Saturday, May 10, 2008

Court of Appeal Examines "Same Actor" Inference

Nita White-Ivy was a senior HR manager. She was Marietta Harvey's boss at a company called Pyramid. Then, White-Ivy became VP of Global HR for Sybase. She hired Harvey to be a director of HR at Sybase. Both women are Filipina. At Sybase, White-Ivy promoted Harvey several times, up to where she was the second-highest ranking employee in the department. Later, White-Ivy was considering demoting Harvey because she was unhappy with Harvey's performance and wanted to reduce her responsibilities. Harvey spoke with other executives about this proposed demotion. White-Ivy did not go forward with the demotion. However, she called Harvey on the carpet for "back-stabbling" and eliminated her position. Also, in response to some other executives' feedback, White-Ivy had commented that there were too many Asian females in the HR department, and she was interested in hiring more males, and more white males.

Harvey sued Sybase for race /national origin and sex discrimination. Thus, she accused White-Ivy, another female Filipina, of firing Harvey because of discrimination. That's the same White-Ivy who supervised Harvey at two companies, hired her at Sybase, and gave her several promotions. Harvey also claimed she was fired for discussing her salary in violation of the Labor Code.

A jury obviously found that there was no way White-Ivy was motivated by sex or national origin discrimination when she decided to fire Harvey, right? Wrong. The jury awarded her $1.8 million, including $500,000 in punitive damages.

The Court of Appeal rejected Sybase's argument that the same actor evidence - evidence that White-Ivy had treated Harvey well on so many occasions over a long period of time - was dispositive. The Court found "substantial evidence" on which the jury could have found discrimination - that White-Ivy was motivated to replace Asian females with males and non-Asians. Under well-settled principles, if a jury's verdict is based on substantial evidence, the jury is is privileged to reject contrary evidence, even if compelling. So, the Court affirmed the jury's verdict, acknowledging the evidence of non-discrimination was strong.

There are a number of lessons to be learned from this case, including about "diversity" efforts. Announcing a desire to hire members of one protected group or another to improve the mix of races and sexes in a department may be used as evidence of discrimination by members of other groups. Even a manager with a history of favoring members of one group may be found to have discriminatory motivations. Finally, the "same actor" inference remains part of employment law, particularly in the context of motions for summary judgment. However, it is unclear how this case, decided after a verdict, will affect courts' analysis.

The case is Harvey v. Sybase and the opinion is here.

Proposed SB 1583 Imposes Liability for Bad Independent Contractor Advice

Non-attorney HR consultants - heads up!

SB 1583, now pending in the legislature, would impose penalties on third parties who merely advise employers that a given worker can be classified as an independent contractor. The penalty applies only if the worker is later found to have been mis-classified. The penalty is $200 per day per contractor. Licensed attorneys are exempt from this bill (whew).

The proposed bill text is here. Be careful out there!

DGV

Wednesday, May 07, 2008

Newspaper Delivery Drivers Are Employees for Workers' Comp. Purposes

State Compensation Insurance Fund assessed Antelope Valley Press workers' compensation premiums for newspaper delivery workers. AVP classified these persons as independent contractors, not employees, and challenged SCIF's decision in court. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the delivery workers were properly considered employees.

The Court of Appeal found “the evidence does not show that in making deliveries. . . the carriers are engaged in a distinct occupation or business of their own” and “delivering papers requires no particular skill.” Moreover, the same company had employees, whom they admitted were employees, performing the same duties as the purported contractors. In addition, applying the seminal case of S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341, found that nearly all the factors therein pointed to employee status. In particular, AVP controlled numerous aspects of how the deliverypersons handled their duties.

Three recent court of appeal opinions have found employee status with respect to delivery persons. The previous ones were JKH Enterprises v. Dept. of Industrial Relations and Estrada v. Federal Express. The current case is Antelope Valley Press v. Poizner and the opinion is here.

Thanks to Matt Norfleet of our San Francisco office for pointing out the decision.

