Westrec Marina Management had a "claims made" insurance policy with Arrowood Indemnity Co.. The policy covered claims reported during the policy period or within 30 days of policy expiration. After receiving a discrimination charge and a demand letter, the employer did not report it to the insurer timely. Arrowood, the insurer, denied the claim. The trial court found in favor of Arrowood and the court of appeal agreed. The court said that Westrec was on notice during the policy period that a "claim" was being made and that Westrec therefore failed to report the claim timely.
So, when you receive a charge, demand letter, etc. and you wish to have insurance coverage, it may be wise to tender to the insurer if there is any doubt about whether the information you have constitutes a "claim."
The case is Westrec Marina Management, Inc. v. Arrowood Indemnity Co., and the opinion is here.
WHAT'S NEW IN EMPLOYMENT LAW? Welcome to Shaw Law Group, PC's law blog. We will focus on employment law developments, particularly in California. Nothing in this forum should be construed as legal advice, 'cause it isn't. So, please consult your lawyer or hire us! (We typically represent employers, not employees). Also - this is a public website, so communications are not privileged. Copyright Shaw Law Group, PC © 2017. All rights reserved.
Sunday, June 22, 2008
Ninth Circuit Invalidates Certain Pre-Employment Inquiries
The Ninth Circuit has issued a few opinions lately in which the court has struck down pre-employment inquiries such as applicant drug testing, medical examinations, and the like. The court recently held that NASA's practice of investigating contractors' employees was too intrusive and, therefore, violated the employees' "information privacy" rights under the Constitution. The court, however, held that the questionnaires and background checks were not "searches" under the Fourth Amendment.
The persons at issue were employees of Caltech, working under a contract for NASA at a federal facility. Of note, these employees were not exposed to sensitive information and were considered "low risk" by NASA.
NASA has conducted the same federal background check since its inception for its own employees, and recently expanded the investigation to contractors. The federal investigation includes questionnaires sent to persons identified by the applicant, and asks for a broad and open-ended amount of information about the applicant's employment history, education, habits, behaviors, financial responsibility, etc.
The court found that parts of the questionnaire were too broad and, therefore, violated the applicants' rights to informational privacy because they were not sufficiently narrow to justify the intrusion.
Interestingly, the court held that questionnaires concerning past illegal drug use were NOT a violation, because they were narrowly tailored to meet the government's legitimate interest in a drug-free workplace. But, the questions asking about counseling for prior drug use were not narrowly tailored and, therefore, a violation of the applicants' privacy rights. Recall that in the recent case of Lanier v. City of Woodburn, the Ninth Circuit invalidated a county's applicant drug testing program.
This case is called Nelson v. NASA and the opinion is here.
The persons at issue were employees of Caltech, working under a contract for NASA at a federal facility. Of note, these employees were not exposed to sensitive information and were considered "low risk" by NASA.
NASA has conducted the same federal background check since its inception for its own employees, and recently expanded the investigation to contractors. The federal investigation includes questionnaires sent to persons identified by the applicant, and asks for a broad and open-ended amount of information about the applicant's employment history, education, habits, behaviors, financial responsibility, etc.
The court found that parts of the questionnaire were too broad and, therefore, violated the applicants' rights to informational privacy because they were not sufficiently narrow to justify the intrusion.
Interestingly, the court held that questionnaires concerning past illegal drug use were NOT a violation, because they were narrowly tailored to meet the government's legitimate interest in a drug-free workplace. But, the questions asking about counseling for prior drug use were not narrowly tailored and, therefore, a violation of the applicants' privacy rights. Recall that in the recent case of Lanier v. City of Woodburn, the Ninth Circuit invalidated a county's applicant drug testing program.
This case is called Nelson v. NASA and the opinion is here.
Labels:
Privacy
Friday, June 20, 2008
U.S. Supreme Court on Employer's Burden of Proof in Age Discrimination Cases
The federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act is structured differently from Title VII. That is why case law interpreting Title VII is not always applicable in ADEA cases.
Like Title VII, ADEA authorizes "disparate impact" cases - where the plaintiff demonstrates a neutral employer practice that has a greater effect on members of a protected group than non-members. The statute provides that an employment practice is legal if based on "reasonable factors other than age." The question the Court addressed in Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab. is whether the "RFOA" provision is part of the plaintiff's burden of proof or an affirmative defense. Agreeing with the EEOC's long-held position, the Court held that employers have the burden of proving that a challenged practice, one that has a statistically significant impact on older workers, is based on "reasonable factors other than age."
