U.S. Supreme Court Protects Public Sector Employee's First Amendment Rights

Central Alabama Community College hired Edward Lane to be Director of Community Intensive Training for Youth (CITY).  After learning CITY had budget problems, he audited the program’s expenses.  During the audit, Lane found out Schmitz, an Alabama state representative, was on the CITY payroll, but not working.  Lane pressed the issue, demanding Schmitz report to work.  She refused.  Lane fired Schmitz.

Schmitz took offense that Lane would try to save the tax payers some money by firing someone collecting a salary for not doing any work.   She allegedly told another employee she would seek retribution against Lane and that she would see to it that his agency would not receive favor from the legislature.  The FBI became involved, and Schmitz was later convicted of corruption charges.   Lane testified under oath before a grand jury and at trial, under subpoena.

Meanwhile, the CITY agency continued its budget woes.  Lane's boss, Franks, later laid off Lane and another probationary employee.  Lane sued Franks under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violation of his civil rights (First Amendment right to testify without retaliation, among other things).  He sued Franks in his "official capacity" as a substitute for the state, and in his individual capacity.

But the lower courts held that Lane was not entitled to First Amendment protection because the testimony he haves were related to his official duties.  Precedents establish that when government employees speak within the course of their duties, the First Amendment provides minimal protection, because of the employer's interest in orderly operation of its work place. 

The U.S. Supreme Court accepted the case to determine if the First Amendment protects employees who provide testimony under oath on matters that concern the job site.  The Court unanimously held that it does, thereby giving Lane a retaliation claim against Franks in his "official capacity" as a representative of the state.  (Lane sought reinstatement and equitable relief against Franks in his official capacity).  

From the Court's unanimous opinion:

Truthful testimony under oath by a public employee outside the scope of his ordinary job duties is speech as a citizen for First Amendment purposes. That is so even when the testimony relates to his public employment or concerns information learned during that employment.

The Court also held:

The content of Lane’s testimony—corruption in a public program and misuse of state funds—obviously involves a matter of significant public concern.

The Court also held that the government did not have an adequate justification to tip the balance in its favor:

an employee’s sworn testimony is not categorically entitled to First Amendment protection simply because it is speech as a citizen on a matter of public concern. Under Pickering, if an employee speaks as a citizen on a matter of public concern, the next question is whether the government had “an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the public” based on thegovernment’s needs as an employer. * * * 

Here, the employer’s side of the Pickering scale is entirely empty: Respondents do not assert, and cannot demonstrate, any government interest that tips the balance in their favor. There is no evidence, for example, that Lane’s testimony at Schmitz’ trials was false or erroneous or that Lane unnecessarily disclosed any sensitive, confidential,or privileged information while testifying . . . .  

So, Lane's case against the state could proceed via his suit against Franks in his "official capacity."  But the Court also held that the lawsuit against Franks personally would be barred by "qualified immunity.":

Qualified immunity “gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 12). Under this doctrine, courts may not award damages against a government official in his personal capacity unless “the official violated a statutory or constitutional right,” and “the right was ‘clearlyestablished’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” * * * 

The relevant question for qualified immunity purposes is this: Could Franks reasonably have believed, at the time he fired Lane, that a government employer could fire an employee on account of testimony the employee gave, under oath and outside the scope of his ordinary job responsibilities? Eleventh Circuit precedent did not preclude Franks from reasonably holding that belief. And no decision of this Court was sufficiently clear to cast doubt on the controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent. * * * *

So, Lane's official capacity case was returned to the lower courts.  Franks is off the hook personally.

This case is Lane v. Franks and the opinion is here.

California Supreme Court Allows Labor Picketing at Shopping Center

But, the Court also held that the Ralphs Grocery parking lot at the Sacramento area center is NOT a public forum, where speech cannot be prevented.  We posted about the Court of Appeal's decision here, by the way.

