Here are the main issues -
1. The plaintiff's allegations of hostile work environment harassment and intentional infliction of emotional distress were not severe / pervasive / extreme / outrageous enough to reach the jury. The plaintiff's claim is summarized here:
Appellant testified that she was harassed and shunned throughout her training period. Her complaints centered around one vessel planner in particular, Anthony Spanjol. Appellant testified that Spanjol would disrespect her by talking down to her and by putting his feet up on her work space. On one occasion, he yelled at her in front of other employees and called her stupid. One of appellant‟s supervisors, Marc Izzo, witnessed this incident, but left the room rather than address it. Appellant testified that when she complained about the incident she was told that she should go home and that Spanjol‟s behavior was just a part of his personality. She also stated that Spanjol often made racially derogatory remarks and engaged in sexually offensive behavior. He would comment on the buttocks of other female employees once they left the room, using terms like "„nigger ass‟" and "„J-Lo ass.‟" On at least one occasion, Spanjol also made crude gestures toward a woman when the woman‟s back was turned. He also mocked these women in appellant‟s presence. During another incident, appellant asked Spanjol a question regarding the unloading of a ship, but he ignored her and "never spoke to [her] again." Appellant testified that shortly after this incident she decided she could no longer handle the work environment and quit her job entirely.The court held that the harassment was not severe or pervasive enough to require a jury's consideration. The court also held that the allegations of co-worker harassment were not actionable because the plaintiff did not prove that her employer knew or should have known of the conduct directed toward her.
2. The court held that the trial court properly excluded evidence of harassment of other women because the only claim tried was retaliation.
3. "Me-too" evidence of retaliation against other women should have been admitted.
4. The plaintiff claimed denial of promotion based on retaliation. The court held she was entitled to damages if she prevailed even if she did not prove constructive discharge. The amount of those damages would have to be limited to what she actually lost (the difference between her pay and the pay if she had been promoted). I don't understand how she would be entitled to that differential after she quit if it's not a constructive discharge. If you voluntarily quit, you no longer receive pay... I know, there I go thinking again.
5. The court held that PMA, an association that negotiated collective bargaining agreements, was not the plaintiff's employer, and therefore could not be held liable for retaliation or other FEHA based actions.
So, lots of reasons to cite this case. It's long, but worth reading. The opinion in McCoy v. Pacific Maritime Association is here.
DGV