Like Title VII, ADEA authorizes "disparate impact" cases - where the plaintiff demonstrates a neutral employer practice that has a greater effect on members of a protected group than non-members. The statute provides that an employment practice is legal if based on "reasonable factors other than age." The question the Court addressed in Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab. is whether the "RFOA" provision is part of the plaintiff's burden of proof or an affirmative defense. Agreeing with the EEOC's long-held position, the Court held that employers have the burden of proving that a challenged practice, one that has a statistically significant impact on older workers, is based on "reasonable factors other than age."
Labels:
age discrimination
Thursday, June 19, 2008
Happy Second Anniversary to Us!
That's right. Our little Firm was born on 6/19/06. (Our little blog didn't come along until 6/30/06, so you can count on another "Look at Me" post on 6/30.)
Since our debut, we've grown to 7 lawyers in two Northern California offices. We've consumed about 250 lbs of coffee, 50 cases of copy paper, 11 computers, 2 projectors, countless boxes of pens, cases of stickies, and a lot of pizza, Chinese food, burritos, falafel, diet coke, a variety of nuts and lots and lots of mints. (tm)
Thanks for coming along with us. I hope we've added value, on and off the blog (notwithstanding this post).
Jennifer and Greg
Since our debut, we've grown to 7 lawyers in two Northern California offices. We've consumed about 250 lbs of coffee, 50 cases of copy paper, 11 computers, 2 projectors, countless boxes of pens, cases of stickies, and a lot of pizza, Chinese food, burritos, falafel, diet coke, a variety of nuts and lots and lots of mints. (tm)
Thanks for coming along with us. I hope we've added value, on and off the blog (notwithstanding this post).
Jennifer and Greg
Ninth Circuit: No Right to Search Text Messages Stored by Third Party
The headlines blared: "Employers can't look at your email or text messages." Unfortunately for you merchants of NSFW* content on employers' systems, not so fast. The case, Quon v. Arch Wireless, is not as broad as the papers suggest.
In Quon. the Ontario, CA sheriff noted excessive text message traffic over the department's system. Under the department's policy, an employee would get 25,000 characters as part of the plan and would have to pay for overage.
But the Sheriff wanted to see if the employees were using the system for non-work related matters. So, he contacted Arch Wireless, which provides the text message service and stores archived messages for the county. (That is, the county used Arch Wireless as its cell provider for text messages). Having received the owner's request, Arch turned over the text messages to the Sheriff.
The problem is that Arch was precluded from doing so by the Stored Communications Act. Arch, as an archiver of messages, could not turn over the messages without a court order or the consent of both parties to the communication.
The Sheriff also argued that its policy destroyed any expectation of privacy. But there was testimony from management that the announced policy was not to "audit" messages if the employee paid the overage. The promise not to inspect created an expectation of privacy.
Bottom line though - if the employer stores its own emails, this case does not apply. When this case does not apply, if you want to ensure you have access to employees' electronic communications, you need a tight policy that destroys any "reasonable expectation of privacy."
On the other hand, if a third party is the repository of your business' emails, texts, third party voice mails.... this case may be a shift in the law regarding when employers are permitted to see these communications. Therefore, employers may wish to consider bringing these IT functions "in house" or giving up the right to monitor such communications at will.
Read Quon v. Arch Wireless here.
DGV
* "Not safe for work." Yes, I am hip, kthanksbye..
In Quon. the Ontario, CA sheriff noted excessive text message traffic over the department's system. Under the department's policy, an employee would get 25,000 characters as part of the plan and would have to pay for overage.
But the Sheriff wanted to see if the employees were using the system for non-work related matters. So, he contacted Arch Wireless, which provides the text message service and stores archived messages for the county. (That is, the county used Arch Wireless as its cell provider for text messages). Having received the owner's request, Arch turned over the text messages to the Sheriff.
The problem is that Arch was precluded from doing so by the Stored Communications Act. Arch, as an archiver of messages, could not turn over the messages without a court order or the consent of both parties to the communication.
The Sheriff also argued that its policy destroyed any expectation of privacy. But there was testimony from management that the announced policy was not to "audit" messages if the employee paid the overage. The promise not to inspect created an expectation of privacy.
