Based on his complaint alone, the plaintiff sought the names and other contact information about all employees statewide. The trial court granted an order allowing a store-wide roster. The plaintiffs sought a writ from the court of appeal to obtain the statewide information.
The court of appeal denied the writ and issued an opinion. The court explained two reasons why the plaintiff was not entitled to contact information of everyone based only on the allegations in the complaint.
First, there was no showing that the plaintiff had any knowledge of practices occurring at other stores. The plaintiff therefore could not argue, "I need the names to see if there's anything unlawful going on in other stores so I can expand my case."
Here are some important excerpts from that discussion:
A party seeking to compel discovery must therefore “set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (b)(1); see Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 53 at p. 223.) To establish good cause, a discovery proponent must identify a disputed fact that is of consequence in the action and explain how the discovery sought will tend in reason to prove or disprove that fact or lead to other evidence that will tend to prove or disprove the fact.So, yes, discovery is broader than admissibility at trial. But the information one seeks in discovery should bear a reasonable relationship to the facts one is seeking to prove as part of the case.
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Plaintiff’s proposed procedure, which contemplates jumping into extensive statewide discovery based only on the bare allegations of one local individual having no knowledge of the defendant’s statewide practices would be a classic use of discovery tools to wage litigation rather than facilitate it. We conclude bare allegations unsupported by any reason to believe a defendant’s conduct extends statewide furnishes no good cause for statewide discovery.
The second reason the court denied the information is because of employees' right to privacy. The plaintiff argued it would use an "opt-out" procedure, where all employees would be sent a letter and be allowed to opt-out of having their contact information shared. The Court of Appeal was not having it, in part because the plaintiff had no good cause to seek the informant in the first place:
we conclude Marshalls’ employees’ privacy interests outweigh plaintiff’s need to discover their identity at this time. Those interests begin with the employees’ right to be free from unwanted attention and perhaps fear of retaliation from an employer. On the other hand, plaintiff’s need for the discovery at this time is practically nonexistent. His first task will be to establish he was himself subjected to violations of the Labor Code. As he has not yet sat for deposition, this task remains unfulfilled. The trial court could reasonably conclude that the second task will be to establish Marshalls’ employment practices are uniform throughout the company, which might be accomplished by reference to a policy manual or perhaps deposition of a corporate officer. The trial court could reasonably conclude that only then will plaintiff be able to set forth facts justifying statewide discovery.For those readers who are lawyers, there's a nice summary of discovery standards and privacy law in this opinion. But I didn't want to make the post too long. Trust me. If this one stays on the books, you can update your form files.
The courts will not lightly bestow statewide discovery power to a litigant who has only a parochial claim. Here, the trial court’s measured approach to discovery was reasonable. Therefore, plaintiff’s petition is denied.
This case is Williams v. Superior Court and the opinion is here.
