Central Alabama Community College hired Edward Lane to be Director of Community Intensive Training for Youth (CITY). After learning CITY had budget problems, he audited the program’s expenses. During the audit, Lane found out Schmitz, an Alabama state representative, was on the CITY payroll, but not working. Lane pressed the issue, demanding Schmitz report to work. She refused. Lane fired Schmitz.
Schmitz took offense that Lane would try to save the tax payers some money by firing someone collecting a salary for not doing any work. She allegedly told another employee she would seek retribution against Lane and that she would see to it that his agency would not receive favor from the legislature. The FBI became involved, and Schmitz was later convicted of corruption charges. Lane testified under oath before a grand jury and at trial, under subpoena.
Meanwhile, the CITY agency continued its budget woes. Lane's boss, Franks, later laid off Lane and another probationary employee. Lane sued Franks under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violation of his civil rights (First Amendment right to testify without retaliation, among other things). He sued Franks in his "official capacity" as a substitute for the state, and in his individual capacity.
But the lower courts held that Lane was not entitled to First Amendment protection because the testimony he haves were related to his official duties. Precedents establish that when government employees speak within the course of their duties, the First Amendment provides minimal protection, because of the employer's interest in orderly operation of its work place.
The U.S. Supreme Court accepted the case to determine if the First Amendment protects employees who provide testimony under oath on matters that concern the job site. The Court unanimously held that it does, thereby giving Lane a retaliation claim against Franks in his "official capacity" as a representative of the state. (Lane sought reinstatement and equitable relief against Franks in his official capacity).
From the Court's unanimous opinion:
Truthful testimony under oath by a public employee outside the scope of his ordinary job duties is speech as a citizen for First Amendment purposes. That is so even when the testimony relates to his public employment or concerns information learned during that employment.
The Court also held:
The content of Lane’s testimony—corruption in a public program and misuse of state funds—obviously involves a matter of significant public concern.
The Court also held that the government did not have an adequate justification to tip the balance in its favor:
an employee’s sworn testimony is not categorically entitled to First Amendment protection simply because it is speech as a citizen on a matter of public concern. Under Pickering, if an employee speaks as a citizen on a matter of public concern, the next question is whether the government had “an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the public” based on thegovernment’s needs as an employer. * * *
Here, the employer’s side of the Pickering scale is entirely empty: Respondents do not assert, and cannot demonstrate, any government interest that tips the balance in their favor. There is no evidence, for example, that Lane’s testimony at Schmitz’ trials was false or erroneous or that Lane unnecessarily disclosed any sensitive, confidential,or privileged information while testifying . . . .So, Lane's case against the state could proceed via his suit against Franks in his "official capacity." But the Court also held that the lawsuit against Franks personally would be barred by "qualified immunity.":
Qualified immunity “gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 12). Under this doctrine, courts may not award damages against a government official in his personal capacity unless “the official violated a statutory or constitutional right,” and “the right was ‘clearlyestablished’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” * * *
The relevant question for qualified immunity purposes is this: Could Franks reasonably have believed, at the time he fired Lane, that a government employer could fire an employee on account of testimony the employee gave, under oath and outside the scope of his ordinary job responsibilities? Eleventh Circuit precedent did not preclude Franks from reasonably holding that belief. And no decision of this Court was sufficiently clear to cast doubt on the controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent. * * * *So, Lane's official capacity case was returned to the lower courts. Franks is off the hook personally.
This case is Lane v. Franks and the opinion is here.
