WHAT'S NEW IN EMPLOYMENT LAW? Welcome to Shaw Law Group, PC's law blog. We will focus on employment law developments, particularly in California. Nothing in this forum should be construed as legal advice, 'cause it isn't. So, please consult your lawyer or hire us! (We typically represent employers, not employees). Also - this is a public website, so communications are not privileged. Copyright Shaw Law Group, PC © 2017. All rights reserved.
Wednesday, January 28, 2009
Starbucks CEO Salary Cut: Spot the Issue
Unless I'm missing something, and I've been accused of missing many things,* Mr. Schultz transformed himself into a non-exempt CEO of a publicly traded corporation! (Yes, the salary is too low to qualify him as exempt under federal law).
I got a laugh out of this, because I'm an idiot. But wouldn't they vet this issue with their employment lawyers?
This is probably not a big deal, since Mr. Schultz is likely not going to sue his own company to recover the overtime wages he will be due once he fails the exempt test. Howard...call me.
*If there is some other aspect of his compensation that qualifies him for the salary test that was not reported in the article, please accept my apologies o SBUX legal team.
Tuesday, January 27, 2009
Lily Ledbetter "Fair Pay" Act
The opinion simply held that Title VII discrimination claims apply what's called a "statute of limitations." The "statute of limitations" protects employers from old claims. Claims that cannot be defended because records are gone, witnesses are dead or moved away, etc. It also protects defendants when plaintiffs "sit on their rights" and wait too long to prosecute their claims. By the way, Title VII indeed contains a statute of limitations. The dispute was over how it was applied.
Ledbetter had an Area Manager job with Goodyear for almost 20 years. Over a period of 15 years, her pay slipped as compared with other males. She finally sued for sex discrimination in her compensation under Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. The court held that the claims were time barred, because the allegedly discriminatory decisions to set her compensation were made outside the limitations period. But Ledbetter argued that every time she was paid, it was a new discriminatory act. As if the payroll coordinator knew how her wages were set. Anyway, the Court decided that her claims were time barred because none of the discriminatory decisions occurred within the 300 day limitations period that applies.
The decision hardly broke new ground. But it created a political firestorm, maybe because there was a presidential election campaign going on? Nah. But - but - Ms. Ledbetter spoke at one of the national party political conventions this year. Shhh.
Anyway, new administration, new laws. The Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act will make all compensation-based discrimination claims timely as long as one paycheck issued under the discriminatory practice falls within the limitations period. Ripple effects? Settlements, documentation and review of compensation decisions, pay equity studies.... the mind boggles.
Here's the text of the Act, which signed on 1/29/09. Oh its effective date? May 26, 2007 - the day the Supreme Court issued its decision. So, it is retro, at least as to pending cases.
Anyway, this will help you take your mind off Ms. Ledbetter and her new law: EFCA can't be far behind!
Greg
Monday, January 26, 2009
Court of Appeal Applies Anti-SLAPP Law to EDD Report
The Court of Appeal disagreed:
Here we are clearly being asked to create a wider exception for claimants who have not republished where it is foreseeable that they might do so in the future. We decline to do so. Such a rule would require courts to engage in considerable speculation as to future conduct and lead to untenable attempts to speculate on future damage. A court could not, for instance, account for the possibility that after a plaintiff has received an award for damages in the form of lost future wages, he or she might republish while seeking a job and be given the job, thus not be damaged, nonetheless.
Since publication or republication to a third person is necessary to establish the cause of action of defamation, we conclude that plaintiff cannot establish a probability of success upon her defamation claim. The motion pursuant to section 425.16 was therefore properly granted.
The case is Dible v. Haight Ashbury Free Clinic and the opinion is here.
U.S. Supreme Court: Retaliation Provisions Cover Investigation Witness
The investigator from the human resources department asked Crawford whether she had experienced inappropriate behavior by the director. She disclosed she had witnessed certain conduct. The district later fired Crawford, allegedly for embezzlement. She sued for retaliation.