The Supreme Court decided that two provisions of California law can protect labor picketing against trespass claims, even though the picketing occurred on private property - a parking lot and entrance to a Ralphs store.   The picketing would be allowed even if non-labor picketing would constitute a trespass.   The way the law allows this is by limiting the grounds under which courts will issue injunctions against picketing to narrow circumstances.  For good measure, the law makes it harder to prove those circumstances than other types of cases.

That sounds a lot like a First Amendment violation to me, because the government is picking and choosing what kind of speech is worthy of protection and what is not.  And that is what Justice Chin essentially said in dissent.  But, the Supreme Court majority disagrees with yours truly on that point, and the Court tends to hold more sway than Greggy's blog, no matter how wrong it is. I kid. :)

OK, here comes a long explanation if you can hang in there - 


So, here's what happened as told by the Supreme Court-

When the College Square Foods Co store opened in July 2007, agents of defendant United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 8 (the Union) began picketing the store, encouraging people not to shop there because the store‘s employees were not represented by a union and did not have a collective bargaining agreement. The Union‘s agents, in numbers varying between four and eight, walked back and forth on the entrance walkway carrying picket signs, speaking to customers, and handing out flyers. These activities generally occurred five days a week (Wednesday through Sunday) for eight hours a day. The Union‘s agents did not impede customer access to the store.

[ I bolded this because if the union did block access to the store, even the union-friendly law under review would permit an injunction]... Anyway, more from the Court's opinion -

In January 2008, Ralphs notified the Union in writing of its regulations for speech at its Foods Co stores, including the one in College Square. Those store regulations prohibit speech activities within 20 feet of the store‘s entrance and prohibit all such activities during specified hours and for a week before certain designated holidays. The store regulations also prohibit physical contact with any person, the distribution of literature, and the display of any sign larger than two feet by three feet. The Union‘s agents did not adhere to Ralphs‘s speech regulations. In particular, they handed out flyers and stood within five feet of the store‘s entrance. Ralphs asked the Sacramento Police Department to remove the Union‘s agents from the College Square Foods Co store, but the police declined to do so without a court order.

OK, so why did the police refuse to get rid of the trespassers on Ralph's private property?   Because they're in a union, too.   They said would only enforce a court order prohibiting the conduct, unless they saw some sort of crime occurring, which was not happening.  So, off Ralphs went to Court for an injunction, where it met the Moscone Act. 

In essence, the Moscone Act (actually two different laws) says that courts cannot enjoin peaceful picketing, gathering, etc. It also imposes a tough evidentiary burden on employers seeking to obtain an injunction, including a requirement of live witness testimony.

The Court of Appeal decided that Ralphs parking area and store entrance were not public forums, so California's broad constitutional right to free speech in public areas would not apply.  Then  the Court of Appeal said that the Moscone Act unconstitutionally permitted some kinds of speech on private property (labor protests), but did not protect others (e.g., anti-abortion protests).  The lower Court reasoned that when the government chooses one type of content for protection, that violates the First Amendment.

On review, the Supreme Court first held that every outdoor shopping plaza is not a public forum, where the First Amendment protects all kinds of speech:

to be a public forum under our state Constitution‘s liberty-of-speech provision, an area within a
shopping center must be designed and furnished in a way that induces shoppers to congregate for purposes of entertainment, relaxation, or conversation, and not merely to walk to or from a parking area, or to walk from one store to another, or to view a store‘s merchandise and advertising displays.

Applying this standard, the Court then decided that the College Station shopping plaza was not a protected public shopping mall where the First Amendment would apply.

So, now, Ralphs has private property and it wants to eject or limit conduct on its property via an injunction against a trespasser.  The Supreme Court had to decide if the Moscone Act's limits on injunctions violated Ralph's constitutional rights.

