, alleging he was not paid bonuses or severance to which he was entitled. He signed an arbitration agreement that probably would have failed under Armendariz. But the Court of Appeal here said that because no FEHA or public policy claim was at issue, Armendariz did not apply.
This decision is significant, because many employers are sued for breach of contract, fraud, and other causes of action not involving discrimination or harassment If Armendariz does not apply, employers will have significant freedom to include in these arbitration agreements terms that would not normally be upheld under Armendariz, e.g., a waiver of entitlement to punitive or tort damages, short statute of limitations, carve-outs permitting the employer to seek injunctive relief, etc. Employers seeking to change arbitration provisions must have them carefully reviewed by counsel - not kidding.
DGV
Monday, April 16, 2007
Ca Supreme Court: Three-Year Statute of Limitations for Meal Periods Claims
Anyway, so what? Well.....wage claims are covered by a three-year statute of limitations; penalty claims are covered by a one-year statute. Three years is three times longer than one year, which may result in larger claims and larger awards .
If you care about such things, this case kind of smarts. But wait...there's more.
The Supreme Court also held that appeals of Labor Commissioner decisions to Superior Courts may include new claims not litigated on the administrative level. That means that employees may lose a claim at the Labor Commissioner level, appeal, and assert entirely new theories in court for the first time as part of the simple appeal "de novo" process. I suppose it also means that employers may appeal Labor Commissioner decisions and face entirely new claims at the Superior Court level.
DGV
Monday, April 09, 2007
One for the Employment Litigators
Also - the court in Demps finally overruled its old decision in Biljac Associates v. First Interstate Bank. No longer may trial courts refuse to rule on objections to evidence at summary judgment hearings by saying, "I'm only relying on admissible evidence."
Disclosure of employees' names and addresses in wage/hour class actions upheld
We previously covered Pioneer Electronics v. Superior Court (Olmstead), in which the California Supreme Court said that disclosure of class contact information was OK if the putative class member had the opportunity to "opt out" of disclosure. But Pioneer was a consumer class action, not an employment law case. Everyone knows employees have reasonable expectations of privacy in personnel information. Employment cases are different. Pioneer won't apply, right?
Wrong. The Court of Appeal in Belaire-West Landscape v. Superior Court (Rodriguez) applied Pioneer to a wage and hour class action. The Court briefly touched on the difference between an employee's privacy interest in personnel records voluntarily disclosed to an employer, but basically said that the ability to "opt out" of disclosure was sufficient protection of that privacy interest.
The disclosure of putative class members' names and addresses may be significant, depending on how the plaintiffs' bar uses the information. Maybe there will be a backlash against the plaintiffs' bar for bothering employees at home. Maybe plaintiffs will submit a lot more hostile declarations in support of class certification motions. Time will tell.
DGV
Thursday, March 22, 2007
Immigration is a hot employment law issue too
First, California employment law does not make distinctions between employees working lawfully or illegally. Labor Code 1171.5 plainly declares:
(a) All protections, rights, and remedies available under state law, except any reinstatement remedy prohibited by federal law, are available to all individuals
regardless of immigration status who have applied for employment, or who are or
who have been employed, in this state. (b) For purposes of enforcing state labor and employment laws, a person's immigration status is irrelevant to the issue of liability,and in proceedings or discovery undertaken to enforce those state laws no inquiry shall be permitted into a person's immigration status except where the person seeking to make this inquiry has shown by clear and convincing evidence that the inquiry is necessary in order to comply with federal immigration law.
In Reyes v. Van Elk, the California Court of Appeal held that section 1171.5 is not preempted by federal immigration laws. Reyes and others accused Van Elk of failing to pay the "prevailing wage." The Superior Court held that federal immigration law preempted section 1171.5 and that Reyes could not seek unpaid prevailing wages because he was an illegal immigrant. The court of appeal reversed, holding that federal law (IRCA) does not preempt section 1171.5, and that Reyes had standing to sue for unpaid wages.
Second, in a case having broad implications for employers hiring workers under immigration visas such as H1-B's, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an employer could be held liable for wrongfully discharging an employee who was not authorized to work in the U.S. The case is Incalza v. Fendi. Incalza worked for Fendi under an E-1 visa. When a French company bought Fendi, the E-1 visa no longer was valid. Fendi, which did apparently not want to retain Incalza anyway, discharged him because he was not lawfully working in the U.S. Incalza asked for a leave of absence to obtain a visa or to marry his fiance, a U.S. citizen.
Incalza sued for breach of contract not to terminate without good cause, among other things. Fendi argued that "good cause" was established because Incalza was not lawfully allowed to work, and Fendi was not obligated to wait until Incalza became authorized to work. A jury found in favor of Incalza. Fendi appealed and ran right into Stephen Reinhardt.
The Court of Appeals said that IRCA does not require employers to terminate workers who may resolve immigration status if they are granted a leave of absence. Does the law require granting a leave of absence? No, but this did not stop the Court of Appeals. The Court said that an employee on leave is not actually "employed" under IRCA. (This is news to employers who must provide all sorts of leaves with guaranteed reinstatement.) Because the employee is not really "employed" while on leave, the court reasoned, the employer can comply with IRCA and not discharge the worker.
Distinguishing Supreme Court authority and the IRCA statute itself, the Court announced this rule: "as a general rule, individuals who are indisputably not authorized to work must be discharged immediately. An individual who has the opportunity to switch from an E-1 to an H1-B . . . is, however, another matter."
Incidentally, the court also held that IRCA does not conflict with Lab. Code section 1171.5, just as the state court in Van Elk did. So, that issue is settled unless the Supremes take up Fendi.
In light of this case, employers seeking to discharge employees must carefully examine whether to use the expiration of a visa as the sole justification for termination. The courts may well say that it was not "necessary" to discharge the worker merely because he or she no longer was authorized to work in the U.S.
Stay tuned.
Thursday, March 08, 2007
Ninth Circuit Protects Employee's Violent Outbursts
Gambini received a warning for her attitude. She claims she had bi-polar disorder. During the meeting over the warning, she became upset, left the meeting, and then started kicking her cubicle and throwing objects. Employees complained they were in fear of her next outburst. The Company hospitalized her and provided FMLA paperwork. They later terminated her employment.