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Crawford's participation in the investigation fell within Title VII's anti-retaliation protections. The court unanimously ruled that "opposition" includes providing information during an investigation. The lower courts and the employer argued that it would require something more affirmative - such as making a complaint.
The case is CRAWFORD v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE and the opinion is here.
Our Little Blog Scores a "TOP" Legal Blogs Mention
And that makes us proud. The kind of pride you feel when someone who has the same first name as you is arrested for pet endangerment. Yes, the crawl-under-your-desk sort of feeling that your humble correspondent has experienced since, oh, fifth grade or so. I know, it's time to up the meds.
Anyway, if you want to find some popular blogs to monitor, here's the list with links to all the heavy hitters. See, you thought this post was going to be a self-indulgent waste of time, didn't you?
Greg
Saturday, January 24, 2009
EFCA Debate and Article
I was up against a professor from my alma mater. I think she would rescind my diploma if it were up to her.
The interesting aspect of the debate is the opinion my opponent offered about the motivation behind this law. It's not about expanding union representation at the workplace for the sake of workers, etc. It's about the labor "movement." The more members the unions get, the more money they earn. The more money they earn, the more they can lobby politicians and affect election outcomes. Their hope is to elect politicians who will change world TRADE POLICY and become anti-"globalization." Now, *I'm* not saying that's what EFCA is really about. Rather, "that's what she said."
Anyway, if you want to hear my radio stylings, you may do so here. The King of all Media has nothing to worry about. (And "baba booey" to you all.)
DGV
Thursday, January 22, 2009
U.S. Supreme Court Clarifies Standards for Unions to Charge Nonmembers Service Fees
(1) the subject matter of the (extra-local) litigation is of a kind that would be
chargeable if the litigation were local, e.g., litigation appropriately related to collective bargaining rather than political activities, and (2) the charge is reciprocal in nature, i.e., the contributing local reasonably expects other locals to contribute similarly to the national’s resources used for costs of similar litigation on behalf of the contributing local if and when it takes place.
Wake up. This is important stuff. The case is Locke v. Karass and the opinion is here.
Court of Appeal: Waiting Time Penalties Are...Penalties
A year or so ago, a superior court in another case made the extraordinary determination that waiting time penalties are wages, not penalties, and were recoverable under the UCL. So much for that argument.
The opinion in Pineda is here.
Wednesday, January 21, 2009
Bye Bye Brinkley
Greg
Tuesday, January 20, 2009
5th Circuit Awards Attorney's Fees Against EEOC
The reason I'm writing about this one is that the EEOC pursued a case well beyond the point that it should have determined it lacked merit. The investigator initially assigned to the charge was on a mission. The plaintiff's deposition doomed the plaintiff's claim. The settlement demands were unreasonably high.
The court of appeals first decided that EEOC failed to "conciliate" or attempt to resolve the case in good faith. The agency made a very high demand and then immediately closed conciliation efforts when the demand was rejected, despite the employer's attempt to engage in settlement negotiations. However, the court also found that failure to conciliate is not a jurisdictional defect.
The court then held that the district court's award of fees against the EEOC was within the court's discretion. The district court awarded about $225,000 in fees for the period of time following the plaintiff's deposition until summary judgment. (That's a heck of a bill for post-deposition litigation through summary judgment, but the district court did not find fault in the billings). The court of appeals agreed with the district court that after the plaintiff's deposition, the agency's further prosecution of the case was absolutely unjustifiable.
This case may be used in situations when a case of arguable merit at inception is revealed through discovery to be frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Fees should be awarded in favor of the employer from that point, if not from the beginning of the case.