Bottom line though - if the employer stores its own emails, this case does not apply. When this case does not apply, if you want to ensure you have access to employees' electronic communications, you need a tight policy that destroys any "reasonable expectation of privacy."
On the other hand, if a third party is the repository of your business' emails, texts, third party voice mails.... this case may be a shift in the law regarding when employers are permitted to see these communications. Therefore, employers may wish to consider bringing these IT functions "in house" or giving up the right to monitor such communications at will.
Read Quon v. Arch Wireless here.
DGV
* "Not safe for work." Yes, I am hip, kthanksbye..
Labels:
Privacy
Supreme Court Strikes Down California AB 1889 - Union "Neutrality"
Some years ago (2003 or so) I was lucky enough to be involved in a case where the court struck down California's AB 1889. That law requires employers receiving state funds not to use them to oppose (or support) union organizing. The California Chamber of Commerce and other groups challenged the law. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Chamber and held the law preempted.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit initially upheld the district court's holding that federal law preempted AB 1889. But, the court then heard the case "en banc" and changed its mind, upholding the California law.
Then, my prior firm was replaced by Supreme Court experts who sought (and obtained!) certiorari review of the decision.
The Supreme Court decided today 7-2 that AB 1889 is preempted by the National Labor Relations Act. That is, California's law impermissibly regulated employers' conduct that is otherwise regulated by the National Labor Relations Act.
This is a very important case for nursing homes and other businesses that receive state funds. The case is Chamber of Commerce v. Brown and the opinion is here.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit initially upheld the district court's holding that federal law preempted AB 1889. But, the court then heard the case "en banc" and changed its mind, upholding the California law.
Then, my prior firm was replaced by Supreme Court experts who sought (and obtained!) certiorari review of the decision.
The Supreme Court decided today 7-2 that AB 1889 is preempted by the National Labor Relations Act. That is, California's law impermissibly regulated employers' conduct that is otherwise regulated by the National Labor Relations Act.
This is a very important case for nursing homes and other businesses that receive state funds. The case is Chamber of Commerce v. Brown and the opinion is here.
Labels:
nlra
Saturday, June 14, 2008
Court of Appeal Permits Claim of "Preemptive" Retaliation
Lisa Steele, a new employee of the California Youth Offender Parole Board, was a participant in a bikini contest (away from work). Her boss, Galindo, attended the contest. When they saw each other, Galindo kissed her on the cheek on a single occasion. No one was offended. Galindo otherwise treated Lisa professionally.
But another employee was in the process of complaining about Galindo's conduct at work. The powers than be apparently were worried that Steele would be a witness against Galindo, although she had not yet complained or participated in an investigation. So, according to the record, the higher-ups engaged in conduct forcing her to resign.
A jury found for Steele on a constructive discharge claim. But the YOPB appealed, arguing (among other things) that Steele had not engaged in protected activity, so she could not have suffered "retaliation."
The Court of Appeal, though, decided that Steele's status as a "potential" witness was enough to confer "protected activity" status. Steele's proof that the constructive discharge was related to management's fear that Steele would testify against Galindo was enough to prove Steele's retaliation claim. Preemptive retaliation for future possible protected activity ... Minority Report anyone?
So, what employee is not a "potential witness" in a workplace discrimination, harassment or retaliation claim? The lower courts will be left to sort that out, I guess. The opinion is Steele v. Youth Offender Probation Board and the opinion is here.
But another employee was in the process of complaining about Galindo's conduct at work. The powers than be apparently were worried that Steele would be a witness against Galindo, although she had not yet complained or participated in an investigation. So, according to the record, the higher-ups engaged in conduct forcing her to resign.
A jury found for Steele on a constructive discharge claim. But the YOPB appealed, arguing (among other things) that Steele had not engaged in protected activity, so she could not have suffered "retaliation."
The Court of Appeal, though, decided that Steele's status as a "potential" witness was enough to confer "protected activity" status. Steele's proof that the constructive discharge was related to management's fear that Steele would testify against Galindo was enough to prove Steele's retaliation claim. Preemptive retaliation for future possible protected activity ... Minority Report anyone?
So, what employee is not a "potential witness" in a workplace discrimination, harassment or retaliation claim? The lower courts will be left to sort that out, I guess. The opinion is Steele v. Youth Offender Probation Board and the opinion is here.