Tuesday, May 06, 2008

Contractual Attorneys' Fees Provision Bites Employer

Profit Concepts Management, Inc. sued Greg Griffith, a former employee, for trade secrets violations in California Superior Court. Griffith moved to quash service on the basis of no personal jurisdiction. Profit Concepts did not oppose the motion and the trial court dismissed the case.

The confidentiality agreement that formed the basis for the lawsuit contained a provision awarding attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. Griffith, having secured dismissal, moved for attorneys' fees under the agreement. Profit Concepts opposed that motion.

The Court of Appeal decided Griffith was the "prevailing party" under Civil Code 1717, which authorizes recovery of contractual attorneys' fees as costs to a prevailing party "regardless" of whether the case proceeds to final judgment. Profit Concepts vainly argued that there was no determination of who prevailed under the contract itself. The court said that section 1717 did not require the prevailing party to win on the contract claim itself.

The case is Profit Concepts Management, Inc. v. Griffith. The opinion is here.

Wednesday, April 23, 2008

Happy Birthday Jennifer Shaw

OK, I know it's a little gross for me to post this. But I know Jennifer's clients and friends check in on the blog from time to time. Please give her a shout for her birthday! I know she'll be happy to hear from you.

DGV

Thursday, April 17, 2008

Court of Appeal: No Individual Liability for Wages or UCL

The Wins Corporations were three garment manufacturers owned by the Wongs. After some business reverses, the businesses did not pay all wages due. The Labor Commissioner sought to hold the Wongs personally liable for the wages under a variety of theories. The trial court held they could not be personally liable. On appeal, the Labor Commissioner argued that managing agents like the Wongs may be held personally liable when the Labor Commissioner commences an action to recover wages under Labor Code section 1193.6. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Reynolds v. Bement, 36 Cal.4th 1075 (2003), the court of appeal held no personal liability for unpaid vacation, final pay, or associated penalties was available under the common law definition of "employer" applicable to these claims.
The court also rejected the Labor Commissioner's argument that the unfair competition law, Bus. Prof. Code section 17200 allowed for personal liability. The court reasoned that the remedy available under 17200 - restitution - could not apply to the Wongs. That's because they personally did not withhold the subject wages. As such, the could not be held liable for "restoring" those wages to the plaintiffs.
Of note, the Labor Commissioner did not dispute the superior court's conclusions that the Wongs were not "alter egos" and therefore waived the issue for appeal. (The superior court had determined the Wongs had respected corporate formalities and adequately capitalized the companies and, therefore, were not alter egos.) The Labor Commissioner also did not challenge the superior court's conclusion that the Wongs could not be held liable under a special statute applicable to the garment industry (section 2673.1) because she did not pursue that liability properly in the administrative forum. So, these theories remain potentially viable ways of holding corporate executives personally liable.

The case is Bradstreet v. Wong and the opinion is here.

Monday, April 07, 2008

CA Supreme Court Rules on California Family Rights Act Issues

So, Lonicki was an employee claiming major depression and work-related stress stopped coming to work and requested medical leave. In the employer’s view, the employee did not have a serious health condition and was capable of performing her duties. The employer ordered the employee to return to work, and fired her when she did not. The twist: While taking FMLA/CFRA leave, she worked for another employer. While her other job was not identical, there was a substantial overlap.
The Supreme Court considered two issues: First, could the employer just fire Lonicki without seeking additional medical certifications as provided by the CFRA statute? The court concluded (6-1) that employers need not do so. Justice Moreno, though, said that the employer must follow that procedure before denying leave based on an employer's belief that the employee is not eligible for leave.
The second issue is the one that got the headlines: If an employee seeks FMLA/CFRA leave for her own health condition, and she works another job, does she really have a serious health condition? Here, the Supreme Court split 4-3 that she MIGHT. The court decided that working another position is evidence that the employee's condition might not qualify for FMLA or CFRA. But the Court refused to hold that working in a comparable job was "conclusive" evidence no serious health condition justified leave. So, off to trial with Lonicki and her employer.