DGV
Tuesday, January 06, 2009
Court of Appeal Affirms Jury Verdict Finding Adequate Accommodation
The real gist of Wilson’s complaint is not that she wasn’t accommodated, but that it took too long for her supervisors to finally agree to a permanent arrangement--i.e., that she could return to work at Control One, in her same position, with the restrictions she wanted. It is this delay that forms the basis of her interactive process* * *
claim. She argues that as a matter of law, the County failed to engage in a good faith
interactive process with her because it did not commence the interactive process until June 2005, prior to which the County simply “contrived a circumstance” to justify not engaging in the interactive process—namely, that Wilson’s disability was
only temporary.
Here, the record demonstrates the County engaged in a process aimed at trying to accommodate Wilson. Indeed, the success of its process is borne out by the fact
that in the end, Wilson got exactly what she wanted—albeit after a series of temporary accommodations.
The case is Wilson v. Orange County and the opinion is here.
Friday, January 02, 2009
SV Employment Law Article Pot Pourri
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR FEHA CLAIMS ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION
By Jennifer Brown Shaw and Shane K. Anderies
The Daily Recorder
2008-12-30
WILL CONGRESS BAN SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION?
By Jennifer Brown Shaw and Carolyn Burnette
The Daily Recorder
2008-12-18
DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION AND QUALIFICATION STANDARDS
By Jennifer Brown Shaw and Matthew J. Norfleet
The Daily Recorder
2008-12-02
GOLDEN STATE OF MIND
By D. Gregory Valenza
The Daily Journal
2008-11-28
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING INTERNAL EEO COMPLAINT PROCEDURES
By Jennifer Brown Shaw and Becki D. Graham
The Daily Recorder
2008-11-20
NEW LAW AIMS TO ENCOURAGE COMPLIANCE WITH DISABLED ACCESS RULES
By Jennifer Brown Shaw and Carolyn G. Burnette
The Daily Recorder
2008-11-06
ALTERNATIVE POSITIONS AS A REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION: WHAT IS REQUIRED?
By Jennifer Brown Shaw and Shane K. Anderies
The Daily Recorder
2008-10-08
THE ADA AMENDMENTS ACT
By Jennifer Brown Shaw and D. Gregory Valenza
The Daily Recorder
2008-09-24
FLESHING OUT THE ADA
By D. Gregory Valenza
The Daily Journal
2008-09-16
BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS KEEP GETTING MORE COMPLICATED
By Jennifer Brown Shaw and Matthew J. Norfleet
The Daily Recorder
2008-09-10
EDWARDS V. ARTHUR ANDERSEN: NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS AND GENERAL RELEASES
By Jennifer Brown Shaw and Becki D. Graham
The Daily Recorder
2008-08-26
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT EMPLOYMENT LAW DECISIONS 2007-2008
By Jennifer Brown Shaw and Shane K. Anderies
The Daily Recorder
2008-07-31
Wednesday, December 31, 2008
San Francisco Minimum Wage Going UP
Tuesday, December 30, 2008
Court of Appeal: Employer Must Disclose Classmember Info Even Over Their Objection?
Well Crab Addison (operator of Joe's Crab Shack) decided to go one better: send out the "opt-out" form to all employees before it was required to disclose the information in discovery, but without specifically discussing the lawsuit at issue. Here's the form:
RELEASE OF CONTACT INFORMATION
From time to time, Joe’s Crab Shack (the “Company”) may be asked to provide your contact information, including your home address and telephone number, to third parties. The Company may be asked to provide such information in the context of legal proceedings, including class action lawsuits.
We understand that many employees may consider this information to be private and may not want it released. Accordingly, please indicate whether you consent to the disclosure of your contact information by marking the appropriate box.
__ No, I do not consent to the Company’s disclosure of my contact information to third parties.
__ Yes, I consent to the Company’s disclosure of my contact information to third parties.
__ I would like to be asked on a case-by-case basis whether I consent to the disclosure of my contact information to a particular third party, and my contact information should only be provided if I affirmatively consent in writing.