Labels:
retaliation
Court of Appeal Rules on Holiday Pay, Regular Rate, and Overtime
Sometimes employers pay workers "holiday premium" pay for working on a holiday. Under federal law, if the holiday premium is at least 1.5 times the normal rate, such premiums may be taken as a "credit" against overtime premiums due in the same workweek.
The Court of Appeal just decided that this federal regulation also applies in California. If you're not familiar with this rule, here's an example from the opinion of how it works:
The plaintiff argued that she was entitled to time and one-half for the 20 hours of overtime she worked. The employer argued it paid her time and one-half for eight of those hours because of the holiday premium policy.
The Court of Appeal decided nothing in the California overtime law required the employer to pay more than the time and one-half for 20 hours of overtime work. However, the court expressly reserved judgment on whether the employee could bring a breach of contact claim for the holiday pay premium.
The case is Advanced Tech Security Services, Inc. v. Roman and the opinion is here.
Well, the court of appeal decided that
The Court of Appeal just decided that this federal regulation also applies in California. If you're not familiar with this rule, here's an example from the opinion of how it works:
During the week of September 4, 2006, Ms. Roman worked 12 hours on Monday, which was Labor Day, 12 hours on both Tuesday and Wednesday, and 8 hours each on Thursday, Friday, and Saturday for a total of 60 hours. Her paycheck reflected payment of one and one-half times her regular rate for the 4 hours of overtime she worked on both Tuesday and Wednesday of that week, as well as the premium rate of pay of one and one-half times for the 12 hours she worked on Labor Day. As such, Ms. Roman was paid for 40 hours at her regular rate of pay and 20 hours at a rate of time and one-half. Ms. Roman contends that the time and one-half she was paid for working on Labor Day was her regular rate of pay pursuant to the Employee’s Handbook, and she was entitled to be paid one and one-half times the premium rate for the hours she worked on Labor Day.
The plaintiff argued that she was entitled to time and one-half for the 20 hours of overtime she worked. The employer argued it paid her time and one-half for eight of those hours because of the holiday premium policy.
The Court of Appeal decided nothing in the California overtime law required the employer to pay more than the time and one-half for 20 hours of overtime work. However, the court expressly reserved judgment on whether the employee could bring a breach of contact claim for the holiday pay premium.
The case is Advanced Tech Security Services, Inc. v. Roman and the opinion is here.
Well, the court of appeal decided that
Labels:
Wage and Hour
OSHA: Employers Must Pay for Most Personal Protective Equipment
Both federal and state OSHA impose rules requiring employees to wear "personal protective equipment" such as work boots, safety goggles, etc. Federal OSHA just issued a final regulation requiring employers to pay for such equipment in most circumstances. The obligation is limited to equipment required for compliance with OSHA standards.
According to OSHA's preface to the regulation:
For a long, detailed discussion and the regulation itself, please see here.
According to OSHA's preface to the regulation:
The items excepted from payment by this rule are: Non-specialty safety-toe protective footwear (including steel-toe shoes or steel-toe boots) and non-specialty prescription safety eyewear, that is allowed by the employer to be worn off the job-site; Shoes or boots with built-in metatarsal protection that the employee has requested to use instead of the employer-provided detachable metatarsal guards; Logging boots required by 1910.266(d)(1)(v); Everyday work clothing; or ordinary clothing, skin creams, or other items used solely for protection from the weather.
For a long, detailed discussion and the regulation itself, please see here.
Labels:
osha
Local Living Wage Ordinance Not Local
Hayward, California has a "living wage" ordinance. This is a local law that requires employers to pay employees more than state or federal minimum wage. Such ordinances typically apply only to employers with city contracts, but San Francisco applies its local minimum wage ordinance to all employers.
Hayward's applies only to city contractors. Cintas had a contract with Hayward to handle laundry services. But many such services were performed outside of Hayward. Employees brought a class action against Cintas, claiming Cintas was violating the Living Wage Ordinance.
Agreeing with the trial court, the Court of Appeal held that Hayward could require city contractors to pay employees under the Living Wage Ordinance, even though the work was performed outside of Hayward. (The ordinance applied only to employees working on the contract, not to all Cintas employees worldwide).
The case is Amaral v. Cintas Corporation and the opinion is here.