Gambini sued and lost the case at trial. In Gambini v. Total Renal Care, deciding the case under Washington law (but tracking its own ADA jurisprudence), the Court of Appeals said that the jury should have been instructed that "if it found that her conduct at issue was caused by or was part of her disability, then it could find that one of the substantial reasons she was fired was her bi-polar condition."
That means the jury has to consider whether the conduct at issue is associated with a mental disability that cannot be seen or really measured. Is the conduct a result of an impairment, or just the result of a bad day, or someone emboldened by ADA protection maybe?
Consider a state like California where nearly every condition is a disability. Any conduct an employee can attribute to a disability is protected? What if the employee's symptoms include breaking things or setting them on fire? What if the employee "because" of a disability does not control bodily functions? How about touching other employees? Cursing? Taking unannounced days off?
Yes, these examples are subject to an "undue hardship" analysis, but the employer has the burden of proving undue hardship, and it's a tough burden. Direct threat? Even tougher! What if the employer fired twenty people without disabilities for throwing objects at a supervisor? The person with a disability gets a pass? I understand there are folks with real disabilities who need a boost. But I don't think the ADA was intended to be stretched in this fashion. Additionally, the opportunity for abuse is pretty high with a decision like this.
Tiny bright spot for the employer - the Ninth Circuit said that the FMLA claim was properly dismissed because the employer showed it would have fired Gambini regardless of her having taken leave.
DGV
Saturday, March 03, 2007
California Final Final Sexual Harassment Training Regs Issued
Yes, we're still qualified. We think.
But employers looking to conduct their training in house, and those evaluating third-party vendors, should carefully review these regulations to ensure that the designer and presenter is qualified under the new regulations.
DGV
California DLSE Changes View on Professional Exemption
In particular, the DLSE clarified that the "learned" professional exemption now requires learning only above the high school level. The manual does not say it is necessary for exempt employees to have post-bachelor's degrees. If you haven't fallen asleep yet, you can view the manual here. Turn to chapter 54, which is at page 236 of 303 on your Acrobat reader....
DGV
California Employers Cannot Require Employees to Use Vacation During FMLA Leave
DGV
Friday, February 16, 2007
Congress Considering "Card Check" Bill to Increase Unionization
Here's a quick and oversimplified overview of union organizing under current laws:
When unions attempt to organize employees, they collect "authorization cards" from employees. Once they obtain enough cards, they typically present them to the employer and demand the right to bargain. (Some unions go straight to the NLRB and petition for an election). But the employer can reject the cards and demand a secret ballot election usually conducted by the National Labor Relations Board. Once the Board processes a petition for an election, the union and employer have about six weeks to "campaign" until the election. The union and the employer present their respective cases, and the employees vote in a secret ballot. The NLRB counts the votes. Unions and their advocates argue this election process deters unionization because employers use unfair or illegal election tactics. Employers argue they and the unions present the facts and let the employees decide. About half the time, the employees decide against the union. Unions don't like that success rate.
So, apparently a majority of the House of Representatives would like to skip all that secret ballot election stuff and let the union obtain representation rights just by collecting authorization cards. HR 800, The Employee Free Choice Act would do just that.
It's a lot easier to organize employees when the employer does not get a chance to explain why union representation is not a good idea. And the First Amendment gives unions a free reign on what they can say to obtain a signature on an authorization card. I bet peer pressure increases the number of signatures. Organizers' unchallenged promises about the benefits of unions help, and there could even be some signature hanky-panky once in a while too. (Such a cynic).
No one is paying attention to the rest of the Bill, though. Another section would require unions and employers to mediate and then arbitrate if negotiations do not quickly result in a new collective bargaining agreement. Lots of power in the hands of one arbitrator to unilaterally "impose" an agreement. Another provision imposes penalties of up to $20,000 per violation of "unfair labor practices" committed by employers before the first collective bargaining agreement is signed.
This Bill is not new. But with the power shift in Congress, this year it is gaining traction. Vice President Cheney has said publicly it will be vetoed if passed. But sometimes deals are made.... So stay tuned.
Saturday, February 10, 2007
AB 1825 Harassment Training Regulations Disapproved
The OAL's chief concern was that the regulations were not sufficiently "clear" in certain respects, particularly regarding who is qualified to prepare and conduct anti-harassment training under the statute. There were also some more technical flaws.
The FEHC plans to modify the regulations and publish them for a brief public comment period
before re-submitting them to the OAL. The FEHC's modifications may have a significant effect on existing programs, depending on whether the new standards "raise the bar" on who is qualified to prepare or conduct AB 1825 training.
Once the regulations are re-issued, employers should reevaluate whether their trainers and training programs meet the new standards.
DGV
Ninth Circuit Explains "Regarded As" Claims under the ADA
Walton v. U.S. Marshall Service involves a former security guard at a federal courthouse. The essential functions of the job include the ability to "localize" sound. Walton had only one functioning ear, which affected her ability to localize sound. After a required medical exam, the security services contractor terminated Walton's employment because she could not perform essential functions of her job. She claimed the contractor "regarded" her as having a disability.
The Ninth Circuit held:
to state a "regarded as" claim a plaintiff must establish that the employer believes that the plaintiff has some impairment, and provide evidence that the employer subjectively believes that the plaintiff is substantially limited in a major life activity. If the plaintiff does not have direct evidence of the employer's subjective belief that the plaintiff is substantially limited in a major life activity, the plaintiff must further provide evidence that the impairment imputed to the plaintiff is, objectively, a substantially limiting impairment.Applying this rule, the Court of Appeals decided that the employer's actions demonstrated only that the employer regarded the employee as having an "impairment," but there was no evidence the employer considered the impairment to be "substantially limiting" in one or more major life activities.
Employers often ask whether exploring the possibility of accommodation, asking an employee to have a fitness for duty examination, or otherwise acknowledging medical impairments will create "regarded as" liability. This decision makes it harder for plaintiffs to make that argument under the ADA and federal Rehabilitation Act.
Tuesday, February 06, 2007
Ninth Circuit Affirms Order Certifying Huge Class Action Against Walmart
Walmart appealed the class certification order. The Ninth Circuit heard oral argument in August 2005, and finally issued its opinion today. A three judge panel voted 2-1 to affirm the district court's decision. Barring settlement or a successful decertification of the class, the huge class action against Walmart will proceed to trial.