No sale, said the Court of Appeal, affirming the trial court:
to the extent the right to privacy is based on the release forms, there are strong reasons for not giving effect to those forms. Employees indicating that they did not want their contact information disclosed, or wanted disclosure on a case-by-case basis, were unaware at the time they signed the forms of the pending litigation to enforce their statutory wage and overtime rights through a class action lawsuit. We may presume that, had they known about the litigation, their response on the form would have been different. Additionally, the forms apprised them that their contact information could be disclosed if required by law, so they were aware of the limitation on privacy offered by the forms.
So, nice try. With a proper disclosure about any existing litigation, it's possible such a form could be given more deference by a court. But the courts seem unreceptive to efforts to preclude plaintiffs from contacting employees.
The case is Crab Addison, Inc. v. Superior Court and the opinion is here.
Tuesday, December 23, 2008
Court of Appeal: How to Calculate Overtime on a Bonus
I am frequently asked how bonuses and commissions affect overtime calculations. Basically, the "half time" (or whole-time in the case of double-time overtime) is due on the bonus, once the bonus is allocated to the hours that were necessary to generate it. You worked 1000 total hours including 20 overtime hours during a bonus period. The bonus is $2000. The incremental hourly rate is $2000/1000 hours = $2.00 per hour. That is the amount of wages on which no overtime previously was paid. So, you owe: 1/2 * $2.00 per hour * 20 overtime hours worked = $20.00.
Get it? The court of appeal did. That's the federal formula, and the formula the DLSE endorses. The court did not mention that California law endorses the use of federal overtime calculation rules. But it does. The plaintiffs wanted the overtime to be calculated by dividing the bonus over the straight time hours and then paying time and one-half on that figure. That would have resulted in double counting. In addition, it would have ignored the simple fact that the employee had to work all hours to earn the bonus - straight plus overtime.
So, if your eyes are crossed, welcome to wage and hour law. The opinion is linked above. It's got a detailed explanation of the rule and the arguments in favor and against.
Enjoy your holiday!
Greg
Monday, December 22, 2008
New FMLA poster
with the new regulations when they become effective next month.
Merry Christmas / Happy Chanukah / Happy Kwanzaa! Happy New Year, too.
Greg
Saturday, December 13, 2008
Court of Appeal: No Defense Attorneys' Fees for Frivolous Claims?
Does that make a lot of sense? Yes, but only if you're gutting the attorneys' fees statute. Employers are responsible to pay for employees' defense costs under Labor Code section 2802, unless the employee is found to have engaged in actual unlawful harassment. So, a frivolous claim against an employee by implication is part of the claim against the employer, no? And given most claims against individual managers are barred as a matter of law, and given awards of attorneys' fees are as rare as hen's teeth anyway, one would think that a court would want to give effect to the Legislature's decision to permit an award of attorneys' fees when claims are frivolous. Right?
No. The court of appeal agreed with the trial court and held that where, as in this case, the employer is paying an individual employee's defense costs, the trial court need not award attorneys' fees if the claim against the employer is not frivolous. You don't believe me? Here's the quote:
In short, despite its finding that Young’s case against Lopez was frivolous and vexatious, the trial court had the discretion to deny attorney fees to Lopez. Because the award would benefit only Exxon, a defendant which was not otherwise entitled to an award and which did not show it incurred any significant fees on Lopez’s behalf that it would not have incurred in any event, we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision.
By the way, the attorneys' fees statute, Government Code section 12965(b) is very simple and says nothing about differing standards for employers and employees.
In actions brought under this section,the court, in its discretion, may award to the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees and costs, including expert witness fees, except where the action is filed by a public agency or a public official, acting in an official capacity.The statute says nothing about basing awards on who pays the fees. I know it says "discretion," but the courts have held that prevailing plaintiffs are generally entitled to fees as a matter of right, while prevailing defendants have a heavy burden to establish the claims were "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." I think the courts may have lost sight of the plain language of the statute over the years.