The case is Lonicki v. Sutter Health Central and the opinion is here.

Saturday, April 05, 2008

Another Arbitration Agreement Invalidated

Metters worked for Ralphs Grocery. He believed he was a victim of discrimination and harassment and complained to human resources, and to the President of the company via a hotline.
Ralphs Grocery has a dispute resolution policy and an arbitration agreement that it includes with a request for dispute resolution. The language requiring arbitration, although on the second page of the form, is surrounded by a border box, is in white type on a black background, and emphasizes that arbitration is required. However, the arbitration agreement is contained in the request for dispute resolution, not in a separate document that is styled "arbitration agreement" or something similarly unambiguous.
The trial court and court of appeal agreed that the Ralphs forms did not establish an "agreement to arbitrate" because there was no contractual "meeting of the minds." Therefore, there was no need to decide whether the arbitration agreement was unconscionable, or whether the Federal Arbitration Act required arbitration. Without an agreement to arbitrate, the FAA does not apply.
The court of appeal found significant that Ralphs would have had a duty to investigate Metters' claims even if he did not submit the request for dispute resolution form. Yet, Ralphs apparently did not adequately explain Metters' options to him.
The case is Metters v. Ralphs Grocery. The opinion is here.

Sunday, March 23, 2008

Ninth Circuit Holds Applicant Drug Testing Policy Violates Fourth Amendment

The City of Woodburn, Oregon, has an applicant drug testing policy. All prospective applicants must be screened for illegal drugs prior to hire.

As a government employer, Woodburn is bound to follow the U.S. Constitution. Drug testing is a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. To avoid securing a warrant to conduct the search, the City must demonstrate a sufficient reason to conduct the drug testing without one.

Lanier applied for a job as a part-time worker in the city's library. She refused the drug test and was not hired. She claimed that requiring her to take a drug test as an applicant violated her rights. The Ninth Circuit agreed. The court held that the city's articulated reasons - general societal problems with drug abuse, protecting children in the library, and the adverse effect drug use has on work performance were sufficiently special. Not so, said the court of appeals. Rather, to conduct applicant drug testing, the City would have to demonstrate that these factors were specific problems in the City's workforce, and involving the particular job for which Lanier applied.

Unless the U.S. Supreme Court reverses this decision, many government drug testing programs for applicants will be invalid. The case also may have ripple effects for private employers. In California, for example, applicant drug testing by private employers is generally lawful. The courts have relied on constitutional jurisprudence in reaching that decision. So, stay tuned.
The case is Lanier v. City of Woodburn. The opinion is here.

Resident Employees Paid Only For Time Worked

Industrial and Welfare Commission Order No. 5-2001 contains a special provision applicable to employees who are required to reside on the premises. These employees are required to be paid only for the time spent actually working, rather than their entire time on the premises, even if they are "on call." The Isners were resident managers of a non-profit home for the elderly. They were required to live on the premises. When they were "on call," they had to remain within earshot of call alarms and respond to "emergencies." They sought compensation for all on-call time. But the Court of Appeal decided that their employer, Falkenberg, compensated them properly for only the time they actually spent working.
The case is Isner v. Falkenberg. The opinion is here.

Recent Shaw Valenza Articles Winter/Spring 2008

In case you missed them, here are some recent articles we've published on a variety of topics. None was an Oprah selection of the month.