DGV
Friday, February 02, 2007
Another San Francisco Paid Sick Leave Update
DGV
Frere Jacques, Dormez-vous?
DGV
Thursday, January 25, 2007
California Supreme Court Approves Pre-Class Certification Disclosure of Putative Class Members
The California Supreme Court in Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court (Olmstead)endorsed pre-certification identification of putative class members. The Court rejected the court of appeal's procedure for contacting witnesses - a letter permitting contact only if the potential class member affirmatively consented to the disclosure of his or her information. Rather, the Supreme Court favored the trial court's procedure - contact information would be disclosed unless the putative class member objected to the disclosure by returning the letter sent by the parties, checking a box denying consent to disclosure.
The Pioneer case is not an employment law decision per se; the case involved claims that a Pioneer DVD player was defective. And the Supreme Court did not mention disclosure of information in personnel files, or employment class actions, even though the employment bar has been waiting for this decision for a couple of years, and an employers' association filed an amicus brief.
There is little good news for employers in the opinion. However, there is language in the decision supporting more protection when plaintiffs in class action seek employees' contact information or disclosure of information from personnel files. Unlike in the consumer class action context, employees' personnel files are protected from disclosure by statute and have been recognized as information entitled to constitutional protection. Therefore, the courts interpreting Pioneer may well adopt more stringent procedures for identification of information in personnel files.
We will see how this shakes out.
DGV
New Trend Emerging: Anti-"Bullying" Laws
The website "bullybusters.org" contains a growing list of states taking up "model" healthy workplace legislation.
Anti-bullying laws would mean that someone could claim a "hostile environment" without showing a linkage between the conduct and a protected criterion, such as race, sex, disability, religion, etc.
Rhetorical question alert: Think this could increase litigation? Think opportunistic workers will file suits against managers in retaliation for legitimate decision-making?
What does this mean? The case law currently includes many statements by courts to the effect of: "the law does not guarantee a Utopian workplace," that feuds between employees (unrelated to illegal discrimination) are not actionable, and that anti-discrimination laws are not "civility codes." Well, if anti-bully advocates have their way, all these dicta in judicial opinions will become obsolete.
The devil of course is in the details. Everyone understands that an abusive person in the workplace is not conducive to good morale, can result in higher turnover, and can make going to work unpleasant etc. (More rhetorical questions follow). But when does an "intense" manager or employee cross the line and become a "bully' subjecting the employer to financial liability? And who is going to decide this? A jury at a cost of tens or hundreds of thousands in legal fees? How will managers be able to manage poor performance, convey negative feedback, and even let off a little steam without the fear of legal liability? And then there's the backlash - Won't it be easier just to fire an at-will employee than let the worker build a "bullying" case?
Workers have arguments now and then. Supervisors are responsible for managing productivity, work performance, attendance, and other unpopular subjects which naturally cause hurt feelings. Should managers be legally required to be nice? Should managers hire people based on whether they are likely to be friendly? Incidentally, should an employee be injured by such conduct, there already is a remedy for physical or psychiatric through the workers' compensation laws.
So, let's hope that the advocates of anti-bullying legislation consider the various issues that anti-bullying legislation will raise, and set a relatively high standard for what is a "bully."
DGV
Sunday, January 21, 2007
Nevada Minimum Wage Increases to $6.15
The new minimum wage of $6.15 applies only to employees who are not covered by the employer's health insurance program. The Nevada minimum wage remains at $5.15 for those who are covered by health care insurance. Here's an AP article.
Fun fact: Nevada hasn't updated its regulations on the web yet. So, the official text says that the minimum wage remains at $5.15. However, the Nevada Labor Commissioner's FAQ's reflect the new figure.
Federal fact: The federal minimum wage is $5.15, but Congress is contemplating a substantial increase this year, perhaps as much as $7.25.
DGV
Wednesday, January 17, 2007
San Francisco Paid Sick Leave Update
So, for example, assume an employee based in Oakland comes into San Francisco for a two hour meeting. The employer must track that time so that the employee earns sick leave after 28 more hours performing work in San Francisco. Other examples - a delivery driver spends 3 hours out of 8 delivering in San Francisco per day, or a salesperson whose territory includes San Francisco and others. In each case, the employer is responsible for toting up the hours worked in SF and crediting one hour's sick pay for each 30 hours of work within the City and County of San Francisco.
Obviously, employees who do not regularly work in SF will not accrue much sick time, and probably won't have much opportunity to take it. But this will be a recordkeeping nightmare. The ordinance is effective on 2/5. Get ready!
Tuesday, January 09, 2007
California Proposed Regs re Expense Reimbursement
DGV
Thursday, January 04, 2007
Update on San Francisco Sick Leave - Poster
Resources - We posted previously on this in November. Also, here is our article we published in the Sacramento Daily Recorder. And here is the ordinance itself.
DGV
Wednesday, January 03, 2007
Employee Monitoring - California Supreme Court to Review Hernandez v. Hillsides
Back in September I posted about the California Court of Appeal's decision in Hernandez v. Hillsides. In that case, two employees were permitted to proceed with an invasion of privacy claim based on video monitoring of their office. There wasn't much monitoring and it was not directed at the employees who sued, so there was a collective shudder among employers who monitor their workers.
Fast forward to today: The California Supreme Court granted review of the case. So, nevermind about Hernandez for the next couple of years. Our advice remains the same anyway: destroy employees' expectation of privacy by giving notice of monitoring and posting signs as appropriate.
Thursday, December 28, 2006
$4 Million to California Disability Discrimination Plaintiff
The California Court of Appeal Roby v. McKesson HBOC reduced the verdict to about $4 million. An attorneys' fees award of $728,000 was not even challenged. The opinion primarily deals with the adjustment to the punitive damages verdict in light of recent case law setting constitutional boundaries. But if we're arguing about whether $2 million or $15 million is an appropriate punitive damages award, something went wrong from an employment law / HR management standpoint.