While I'm complaining, the Court of Appeal also decided not to publish its analysis of Young's claims on the merits. That means the bar will not benefit from the court's detailed analysis of Young's claims for discrimination, harassment, retaliation, etc. The decision should be published if only because Young claimed a mental disability and that her outbursts and conduct in violation of policy were attributable to the disability. The Court distinguished Gambini v. Total Renal Care, discussed here, and held that Young's disability did not exempt her from termination for her misconduct.
Anyway, I'm sure Exxon is happy to have won the case. But there was a dark lining in a silver cloud that may affect employment litigation for the rest of us. The opinion in Young v. Exxon is here.
Wednesday, December 10, 2008
Court of Appeal: Summary Judgment Against Plaintiffs Challenging Starbucks' Application
CALIFORNIA APPLICANTS ONLY: Applicant may omit any convictions for the possession of marijuana (except for convictions for the possessions of marijuana on school grounds or possession of concentrated cannabis) that are more than two (2) years old, and any information concerning a referral to, and participation in, any pretrial or post trial diversion program.”
Although that may read like a proper disclaimer, it was included in a larger paragraph of disclaimers located away from the general convictions question, which did not exclude such marijuana convictions. So, the California disclaimer did nothing to stop Erik Lords and his band of merry putative classmembers from filing suit, claiming the application form was defective. Erik and co. wanted about $26 million in penalties. Aggrieved applicants get a penalty of $200 or actual damages for faulty applications.
The court of appeal agreed with the trial court and the plaintiffs that the general disclaimer was improperly placed away from the general convictions question. Had the properly worded disclaimer been placed next to the conviction question, it would have been legally correct, the court said.
But the court of appeal detected a couple of problems with Lords' prayer. [I kill me]. First of all, none of the named plaintiffs had a marijuana conviction. Second, all had read the allegedly hidden language. Third, none was denied employment because of a wrongfully disclosed conviction.
So, the court said:
We see nothing in the statute to support plaintiffs’ claim that the Legislature ntended to protect the privacy interests of job applicants who had no marijuana convictions in their background. As we explain below, we decline to adopt an interpretation that would turn the statute into a veritable financial bonanza for litigants like plaintiffs who had no fear of stigmatizing marijuana convictions.The case is Lords v. Starbucks and the opinion is here.
Wednesday, December 03, 2008
No Punitive Damages for Meal and Rest Period Violations
Wait no longer. Ms. Brewer is a waitress at Cottonwood golf resort's restaurant. She sued for meal and break violations among a smorgasbord of other employment claims. She lost on her age discrimination claims. But she won on some Labor Code violations. The jury also awarded her punitive damages, over and above the meal and break premiums, penalties for improper wage statements, etc. (I bet you thought I was going to make food puns throughout this post, didn't you?)
The court of appeal reversed on punitive damages. The court decided that the Labor Code creates new rights not available at common law. Therefore, their remedies are exclusive. The court also held that a claim for unpaid meal periods and other Labor Code violations "arise" out of contract - the employment relationship. As such, punitive damages are not available as a matter of law.