NO INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY FOR RETALIATION UNDER THE FEHA
By Jennifer Brown Shaw and Shane Anderies
The Daily Recorder
12 March 2008

NEW PROPOSED REGULATIONS FOR THE FMLA
By Jennifer Brown Shaw
The Daily Recorder
26 February 2008

ONE TOKE OVER THE LINE
By D. Gregory Valenza
The Daily Journal
15 February 2008

EXPANSION OF FMLA LEAVE FOR FAMILIES OF SERVICE MEMBERS
By Jennifer Brown Shaw and Matthew J. Norfleet
The Daily Recorder
13 February 2008

LEDBETTER V. GOODYEAR: WHAT DOES IT STAND FOR AND WILL IT STAND?
By Carolyn G. Burnette and D. Gregory Valenza
Employment & Labor Relations Law - American Bar Association
1 February 2008

FREE SPEECH AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR WORKPLACE
By Jennifer Brown Shaw and Becki D. Graham
The Daily Recorder
30 January 2008

SHOULD PAY CARDS BE TREATED THE SAME AS PAYCHECKS?
By D. Gregory Valenza
The Daily Journal
18 January 2008

EMPLOYEE TERMINATIONS: STEPS TO REDUCE LIABILITY
By Jennifer Brown Shaw
The Daily Recorder
15 January 2008

PREVENTING UNION ACTIVITIES VIA COMPANY EMAIL GETS EASIER
By Jennifer Brown Shaw
The Daily Recorder
2 January 2008

UPDATED EMPLOYEE POLICIES FOR 2008
By Jennifer Brown Shaw
The Daily Recorder
18 December 2007

DISABILITY AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR EMPLOYEES' MISCONDUCT?
By D. Gregory Valenza
The Daily Journal
7 December 2007

Cease and Desist Letter Gets SLAPP Protection

Here's the way the court put it:

An employer fired one of its employees amid allegations that the employee had misappropriated customer lists and solicited his employer’s customers to start a
competing business. Several months before litigation was commenced by the employer against its former employee, the employer’s attorney drafted a letter to the employer’s customers that accused the employee of breach of contract and
misappropriation of trade secrets, and that “suggest[ed]” to the customers that, to avoid potential involvement in any ensuing litigation “as a material witness, or otherwise,” the customers should not do business with the former employee. The employee commenced a defamation action against the former employer. We hold that, in the circumstances of this case, the lawyer’s letter to the customers was a “writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a . . . judicial body” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2)) and therefore covered by the anti-SLAPP statute because the letter directly related to the employer’s claims against the employee, and the employer was seriously and in good faith contemplating litigation against the employee.
Of note, the court also ruled that it made no difference that the lawyer sent the letter to its customers rather than just the former employee. The court also said that the litigation privilege was irrelevant to whether the communication satisfied the requirements of the anti-SLAPP statute. However, the litigation privilege would be relevant to the second prong of anti-SLAPP analysis - the plaintiff's chance of success on the merits.

This case is good news for practitioners who send out "cease and desist" letters to former employees accused of violating restrictive covenants. It's also good news for employers, as they could have found it harder to find lawyers to send out such letters if the former employee could freely sue for defamation.

The case is Neville v. Chudacoff. The opinion is here.

Tuesday, March 11, 2008

California Court of Appeal Upholds Rare Attorneys Fees Award Against Plaintiff

Daniel Villanueva sued the City of Colton for discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act. The trial court sustained nearly all of the City's objections to his evidence, leaving him with virtually no opposition to the City's motion for summary judgment. He lost. Then the trial court awarded the City $39,000 in attorneys fees for pursuing a frivolous case. The Court of Appeal held that the City properly won summary judgment, that the unchallenged evidentiary objections precluded the court's consideration of excluded evidence, and that on the merits there was nothing to the case. The court then held that 1) the trial court must consider the employee's ability to pay an attorneys' fees award and 2) the plaintiff put on no evidence of inability to pay. So, the trial court's award of fees was upheld, as the case was frivolous.

The case is Villanueva v. City of Colton. Opinion is here.