The plaintiff's psychological disability resulted in some unpleasant side effects, like body odor resulting from medication. In addition, her absences resulted in discipline and, ultimately, termination under a no-fault attendance policy. The evidence demonstrated that the line supervision was unsympathetic to the employee's issues. In fact, there was evidence of some outright hostility by the employee's direct supervisor. But when the employee complained after her termination, not much was done to assess the situation and ensure consistent and fair treatment. Thus, some employees received much more lenient treatment under the no-fault attendance policy. Additionally, the Company did not exempt from the attendance policy leave that fairly obviously would have qualified as FMLA/CFRA leave. A more detailed review of the application of the "rolling" no-fault attendance policy to this employee might have saved McKesson a few million. Under the disability discrimination laws, mechanical application of attendance policies may be hazardous to the balance sheet.
Silver lining - the court held that there was insufficient evidence of a hostile work environment, resulting in vacatur of about $1.1 million of the award. There was indeed evidence of "hostility" and some mistreatment. However, it was not sufficiently "severe or pervasive" to sustain the jury's verdict. Additionally, the court distinguished between conduct that will support a "harassment" claim, and personnel actions, which do not constitute "harassment" in the legal sense. As a result of the court's findings, Roby's supervisor escaped about $500,000 in personal liability for her mistreatment of Roby.
Wednesday, December 20, 2006
Arbitration Agreements in California Set to Make a Comeback
Until now. Of late, courts have wrestled with the issue of whether an arbitration agreement can include a provision (1) requiring arbitration but (2) prohibiting the plaintiff from bringing a "class action." In the Discover Bank v. Superior Court(2005) 36 Cal.4th 148 case, decided last year, the California Supreme Court held that consumer class actions could not be barred by arbitration clauses. However, the High Court left the door open a crack for class action waivers in claims for larger damages - such as employment claims. The Court of Appeal in Gentry v. Superior Court(2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 944, review granted April 26, 2006, S141502 held that Discover Bank did not bar class action waivers in employment claims, but as you can see, the Supremes accepted review of that case in April 2006, rendering it not citable as authority.
Well, in Konig v. U-Haul Company of California, the California Court of Appeal again held that Discover Bank does not bar class action waivers in employment claims. Konig brought a class action against U-Haul for a varieity of alleged wage and hour violations on behalf of himself and a class of U-Haul employees. U-Haul moved the court to compel Konig to arbitrate his claims based on an arbitration agreement he signed, which included the following language: "I understand that final and binding arbitration will be the sole and exclusive remedy for any such claim or dispute against [defendant]... and that, by agreeing to use arbitration to resolve my dispute, both [defendant] and I agree to forego any right we each may have had to a jury trial on issues covered by the [U-Haul Arbitration Policy], and forego any right to bring claims on a representative, class member basis, or as a private attorney general."
The Court of Appeal once again upheld this class action waiver under Discover Bank. Now before you run to your employment lawyer, a couple of caveats. First, the California Supreme Court has taken up this issue in Gentry, mentioned above. So the Supreme Court may well take this case up, too. Second, there was a dissent in this case, which makes it even more likely that the Supreme Court will accept review. So, the Supreme Court may answer the question of class action waivers once and for all within the next year or two.
Happy holidays to our readers and their families.
DGV
Thursday, December 14, 2006
Employer Not Liable to Third Party for Employee's Internet Postings
Agilent employed Cameron Moore in Silicon Valley. Moore became upset with a couple of former Varian employees. He signed into an internet bulletin board regarding Varian, where he made some threatening posts against the former Varian employees. He used the handle... "crack_smoking_jesus." (I know. I just had to).
The threats came to the attention of the FBI, who traced them to Agilent. After an investigation, Agilent and the FBI confronted Moore.
The ex-Varian employees sued Moore and Agilent for, among other things, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and other torts associated with the threatening posts. The plaintiffs claimed Agilent was aware of the postings and did not stop them.
In court, Agilent claimed it was immune from liability under a provision of the Communications Decency Act of 1996. Section 230(c)(1) of that law provides: "[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider." The statute goes on to preempt inconsistent state laws: "Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State from enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section. No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section." The purpose of this section is to protect those who facilitate internet communication from liability when users abuse their communication privileges.
The trial court held Agilent was immune from suit and the Varian ex-employees appealed. The Court of Appeal in Delfino v. Agilent affirmed. This is the first known opinion applying the CDA's immunity to employers. In essence, the court agreed with Agilent that it was a mere passive provider of access to the internet, that the plaintiffs attempted to hold Agilent responsible as if it had published the offending statements itself, and another person actually published them (Moore).
The plaintiffs tried to bring in Agilent under state-law principles of respondeat superior and ratification, but the appellate court was unmoved. While the plaintiffs could seek damages against Moore himself, Agilent could not be held vicariously liable because the acts were performed outside the course and scope of employment. Ratification would not fly given Agilent fired Moore after learning what he did.
To ensure your internet connection does not expose your business to liability it is important to have an internet usage policy that prohibits engaging in misconduct on the internet, and provides for monitoring. The CDA apparently will provide strong protections as well. However, it bears noting that this case involves a lawsuit by third-parties, not current employees of the same company. It is too early to tell what effect the CDA will have on employment claims such as hostile environment harassment alleged to be caused by internet activity.
DGV
Sunday, December 10, 2006
Federal DOL Seeks Comments on FMLA Regulations
DGV
Sunday, November 26, 2006
IRS Announces 2007 Mileage Reimbursement Rate
California employers must reimburse employees for expenses they incur. The state Division of Labor Standards Enforcement accepts the IRS rate as adequate compensation for employees' use of personal automobiles. Therefore, employers should adjust the reimbursement rate effective January 1, 2007.
DGV
Final AB 1825 Sexual Harassment Training Regulations
Most employers that completed their initial training in 2005 will be training supervisors again in 2007. So, employers should ensure their training programs comply with the new regulations.
DGV
Monday, November 13, 2006
Get ready for more posts in 2007....
After years of no major federal employment laws (save last year's Pension Protection Act), Congress is changing hands. And here come the unions, trial lawyers, and politicians with some fresh ideas for employers. Here is an AP article on the subject.
Of course, having carefully studied civics as a child, I know it will take a lot of work to pass even one employee-friendly bill. (I also know that conjunctions' function is to hook up words and phrases and clauses.)
But I think even a divided Congress can pass some new employment mandates, assuming the President is willing to horse-trade a judicial appointment or a military appropriation or two.
