A 9th Circuit panel held, 2-1, that a police officer with ADHD did not have a legally sufficient "disability" to justify a claim under the ADA. That is because, the court found, his "impairment" did not "substantially limit" the major life activities of working or interacting with others.
The employee, Weaving, was diagnosed with ADHD at six years old. At 12, he stopped taking medication, but had difficulty getting along with others during his teen and adult years.
So, Weaving becomes a police officer in Beaverton, Oregon. He passed all the exams, physical and mental. He did not disclose his ADHD diagnosis or prior medications, believing he was no longer afflicted. He stayed in Beaverton for about 10 years, and received much negative feedback about his personality conflicts.
He joined the Hillsboro, Oregon, police force in 2006. He disclosed his previous ADHD diagnosis and noted some of the personality conflicts that had plagued him. Hillsboro offered him provisional employment, subject to a medical evaluation. Weaving passed that evaluation, as well as another one when he applied for promotion to sergeant. His superiors noted he sometimes was perceived as arrogant or intimidating, but that he did his job well.
After a couple of incidents of conflict with his co-workers/ subordinates, the city placed Weaving on administrative leave. (Paid, natch.). While on leave, Weaving came to the conclusion that ADHD might be the source of some of his troubles (!). A doctor agreed that his ADHD might cause him to interact roughly with co-workers, but that he could still be an "excellent" officer. So, weaving told the City that he should be reinstated with "all reasonable accommodations," so that he might obtain treatment and improve his communications.
But, while on administrative leave, the city conducted an investigation. The consensus was that Weaving was, in effect, a terror. Two doctors evaluated him as medically fit for duty, too. So, the city decided to discharge Weaving.
A jury found the city violated the ADA by firing Weaving and awarded him money damages. but not reinstatement. The city appealed.
The court of appeals first considered whether Weaving was "substantially limited" in the major life activity of working. The ADA Amendments Act relaxed the "substantially limited" standard. Even so, the court held there was no evidence of substantial limitation:
The record does not contain substantial evidence showing that Weaving was limited in his ability to work compared to “most people in the general population.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). On the contrary, there is evidence showing that Weaving was in many respects a skilled police officer. ****
Weaving's supervisors recognized his knowledge and technical competence and selected him for high-level assignments. In 2007, before receiving any treatment for adult ADHD, he was promoted to sergeant. In 2009, a psychologist and a physician/psychiatrist both deemed Weaving fit for duty as a
police officer.
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Given the absence of evidence that Weaving’s ADHD affected his ability to work, and in light of the strong evidence of Weaving’s technical competence as a police officer, a jury could not reasonably have concluded that Weaving’s ADHD substantially limited his ability to work.
Weaving also claimed substantial limitation in the major life activity of interacting with others. The Ninth Circuit recognizes that as a major life activity. But, reviewing its own and other courts' decisions, the court said that merely failing to "get along" is not the same as interacting:
The court then further explained its ruling, removing the possibility that mere "jerks" can claim they have disabilities.
In dissent, Judge Callahan assiduously argued that the majority substituted its judgment for the jury and was unfaithful to the circuit's precedent. She claimed the majority cherry-picked evidence, rather than simply looked for substantial evidence to support the jury's conclusion.
The opinion in Weaving v. City of Hillsboro is here.
Weaving’s interpersonal problems do not amount to a substantial impairment of his ability to interact with others within the meaning of the ADA. Weaving’s ADHD may well have limited his ability to get along with others. But that is not the same as a substantial limitation on the ability to interact with others. See McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1235; see also Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 386 F.3d 192, 203 (2d Cir. 2004) (distinguishing “‘getting along with others’ (a normative or evaluative concept) and ‘interacting with others’ (which is essentially mechanical)”).
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Weaving was able to engage in normal social interactions. His interpersonal problems existed almost exclusively in his interactions with his peers and subordinates. He had little, if any, difficulty comporting himself appropriately with his supervisors. A case like Weaving’s is what we described in McAlindin as not giving rise to a disability claim.
The court then further explained its ruling, removing the possibility that mere "jerks" can claim they have disabilities.
One who is able to communicate with others, though his communications may at times be offensive, “inappropriate, ineffective, or unsuccessful,” is not substantially limited in his ability to interact with others within the meaning of the ADA. Jacques, 386 F.3d at 203. To hold otherwise would be to expose to potential ADA liability employers who take adverse employment actions against ill-tempered employees who create a hostile workplace environment for their colleagues.Right. On the other hand, those who have a severe inability to relate to others (such as those who cannot relate to anyone, rather than co-workers) may still claim a disability under the court's previous decisions. I would also point out that the court does not close the door on all persons claiming a disability based on ADHD. The name of the condition does not matter. It's all about how the condition's impairment "substantially limits" one or more major life activities. So, it's possible that another person's ADHD could result in more profound limitations. Remember too that the effects of medication are irrelevant under California and federal law.
In dissent, Judge Callahan assiduously argued that the majority substituted its judgment for the jury and was unfaithful to the circuit's precedent. She claimed the majority cherry-picked evidence, rather than simply looked for substantial evidence to support the jury's conclusion.
The opinion in Weaving v. City of Hillsboro is here.