Friday, March 07, 2008

Court of Appeal: $44 recovery; $500 in fees

The Second District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's refusal to grant attorneys' fees in a wage and hour case. The amount in controversy was: $44.63. The plaintiff, Harrington, unsuccessfully tried to bring a class action. His individual claim was for one day of unpaid overtime. Because of penalties, etc., the case settled for $10,500, plus "reasonable attorneys fees." The trial court said that the $10,500 was enough to pay the attorneys.
The Court of Appeal held that the trial court was required to award "reasonable" attorneys' fees to Harrington as the prevailing party. The court then said there was "no way on earth" that Harrington's attorneys were entitled to the $46,000 in fees they claimed. Instead, the court fixed a reasonable amount at ... $500. That's enough for a nice lunch for the whole office, guys. Celebrate the win!

Harrington v. Payroll Entertainment Services, Inc.

Monday, March 03, 2008

California Supreme Court: No Individual Liability for Retaliation Under FEHA

Years ago, lower courts held that individual managers may be held liable for "retaliation," i.e, taking negative action against an employee for his or her engaging in protected activity. At the same time, the courts decided individual managers could not be held liable for "discrimination," i.e., taking adverse action based on an employee's membership in protected groups. Back in 1998, the California Supreme Court ruled in Reno v. Baird that supervisors could not be held liable for discriminatory decisions amounting to "personnel actions."

The difference in the courts' treatment of these two types of actions apparently was based on differences in language between the statute barring "discrimination" and the section prohibiting "retaliation." However, a primary policy underlying Reno - permitting managers to manage without fear of personal liability - was inconsistent with holding managers personally liable for retaliation. That is, a manager's "retaliatory" decision is based on an unlawful motivation, just as a "discriminatory" decision.

The California Supreme Court finally reviewed the issue of individual liability for managers based on allegations of retaliation in violation of FEHA. In Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines, the Court decided that Reno's rationale controlled the question and that individuals could not be held personally liable. The opinion is here.

The Legislature has never overturned Reno. When the Supreme Court held in Carrisales v. Dept. of Corrections that individual non-supervisors could not be held personally liable for harassment, the Legislature moved quickly and specifically passed a law imposing such liability.

Perhaps the Legislature will seek to do so again. However, as the Court pointed out, a manager facing personal liability for normal personnel actions (demotion, termination, failure to promote, compensation, discipline, etc.) will face a conflict of interest every time he or she faces the issue of whether to take adverse action against an employee. With harassment, on the other hand, a manager may avoid liability simply by refraining from engaging in conduct that may amount to "harassment." Hopefully, the Legislature will consider that issue carefully before seeking to overturn Reno or Jones.

U.S. Supreme Court: A Charge by Any Other Name... Is Still a Charge

The U.S. Supreme Court decided 7-2 that an EEOC Intake Questionnaire was a valid substitute for the official "Charge" of Discrimination. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, reasoned that the Intake Questionnaire, coupled with an attached affidavit, contained all the information required of a Charge by regulation. The attached affidavit also contained a request for the EEOC to act. That was enough in the case at bar. However, the EEOC need not deem every Intake Questionnaire to be a Charge.

The employer, Federal Express, did not receive notice of the Charge, nor was it given the opportunity for conciliation, all of which appear to be contemplated by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The majority recognized that problem, suggesting the district court can stay the civil action pending the conciliation process.

The majority also suggested that the result might be different under Title VII. The procedural rules and laws differ slightly under the ADEA, which permits lawsuits after agency inaction for more than 60 days. The EEOC also may commence litigation under the ADEA without a charge, so long as it first attempts to conciliate.

Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented.

This case will create problems for employers seeking to invoke the statute of limitations in federal discrimination actions. Additionally, as Justice Thomas pointed out in the dissent, becaause not every Intake Questinonaire will qualify as a Charge, there most likely will be litigation over this issue, driving up litigation costs and delays. It remains to be seen whether the EEOC accepts the Court's suggestion to clarify its rules on filing Charges.

The case is Federal Express Corporation v. Holowecki, and the opinion is here.