DGV
Thursday, November 09, 2006
SF Passes Paid Sick Leave Requirement
- "Small employers" of under 10 employees (counted as any 10 employees who perform any work in a week, must provide at least 40 hours of paid sick leave; larger employers must provide at least 72 hours. Employers are invited but not required to be more generous.
- Sick leave begins accruing after 90 days of employment. An employee accrues one hour for each 30 hours' worked. The sick leave accrues until it reaches a cap of 40 hours for small businesses or 72 hours for large businesses.
- Employers that provide more PTO or sick leave than stated above under existing policies are deemed in compliance. However, employers will have to adjust policies to comply with the uses of sick leave, attendance policies, and the like.
- Sick leave may be used either for the employee's own illness, OR for the illness of a covered person: "child; parent; legal guardian or ward; sibling; grandparent; grandchild; and spouse, registered domestic partner under any state or local law, or designated person." Employees without covered relations may designate one "designated person" for whom the employee may take paid sick leave to care for.
- The sick leave appears to be available for use for absences of less than one day, including medical appointments.
- Sick leave accrues and "carries over" year to year if not used, but need not be paid out at termination. The accrual stops at the caps above (40 hours for smaller and 72 hours for larger employers).
- Employees must provide "reasonable advance notice" of the need for leave, presumably on occasions when it is used to care for others or for medical treatment. Employers may take "reasonable measures" to verify or document time off.
- Employers must maintain records for four years and make them available to the city for inspection.
- Time taken under this provision may not be counted as an attendance violation under company policy.
- Any adverse action taken within 90 days of an employee's engaging in any of a number of "protected activities" relating to this leave benefit (including filing a complaint or even telling other employees about the availability of paid sick leave) creates a rebuttable presumption of retaliation.
- There is a provision for private civil enforcement, including penalties of up to 3 times the sick pay denied for violations or $250, whichever is greater, liquidated damages of $50, interest, costs and attorneys fees. Class actions are authorized only for equitable relief, costs, and attorneys' fees. And....
- Yes, there will be a new poster required to be posted.
Employers that do business in San Francisco must address the many administrative and payroll issues attendant to this law asap. It goes into effect 90 days from November 7, or about February 5.
Saturday, October 28, 2006
California Court of Appeal: Class Action Should Have Been Certified
The plaintiffs accused Cintas of violating Los Angeles County's Living Wage Ordinance by failing to provide the class with the legally mandated pay and benefits. Cintas argued that the case was not amenable to class certification because the plaintiffs were inadequate representatives, common issues did not predominate over individual ones, and class procedures would not be superior to other means of recovering. These are all proper factors for a trial court to consider under the legal framework for deciding class certification issues.
So, was it that substantial evidence did not support the trial court's finding? Hard to say. It appears the Court simply disagreed with the class certification order and decided it the other way. This is precisely what the Court of Appeal did in Sav-On, which is why the Supreme Court imposed the deferential standard of review.
The appellate court in Cintas decided that the trial court should have divided up the putative class into sub-classes, which would have ameliorated the commonality concerns. The court also held that class actions would be superior to individual actions for this type of case.
This case involves an allegation of a failure to apply a relatively simple law properly to a large group. Therefore, the common facts may well be more prevalent than in a more fact-intensive case such as involving exemptions from overtime.
DGV
Wednesday, October 25, 2006
Statute of Limitations for Vacation Claims
The court also decided that claims for unpaid wages were subject to the statute of limitations for oral contracts (two years), rather than the three-year statute applicable to statutory claims. This holding likely will not apply to overtime claims, because overtime is a creature of statute. The obligation to pay (base) wages, on the other hand, arises from the "contract" to perform services in exchange for pay.
Finally, the court held that business expense reimbursement claims under Labor Code section 2802 arise as the employee incurs the expense, and that a three-year statute of limitations applies. This means that employees who do not submit expenses for reimbursement within three years of incurring them would be barred from recovery, even if the employees have not yet been terminated. Some of you know people who might wait three years to turn in an expense report.
DGV
Saturday, October 14, 2006
Court Cancels "Groundhog Day" for Serial Wage and Hour Class Actions
Yet, the plaintiff's lawyer was undeterred and filed yet another class action in Alvarez v. May Department Stores Co., this one venued in L.A. As with the prior cases, Alvarez challenged the exempt status of assistant managers.
The L.A. Superior Court sustained a demurrer to the complaint. The court held that the class action allegations were barred by the doctrines of "collateral estoppel" aka "issue preclusion." Huh?
Collateral estoppel is a doctrine which prevents relitigation of issues
previously argued and resolved in a prior proceeding. . . . In order to apply this principle: (1) the issue must be identical to that decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue must have been actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the issue
must have been necessarily decided in the prior proceeding; (4) the decision must have been final and on the merits; and (5) preclusion must be sought against a person who was a party or in privity with a party to the prior
proceeding.
Ohh.
So, Alvarez's lawyer appealed, arguing that collateral estoppel cannot preclude a later class action. Rather, Alvarez said at oral argument that he could continue to litigation class certification in new lawsuits until it was no longer "economically feasible" to do so.
Well, the Court of Appeal in Alvarez v. May Department Stores decided enough was enough and affirmed the trial court, barring re-litigation of the certification question. So, employers who defeat motions for class certification likely will not have to face endless "me-too" lawsuits on the same issue. It is unclear from this opinion whether collateral estoppel would apply no matter how much time has passed between the old lawsuit and the new one. Stay tuned.
DGV
Wednesday, October 11, 2006
UPS's Safety Standard Violates ADA
The Ninth Circuit, in Bates v. UPS, held that UPS's job requirement violated the ADA. UPS' primary argument was that the employees were not "qualified" because they could not perform the essential functions of the job (including hearing at the level mandated by the DOT) "safely" with or without accommodation.
The court rejected the normal "McDonnell Douglas" burden-shifting analysis, saying that when an employer takes disability into account when making a decision, it is unnecessary to use that analysis. The court analyzed whether UPS engaged in "discrimination" under the ADA by using a qualification standard that screens out people with disabilities - here, the hearing impaired. The hearing test of course did screen out the hearing impaired. UPS argued that the plaintiffs could proceed only if the proved that the hearing test screened out applicants who could drive "safely," an essential job function. But the court said that the burden was on UPS to show the contrary.