The Supreme Court decided the Court of Appeal was wrong, and that the Moscone Act can favor union picketing on private property without violating the Constitution.  Here is the Court's explanation of the law itself:

certain activities undertaken during a labor dispute are legal and cannot be enjoined. (Id., §527.3, subd. (b).) Those activities are:

“(1) Giving publicity to, and obtaining or communicating information regarding the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling any public street or any place where any person or persons may lawfully be, or by any other method not involving fraud, violence or breach of the peace.

“(2) Peaceful picketing or patrolling involving any labor dispute, whether engaged in singly or in numbers.

“(3) Assembling peaceably to do any of the acts specified in paragraphs (1) and (2) or to promote lawful interests.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.3, subd. (b).)

Expressly excluded from the Moscone Act’s protection, however, is “conduct that is unlawful including breach of the peace, disorderly conduct, the unlawful blocking of access or egress to premises where a labor dispute exists, or other similar unlawful activity.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.3, subd. (e).)

In addition, the law imposes burdens on courts and businesses seeking injunctions for violations:

Section 1138.1 prohibits a court from issuing an injunction during a labor dispute unless, based upon witness testimony that is given in open court and is subject to cross-examination, the court finds each of these facts:

“(1) That unlawful acts have been threatened and will be committed unless restrained or have been committed and will be continued unless restrained, but no injunction or temporary restraining order shall be issued on account of any threat or unlawful act excepting against the person or persons, association, or organization making the threat or committing the unlawful act or actually authoriz[ing] those acts. “(2) That substantial and irreparable injury to complainant’s property will follow.

“(3) That as to each item of relief granted greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant by the denial of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by the granting of relief.

“(4) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law.

“(5) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complainant’s property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection.” (§ 1138.1, subd. (a).)

OK, I've bolded what makes the Moscone Act tough on those who seek injunctions even against violent union conduct that is unprotected.  First, in most cases, a court will issue a temporary injunction  on papers.  For labor injunctions, there must be live testimony. Second, the injunction can be issued only against individuals that violate the Act specifically, not against a whole union, absent proof that the whole union is actually authorizing the conduct. Tough to get the names of the folks breaking stuff outside your store, right?
Oh, and you have to put on evidenced that the police cannot or will not help. Easy breezy!  These requirements just do not apply to temporary injunctions in other contexts.

So, the Supreme Court did not see a problem with this. First, the Court surveyed a long line of cases recognizing the rights of unions to conduct peaceful picketing on private walkways outside of businesses.  The Court then did its best to overcome federal decisions holding that laws could not restrict one kind of speech, but not another.  The Supreme Court's rationale was that the Moscone Act does not restrict speech, it merely insulates union speech from legal action.

The Supreme Court apparently does not agree that the general rules permitting injunctions restrict speech on private property.  That is, if you come to my business to picket about some non-labor related issue, I can obtain an injunction more easily because I don't have to follow the Moscone Act. As such, the California Code of Civil Procedure contains a content bias.

Anyway, there are a number of concurring and dissenting opinions, too. The Chief Justice tried to write a concurrence softening the blow of the majority ruling, but Justice Liu essentially called "bull" on the CJ's opinion, arguing that the CJ's interpretation of the majority's opinion was not supported.  As I said earlier, Justice Chin wrote a dissent that I thought was correct, but what do I know?

This may not be the end of this discussion. The Court appears to have opined on federal law, which means that the U.S. Supreme Court likely has jurisdiction to consider whether the First Amendment trumps California law.  We will see what happens next.

I know, long post, but complex issue.  Bottom line - business owners have little power to exclude union picketing, absent (1) fairly egregious conduct (2) money to conduct a mini-trial in court to obtain an injunction and/or (3) business-friendly local politicians / police.  I emphasize that this decision applies to any business located on private property, such as an office park complex.  It's not limited to grocery stores or malls.  The Moscone Act protects picketing from trespass injunctions all over the place.

The opinion is Ralphs Grocery Co. v. UFCW, Local 8 and the opinion is here.