Tuesday, February 26, 2008

U.S. Supreme Court Punts on "Me Too" Evidence in Discrimination Cases

Mendelsohn sued Sprint for age discrimination. At trial, she attempted to admit evidence that other Sprint employees were subjected to age discrimination, even though by different supervisors at different times, and otherwise unrelated to the discrimination she experienced. This is known as "me too" evidence. The district court held the evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, believing the district court adopted a "per se" rule excluding "me too" evidence based on Tenth Circuit precedent.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a unanimous ruling, reversed the Tenth Circuit. However, the Court did not analyze the extent to which "me too" evidence is admissible. Rather, this case was decided as a matter of civil procedure / evidence law. On the merits, the court said that "me too" evidence is neither per se admissible or inadmissible, and the decision to admit it is within the trial court's discretion based on factors normally applicable to the relevance analysis. No guidance on this issue at all.
The case is Sprint / United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn. The opinion is here.

Thursday, February 21, 2008

U.S. Supreme Court: ERISA Actions Against Fiduciaries

There is nothing like an ERISA case to stimulate debate and discussion at the water coolers of all employment lawyers' firms. OK, I'm kidding. I think. But from what I'm reading, this is an important ERISA case that may result in more claims.

The Supreme Court decided that individual members of a defined contribution plan may sue plan fiduciaries for misconduct that depletes the value of the individual account within the plan. The case is Larue v. DeWolff et al. and the opinion is here.

U.S. Supremes: Arbitrate Claims Under Labor Commissioner's Jurisdiction

The California Labor Commissioner has primary jurisdiction over disputes under California's Talent Agencies Act. (Lab. Code section 1700 et seq.). But some television star named "Judge Alex" (not the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit) Ferrer, and his entertainment lawyer, Preston, agreed in their contract to arbitrate any disputes between them. When Preston attempted to collect fees he alleged were due him, the Labor Commissioner took the claim and refused to stay it pending arbitration.

Judge Alex sought an order compelling arbitration, which was denied. The California Court of Appeal held that Federal Arbitration Act did not trump the Labor Commissioner's jurisdiction, because the FAA does not apply to administrative agency jurisdiction.

The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, and held that an arbitrator gets to decide whether Preston's agreement with Ferrer was enforceable under the Talent Agencies Act. In so holding, the Court clarified that when a party challenges an entire contract is unenforceable, not just the arbitration clause, the arbitrator decides that issue, even if the alternative forum is an administrative agency under state law.

The case is Preston v. Ferrer. The opinion is here.

Saturday, February 16, 2008

NLRA Preempts California Wrongful Termination Claim

Richard Luke was suspended for alleged dishonesty regarding his whereabouts. He then sent an email to his employer's parent's management entitled "trouble brewing." He was promptly fired the next day for circulating an anti-management petition and for ignoring the "chain of command." He testified at his deposition that he and other employees discussed working conditions such as being passed over for promotion, and physical conditions at the wine-label manufacturing plant at which he worked. He thought that was why he was fired. He said discharging him for that reason violated the public policy expressed in Labor Code section 232.5 (no adverse action against employee who "discloses" working conditions.).
In Luke v. Collotype Labels USA, Inc., opinion here, the court of appeal found that section 232.5 is preempted by the National Labor Relations Act. Essentially, Luke's working with other employees to complain about promotions and plant conditions was a "concerted activity" that were "arguably" protected by the NLRA. As such they fall within the "Garmon" preemption doctrine.
Although the court in Luke did not even cite the court of appeal's decision in Grant-Burton v. Covenant Care, 99 Cal.App.4th 1361 (2002), opinion here, this decision contradicts Covenant Care's holding that a common law wrongful termination claim based on section 232 (prohibiting discharge for discussing wages) was viable. The court in Covenant Care addressed the NLRA, but noted the parties had not raised Garmon preemption on appeal, and left that issue for remand. (That sound you hear is me, smacking my forehead really hard.) With all due respect to the court of appeal in Covenant Care, that case was incorrectly decided, as shown by the decision at blog.