An employee clashes with her manager, takes a medical leave of absence for "stress," receives repeated extensions, and her doctor says she can come back to work, but only under a new manager. Heard that one before? That's what Higgins-Williams v. Sutter Medical Foundation is about.
The plaintiff-employee took CFRA/FMLA leave initially. Then she exhausted it and returned to work. Her manager immediately gave her a negative evaluation. The regional manager, Perry, began to single plaintiff out for negative treatment, such as being curt with plaintiff while being friendly with others. Then plaintiff's boss accused the plaintiff of being irresponsible with her badge and Perry allegedly grabbed her arm. The plaintiff had a "panic attack," and did not return to work again.
Sutter granted a series of extended absences as temporary accommodations. Plaintiff's doctor continued to insist that she could return to work under a new supervisor and perform her duties without restriction. The doctor then certified that plaintiff could return to work in her original department, but on light duty. The doctor would not commit to a return to work date when the plaintiff could perform her essential functions with or without an accommodation (that did not include a new supervisor).
Sutter then drew the line:
On January 24, 2011, Sutter informed plaintiff (1) that Dr. Chen had stated on January 6, 2011, that plaintiff could not return to work then, but that plaintiff wanted to return on March 1, 2011, on light duty in the Connecting to Work Program; (2) that Dr. Chen did not provide any information as to if or when plaintiff would be able to return to her clinical assistant position; (3) that there was no information to support a conclusion that additional leave as an accommodation would effectuate plaintiff‟s return as a clinical assistant; and (4) that if plaintiff did not provide such information by January 31, 2011, her employment would be terminated February 1, 2011.
Plaintiff and her doctor apparently did not get the gist of this communication.
Sutter then terminated the plaintiff's employment on February 1, 2011.
On January 28, 2011, Dr. Chen informed Sutter that plaintiff was not medically cleared to return to work at that point, and that plaintiff would continue her regimen of psychotherapy and medications. In her deposition, plaintiff testified she did not feel she could have returned to work in the Shared Services Department with regional manager Perry or supervisor Prince on February 1, 2011. Plaintiff also testified at her deposition
that at the time of her termination, she "was willing to try‟ to return to work on March 1, 2011, in the Shared Services Department under manager Perry.
So, the plaintiff sued for disability discrimination, retaliation, failure to prevent, and denial of accommodation under the Fair Employment and Housing Act. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment.
The basis for the Court of Appeal's decision is significant. The Court reaffirmed previous case law in which the court held that inability to work for a particular supervisor is not a covered disability:
An employee's inability to work under a particular supervisor because of anxiety and stress related to the supervisor‟s standard oversight of the employee‟s job performance does not constitute a disability under FEHA. (Hobson v. Raychem Corp. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 614, 628 (Hobson) [“the inability to perform one particular job, or to work under a particular supervisor, does not constitute a qualified disability” under FEHA (italics added)]; see Weiler v. Household Finance Corp. (7th Cir. 1996) 101 F.3d 519, 522, 524-525 [both Hobson and Weiler apply the narrower federal test of disability of “substantially limits” a major life activity, rather than the broader California test of simply “limits”; Hobson was disapproved on this point in Colmenares v. Braemar Country Club, Inc. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1019, 1031, fn. 6] (Colmenares).)
As stated above, the Court of Appeal acknowledged that the Hobson decision applied a less employee-friendly definition of disability. But the Court then held that even under the current formulation, inability to work for the current supervisor is not a disability, because it does not "limit" the major life activity of working.
The Court then held that because the plaintiff did not have a disability, she could not succeed under her claims for common law wrongful termination, denial of accommodation or failure to engage in the interactive process.
Of note, the Court of Appeal remanded the case to the trial court regarding its award of costs to Sutter. Costs no longer are awarded to prevailing defendants as a matter of right in FEHA cases, following the California Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. Chino Valley Independent Fire Dist. (2015) 61 Cal.4th 97 (discussed here).
This case is Higgins-Williams v. Sutter Med. Foundation, and the opinion is here.