That left UPS with the burden of proving "business necessity" and "job-relatedness" as an affirmative defense. On that point, the court decided UPS had to prove one of two things to uphold UPS's blanket exclusion: (1) "all" deaf drivers would drive substantially less safely than the "hearing" drivers or (2) it would be impossible to prove whether that was true. The court analyzed the extensive expert evidence submitted and agreed with the district court that the findings were inconclusive. Thus, UPS would have to exclude drivers on a case by case basis rather than categorically reject all drivers having a certain level of hearing impairment or greater.
This case will affect employers who use medical examinations to screen out groups of employees who do not meet the given criteria. The employer will be foreclosed from arguing the employee is not "qualified." Instead, the employer will have the burden of proving the exclusion was "job-related and based on business necessity," a high burden.
Tuesday, October 03, 2006
Still More Amendments to AB 1825 Regulations
DGV
Saturday, September 16, 2006
Commission Plans - Chargebacks and Forfeitures
This opinion is thoroughly reasoned, including a comprehensive discussion of related case law. It can help employers and their lawyers draft lawful commission plans that permit sales employees to benefit from early cash flow without receiving windfalls from overpaid commissions. Yes, even in California.
DGV
Video Monitoring of Employees at the Workplace
The newest California decision is Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc. An employer set up a motion-activated video camera in an office to determine who was accessing a computer at night to view porn. The manager who installed the camera disconnected it each day and re-connected it only at night. Two employees who used the office during the day discovered the camera one day when it had not been disconnected. They sued for invasion of privacy.
The employer argued the camera was not even activated during the day (except for the one day it was mistakenly left on). But the California Court of Appeal held "a plaintiff need not establish that he or she was actually viewed or recorded in order to succeed on a cause of action for invasion of privacy." Employers can monitor employees' work areas by ensuring the employees do not have an "expectation of privacy." The way to do this is by giving notice of the monitoring. Notice may take away the element of surprise, but it also deters the conduct sought to be monitored.
Unintended consequences department: What effect will this decision would have on "nanny cams?" A nanny or babysitter is an employee. The workplace is the parents' home. Under this decision, a nanny may be able to argue a privacy invasion if the parents set up hidden cameras. However, the court pointed out that the employer failed to establish a sufficient justification for the monitoring, nor did the employer sufficiently establish the employees had a diminished expectation of privacy. Perhaps homeowners may argue that nannies do not have privacy expectations while working in a private home. Stay tuned (so to speak).
DGV
Thursday, September 14, 2006
OFCCP Says, "Never Mind" Those Surveys
Anyway, the OFCCP apparently determined the EO Surveys were not a necessary enforcement tool and eliminated the requirement. They initially proposed to do this in January.
One less paperwork obligation!
DGV
Wednesday, September 13, 2006
Another Non-Compete Provision Struck Down
Non-competes, non-solicits, and trade secrets agreements are tricky (obviously). So, if they are important to you, ensure they are drafted to survive at least four judges' scrutiny (one trial judge and three at the court of appeal).
DGV
Tuesday, September 12, 2006
Independent Contractors in California
The California Court of Appeal in JKH Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Indus. Relations decided that a group of delivery messengers were wrongly classified as independent contractors rather than employees. The court brushed aside evidence that the employer, JKH, did not control the messengers' means or methods of performing the work. The court noted that when the job does not require specialized skills, the employee's autonomy is not as important. Rather, the court focused on the messengers' hourly rate of pay (rather than payment by the job), and the fact that the alleged contractors were performing the job essential to the business' purpose. (That is, JKH was a delivery service, and it classified those responsible for accomplishing that business purpose as contractors).
Interestingly, the court also decided that when independent contractor status is evaluated in the context of whether the employer should have provided workers' compensation insurance, the court must evaluate the case differently than when the case is brought in another context.
DGV
Wednesday, September 06, 2006
Even "Limited" Non-Competes Illegal in CA
Employers and their lawyers, fonts of ingenuity that they are, have come up with a variety of end-runs around California's prohibition on non-competes. Non-solicitation agreements, for example, have been held lawful to the extent necessary to protect a valid, protectable interest, such as a trade secrets.
Another example is an agreement not to compete with the employer's primary competitors - a "limited" non-compete. So, hypothetically, McPotroast might implement an agreement restricting employees from going to work for King Carnivorous, but the employee can work for anyone else.
Is that sort of arrangement illegal in California? The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has ruled said "no," predicting how the California Supreme Court would rule on the issue.
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of California was wrong, says the Court of Appeal in the August 30, 2006 decision in Edwards v. Arthur Andersen.
The opinion surveys California non-competition law in some detail and the court then concludes even a limited non-compete is illegal unless necessary to protect trade secrets or unless one of the narrow statutory exceptions to the general rule applies:
In sum, we conclude the "narrow restraint" doctrine is a misapplication of California law. Noncompetition agreements are invalid under section 16600 even if narrowly drawn, unless they fall within the statutory or trade secret exceptions. Thus, the noncompetition agreement at issue here was invalid and violated California's public policy, unless, on remand, Andersen proves the trade secret exception applies.
The Court then held that requiring Edwards to sign the agreement established a required element of the tort of "interference with prospective economic advantage" (the "independently wrongful act" element.). As such, Edwards was permitted to proceed on this theory, exposing Andersen to the a panoply of tort damages, including punitive damages.
Tuesday, September 05, 2006
Sexual Harassment Training and Prevention Reducing Claims?
The article tries to link the decrease in EEOC filings with AB 1825, California's mandatory training law. But that law took effect just last year, so it can't be responsible for the decrease in charges between 1995-2005. AB 1825 may further reduce harassment claims in the future, but employers' voluntary prevention efforts deserve at least some of the credit for the decrease in claims.
Since Clarence Thomas' confirmation hearings, companies even of modest size increasingly have implemented comprehensive prevention programs. More than just a zero tolerance policy - these include routine training, open door policies, "grievance" or in-house resolution programs, anonymous tip lines, and skilled investigators.