Here's a long quote from the opinion to prove I read it, or at least that I know how to cut and paste:
We agree with Cottonwood’s contention, which Brewer does not dispute on appeal, that the Labor Code statutes regulating pay stubs (§ 226) and minimum wages (§ 1197.1) create new rights and obligations not previously existing in the common law. Moreover, those same statutes provide express statutory remedies, including penalties for the violation of those statutes that are punitive in nature, that are available when an employer has violated those provisions. Section 226, subdivision (e), provides that any employee “suffering injury as a result of a knowing and intentional failure by an employer to comply with [the pay stub requirements] is entitled to recover the greater of all actual damages or fifty dollars ($50) for the initial pay period in which a violation occurs and one hundred dollars ($100) per employee for each violation in a subsequent pay period, not exceeding an aggregate penalty of four thousand dollars ($4,000), and is entitled to an award of costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.” Similarly, section 1197.1, subdivision (a) provides that any employer who pays or causes to be paid to any employee a wage less than the minimum wage “shall be subject to a civil penalty as follows: [¶] (1) For any initial
violation that is intentionally committed, one hundred dollars ($100) for each underpaid employee for each pay period for which the employee is underpaid[;]
[¶] (2) For each subsequent violation for the same specific offense, two hundred fifty dollars ($250) for each underpaid employee for each pay period for which the employee is underpaid regardless of whether the initial violation is intentionally committed.” Here, Brewer sought and recovered the maximum $4,000 penalty available for Cottonwood’s pay stub violations, and the judgment contained an additional penalty of $15,300 pursuant to section 1197.1 for the overtime violations. We are not persuaded by Brewer’s argument that the remedies set forth in the statutory scheme were not intended to be the exclusive remedy available for statutory violations, and Brewer does not articulate any basis for concluding those penalties are so inadequate that other remedies should be permitted. Similarly, the
regulations requiring employers to provide meal breaks (§ 512) and rest breaks
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11090, subd. 12(A)), and providing numerous forms of
remedies for their violation, also appear to have created new rights and obligations not previously existing in the common law, and the statutory scheme provides “a comprehensive and detailed remedial scheme for its enforcement.” (Rojo v. Kliger, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 79.) Those remedies include an award in the nature of liquidated damages under section 226.7 (cf. Murphy v. Kenneth Cole
Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 1112 [because “damages [from missed
meal and rest breaks] are obscure and difficult to prove, the Legislature may
select an amount of compensation [for the violation] without converting that
remedy into a penalty” for statute of limitations purposes]), injunctive relief
(see generally § 1194.5), and potential statutory penalties (see § 558). We are convinced that, because the meal and rest break provisions of the Labor Code “established a new and comprehensive set of rights and remedies for [employees]… [and] [n]o such specialized rights and remedies existed at common law… the remedy provided in the statute ‘is exclusive of all others unless the statutory remedy is inadequate.’ [Quoting Turnbull, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d at p. 827.]” (De Anza Santa Cruz Mobile Estates Homeowners Assn. v. De Anza Santa Cruz Mobile Estates, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 916.)
* * *
We are also convinced that, even were the remedies provided by the statutory scheme not the exclusive remedies for the new rights, punitive damages would nevertheless be unavailable because punitive damages are ordinarily limited to actions “for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract” (Civ. Code, § 3294), and Brewer’s claims for unpaid wages and unprovided meal/rest breaks arise from rights based on her employment contract. Brewer argues, without citation to relevant authority, that Cottonwood’s breach of its statutory obligations under the Labor Code is a “breach of an obligation not arising from contract,” thereby supporting the award of punitive damages.However, in analogous situations, the courts have recognized that, when a statute imposes additional obligations on an underlying contractual relationship, a breach of the statutory obligation is a breach of contract that will not support tort damages beyond those contained in the statute.(See, e.g., Kwan v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 174, 187–192 [breach of Consumer Warranty law obligations is breach of contract and does not support tort damages for emotional distress].) We apprehend the Labor Code provisions governing meal and rest breaks, minimum wages, and accurate pay stubs constitute statutory obligations imposed only when the parties have entered into an employment contract and are obligations arising from the employment contract. The breach of an obligation arising out of an
employment contract, even when the obligation is implied in law, permits contractual damages but does not support tort recoveries. (Cf. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 700.) Although Brewer relies on language from Gould v. Maryland Sound Industries, Inc. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1147 to assert prompt payment of wages involves sufficiently fundamental public polices that the willful failure to make such payments will support punitive damages, the court in Gould expressly recognized that, although a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy would state a tort claim, a claim seeking tort recoveries based on the allegation the employer otherwise breached the employment contract agreement was barred by Foley. (Gould, at p. 1155.)
The case is Brewer v. Premier Golf Properties and the opinion is here.
Tuesday, December 02, 2008
IRS Standard Mileage Rate for 2009: $0.55 Per Mile
The IRS's announcement is here.
DGV