Harassment prevention really came of age as a result of the Faragher / Ellerth line of Supreme Court cases, where the U.S. Supremes provided employers with a defense to harassment claims when they take preventive measures. California employers also took notice after Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie, where a jury socked the big firm for millions in punitive damages on actual damages of $50,000 as I recall. Finally, the U.S. Supremes' decision in Kolstad v. ADA (why yes I did write an amicus curiae brief, thank you for remembering), provides a defense to punitive damages claims in federal discrimination cases, when an employer demonstrates its good faith efforts to comply with anti-discrimination laws. "good faith efforts" include training and other prevention efforts.
*** Warning: Only slightly tongue-in-cheek marketing ploy follows****
So, you ask, where does one find a great trainer - one who will motivate people to pay attention and take the training seriously, while covering all the legal bases? Hmm. (Yes, you're supposed to click the link!).
DGV
Thursday, August 31, 2006
California Still Revising Harassment Training Regulations
The most significant modification is that employers may elect to use a "training year" for all supervisors, such that each supervisor is trained once at some point in every other calendar year. For example, the employer could pick 2007 as a training year for all supervisors, thereby requiring all supervisors to be trained again by the end of 2009. (New supervisors and new hires still would have receive initial training within six months of hire or promotion). The regs' other alternative is to track each supervisor's training individually, ensuring that supervisor is trained on a bi-annual schedule. This change should help employers who would not be able to keep up with each supervisor's "anniversary" date for training purposes.
The final regulations should be out by the end of this year.
DGV
Bad ADEA Release Held Invalid
Separation agreements and releases of claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act are not valid unless they comply with the technical requirements of the Older Workers' Benefits Protection Act of 1989. These agreements must, among other things, be written in clear language, advise the employee to seek an attorney, provide up to 21 days (45 in case of a layoff of two or more employees) for the employee to consider the release, and a 7-day revocation period. When a release does not follow the OWBPA requirements, the employee may keep the severance and sue under the ADEA.
In Syverson v. IBM Corp., the Ninth Circuit held IBM's release was insufficiently clear, thereby invalidating the age discrimination release and allowing a class of laid-off employees to sue for age discrimination. Unfortunately for IBM, the Eighth Circuit already held that the release was invalid. The Ninth Circuit, however, performed its own analysis, and reached a similar conclusion.
The main problem with this release was that it contained a release of all claims (including ADEA claims), but also contained a "covenant not to sue," exempting ADEA claims. A release extinguishes a claim; a covenant not to sue is a promise not to assert a right in court.
The employees argued the release was unclear because it left the reader with the impression that he/she could bring a lawsuit under ADEA even after signing the release. IBM argued (reasonably) that the covenant not to sue was significant because it provided IBM protection from employees who released claims but then filed lawsuits anyway. IBM explained the release invalidated the claim, but the covenant not to sue would permit IBM to recover its defense costs. Why carve out the ADEA claim from the covenant not to sue? IBM said it intended to comply with the EEOC rule that a covenant not to sue cannot be used to preclude employees from challenging the validity of the ADEA release in court.
The Ninth Circuit said that the IBM covenant not to sue was ambiguous and hard to understand. The tension between the covenant and release was sufficient to invalidate the ADEA release.
So, if you use a "standard" release for employees 40 and over, you may wish to obtain a tune-up in light of this decision. Additionally, federal courts have been scrutinizing the validity of "birthday lists" required for effective ADEA releases in the context of layoffs. So, be careful out there!
DGV
Wednesday, August 30, 2006
California Appeals Court Interprets Bounty Hunter Amendments
Shortly after its passage, employees and their lawyers brought countless class actions for every conceivable violation of the Labor Code. In one of the more frequently cited examples, an employee sought tens of millions in penalties under PAGA because a poster was printed in the wrong font size.
The abuse of this law was so rampant, the Legislature amended the law just a few months after it became effective. The amendments were passed as "urgency" legislation that took effect immediately upon its passage. The amendments created a "safe harbor," requiring employees to notify the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement and the employer of perceived violations, so they might be corrected before a lawsuit was filed.
So much for the safe harbor. In Dunlap v. Superior Court (Bank of Am.), the Court of Appeal decided that a plaintiff may seek "statutory penalties" that were available under the Labor Code pre-PAGA, without complying with PAGA's notice requirement. Dunlap brought a class action for a pu-pu platter of Labor Code violations, including failure to pay overtime, failure to keep payroll records, meal and break violations, and failure to pay wages timely. Bank of America moved to strike, alleging Dunlap did not follow PAGA's notification prerequisites. Dunlap argued that he was suing for "statutory penalties," authorized by Lab. Code section 218, which existed long before the passage of PAGA.
The Court of Appeal decided Dunlap was correct. Even though PAGA specifically requires employees to follow its notice requirements for violations of the substantive laws Dunlap included in his Complaint, the Court of Appeal decided Lab. Code section 218 permitted a separate civil action without following PAGA. The Court distinguished between "statutory penalties" available to employees before PAGA and "civil penalties" recoverable only after meeting PAGA's exhaustion requirements.
This case cuts a huge loophole into PAGA. Why would an employee take the time to follow PAGA's exhaustion requirements and then divvy penalties with the state when the employee can bring his or her own action under section 218? (Yes, Virginia, that's a rhetorical question). PAGA will be used only for the obscure violations subject to penalties that previously could be recovered only by the Labor Commissioner, or the new catch-all penalty.
The Court of Appeal invited the Legislature to clarify PAGA again if its interpretation was incorrect. The PAGA"s notice provisions give employers a chance to comply with the many Labor Code mandates before facing huge liabilities for penalties. If the Labor Code is meant to protect employees, rather than create hundreds of opportunities for "gotcha" lawsuits, the Legislature should make whatever clarification is necessary to overturn Dunlap.
DGV
Wednesday, August 23, 2006
Employers Who Hire Illegals Sued by Other Employers
Under Prop. 64, which narrowed the UCL's applicability, the plaintiff will have to establish "standing," or actual injury in fact in order to maintain the lawsuit. For example, an employer would have to establish that it lost business to a competitor that hires illegal aliens and could set prices lower as a result.
"Illegalemployers.org" a group that seems to have been formed specifically to target employers that hire undocumented workers, is referenced in the article.
It seems that the marketplace is going to implement its own immigration reform since the government's efforts to enact immigration reform legislation stalled back in April.
DGV
Tuesday, August 22, 2006
California Minimum Wage Update
Under the compromise, the minimum wage will not be indexed to inflation.
If passed, the minimum wage increase will affect California's executive, administrative, and professional exemptions from overtime, which require a minimum salary of twice the minimum wage. So, the new minimum salary requirements will be $31,200.00 on 1/1/2007 and $33,280 on 1/1/2008.
The bill has not yet been signed, so it is possible additional changes will be made. We will keep you posted.
DGV
Monday, August 14, 2006
"Pretext" standard concisely explained
once a non-retaliatory explanation has been articulated, [*7] the plaintiff must show that this explanation is a pretext for discrimination. To do this the employee must establish that the explanation is a lie, which permits a jury to infer that the tale has been concocted to conceal an unlawful truth. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 125 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1993).It is not enough to demonstrate that the employer was mistaken, inconsiderate, short-fused, or otherwise benighted; none of those possibilities violates federal law. See Forrester v. Rauland-Borg Corp., No. 05-4650 (7th Cir. June 29, 2006) (collecting authority); Pollard v. Rea Magnet Wire Corp., 824 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1987). Poor personnel management receives its comeuppance in the market rather than the courts.
Gee, I wish I had written that.
Closer to home, the California Supreme Court has articulated a similar standard:
On the other hand, if nondiscriminatory, Bechtel's true reasons need not necessarily have been wise or correct. While the objective soundness of an employer's proffered reasons supports their credibility . . . the ultimate issue is simply whether the employer acted with a motive to discriminate illegally. Thus, "legitimate" reasons . . . in this context are reasons that are facially unrelated to prohibited bias, and which, if true, would thus preclude a finding of discrimination. . . . "
Guz v. Bechtel Nat., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 358 (Cal. 2000).
DGV
Thursday, August 10, 2006
Yes, you have no class action
Au contraire. In this post-Sav-on decision, Dunbar v. Albertson's, the First District Court of Appeal held the trial court was within its discretion to deny class certification in an overtime case.
DGV
Wednesday, August 09, 2006
Employer's Policy Defeats Employee's Claim Computer Was Private
The 9th Circuit held the search did not violate the 4th Amendment because the employee had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his work computer. The most significant fact in the Court's view was that the employer had a policy permitting random monitoring and searching of the computer.
The Court of Appeals in part relied on a California court's decision, TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Superior Court (Zieminski) (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443 , 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 155. In that case, the California Court of Appeal held that an employee had no expectation of privacy in a company-owned computer that the employee used at his home for work and personal mixed use:
As can be seen, Zieminski knew that TBG would monitor the files and messages stored on the computers he used at the office and at home. He had the opportunity to consent to TBG's policy or not, and had the opportunity to limit his use of his home computer to purely business matters. To state the obvious, no one compelled Zieminski or his wife or children to use the home computer for personal matters, and no one prevented him from purchasing his own computer for his personal use. With all the information he needed to make an intelligent decision, Zieminski agreed to the Company's policy and chose to use his computer for personal matters. By any reasonable standard, Zieminski fully and voluntarily relinquished his privacy rights in the information he stored on his home computer, and he will not now be heard to say that he nevertheless had a reasonable expectation of privacy.The 4th Amendment applies only to the government. But California's constitutional right to privacy can be asserted against private employers. Therefore, employers that do not have electronic monitoring policies risk claims that email / internet monitoring is an invasion of California workers' privacy. It seems to me that a company employing California workers would be vulnerable to such a claim even if the corporation is located out of state.
DGV
Tuesday, August 08, 2006
San Francisco Employers - Wallet alert
The cost is estimated at $200 million (about $2400 per uninsured resident), which means it will be much higher. The white paper says the program will be financed by a "combination of sources, including tax dollars, local business contributions and individual premiums," according to the report.
According to FAQ's developed by SF's health care agency, non-profits with under 50 workers and small employers with under 20 workers will be exempt initially. Employers with less than 100 employees will have to contribute up to $1.06 per employee hour on some form of health insurance, reimbursement of medical costs, or contribution to the new "SF HAP." That number increases to $1.60 per hour for employers of over 100 workers.
DGV
Monday, August 07, 2006
California minimum wage update
DGV
Thursday, August 03, 2006
California Supreme Court Says: "At Will" Means "At Will"
Here's the offer letter:
Brook, please know that as with all of our company employees, your employment with Arnold Communications, Inc. is at will. This simply means that Arnold Communications has the right to terminate your employment at any time just as you have the right to terminate your employment with Arnold Communications, Inc. at any time.
The lower court apparently decided that because the offer explained "at will" meant that employment could be terminated "at any time," it left open the possibility that the grounds for termination somehow were other than "at will."
In a refreshingly brief opinion based on logic and common sense, the Supremes unanimously decided that the agreement contained no ambiguity whatsoever:
The language of the parties' written agreement is unambiguous. AWI's letter plainly states that Dore's employment with AWI was at will. Indeed, as the trial court observed, Dore admitted as much and further admitted that he "read, signed, understood and did not disagree with the terms of the letter." Even the Court of Appeal acknowledged that the term "at will" when used in an employment contract normally conveys an intent employment may be ended by either party "at any time without cause." Although AWI's letter also states that AWI would provide Dore a "90 day assessment" and "annual review," these provisions, in describing AWI's employee evaluation schedule, neither expressly nor impliedly conferred on Dore the right to be terminated only for cause.
The Supreme Court also held that the 90-day probationary period and the promise of an annual review did not create any expectation of continued employment contrary to employment at will:
Although AWI's letter also states that AWI would provide Dore a "90 day assessment" and "annual review," these provisions, in describing AWI's employee evaluation schedule, neither expressly nor impliedly conferred on Dore the right to be terminated only for cause.
Right. Introductory periods are not inconsistent with at-will employment, contrary to what some have said. Of course, where employment is "at will" an introductory period is not legally required. But they do serve a purpose, in that they manage employees' expectations and provide management with a safe harbor for making an initial assessment regarding whether a hire is going to work out.
****Shameless self-promotion follows********
When you read the opinion, don't stop before you get to the page listing the attorneys! That's right, your humble correspondent helped write an amicus brief supporting the employer (surprise). Would it have been nice if the opinion had included a cite to our brief? Natch.DGV