DGV
Hayward's applies only to city contractors. Cintas had a contract with Hayward to handle laundry services. But many such services were performed outside of Hayward. Employees brought a class action against Cintas, claiming Cintas was violating the Living Wage Ordinance.
Agreeing with the trial court, the Court of Appeal held that Hayward could require city contractors to pay employees under the Living Wage Ordinance, even though the work was performed outside of Hayward. (The ordinance applied only to employees working on the contract, not to all Cintas employees worldwide).
The case is Amaral v. Cintas Corporation and the opinion is here.
DGV
Labels:
living wage,
Wage and Hour
Friday, May 30, 2008
Court of Appeal: No Disability and No Retaliation
In 2000, the California Legislature amended the Fair Employment and Housing Act to ensure the definition of "disability" is broader than the definition in the Americans With Disabilities Act. Way broader. For example, under state law, the employee's "mitigating measures" (such as glasses to help the sight impaired) are not taken into account when evaluating if a person has a disability. Another major difference is that an impairment need only make life activities "difficult" to be "limiting." Under federal law, the impairment must be "substantially" limiting, which is much tougher to prove.
I don't know of any published opinion holding that someone failed to demonstrate a "disability" under the new state law version of the definition. Until now.
Arteaga was part of a crew on a Brink's armored car. He picked up money from ATMs. Money was missing, repeatedly. Brink's investigated and let Arteaga know. An investigation into theft could create a certain numbness, as well as stress. Predictably, therefore, after the investigation commenced, Arteaga began complaining of pain and numbness in his arms, fingers, shoulders and feet, and that he was experiencing "stress." No one had noticed any issues with Arteaga's performance related to the numbness, nor had he complained about it before, although he said he had been experiencing it for a couple of years.
Holding Arteaga did not have a disability, the court noted that his alleged impairment did not "limit" his ability to work, either compared with his pre-disabled condition or with others who perform the work. The opinion is full of interesting observations about relevant considerations: Arteaga did not disclose any impairments on medical forms; the company took him to a doctor on two occasions who released him back to work immediately; he had not complained of any issues until he was under investigation; pain alone does not automatically constitute a disability; no duty to accommodate when employee did not disclose disability; and others.
Arteaga also claimed retaliation because he filed a workers' compensation claim. The court held that the timing was not enough to raise a triable issue of fact because the company had been investigating Arteaga's performance before he filed the workers' compensation claim and then simply followed through with the termination decision.
The case is Arteaga v. Brink's Incorporated. The opinion is here.
DGV
I don't know of any published opinion holding that someone failed to demonstrate a "disability" under the new state law version of the definition. Until now.
Arteaga was part of a crew on a Brink's armored car. He picked up money from ATMs. Money was missing, repeatedly. Brink's investigated and let Arteaga know. An investigation into theft could create a certain numbness, as well as stress. Predictably, therefore, after the investigation commenced, Arteaga began complaining of pain and numbness in his arms, fingers, shoulders and feet, and that he was experiencing "stress." No one had noticed any issues with Arteaga's performance related to the numbness, nor had he complained about it before, although he said he had been experiencing it for a couple of years.
Holding Arteaga did not have a disability, the court noted that his alleged impairment did not "limit" his ability to work, either compared with his pre-disabled condition or with others who perform the work. The opinion is full of interesting observations about relevant considerations: Arteaga did not disclose any impairments on medical forms; the company took him to a doctor on two occasions who released him back to work immediately; he had not complained of any issues until he was under investigation; pain alone does not automatically constitute a disability; no duty to accommodate when employee did not disclose disability; and others.
Arteaga also claimed retaliation because he filed a workers' compensation claim. The court held that the timing was not enough to raise a triable issue of fact because the company had been investigating Arteaga's performance before he filed the workers' compensation claim and then simply followed through with the termination decision.
Where the employee relies solely on temporal proximity in response to the employer’s evidence of a nonretaliatory reason for termination, he or she does not create a triable issue as to pretext, and summary judgment for the
employer is proper.
The case is Arteaga v. Brink's Incorporated. The opinion is here.
DGV
Labels:
age discrimination,
Disability,
retaliation
Wednesday, May 28, 2008
GINA's Little Secret
We posted on the new GINA law here. Most of the law prohibits employment discrimination based on genetic characteristics and genetic testing except in specified circumstances. But wait, there's more! Jennifer pointed out to me that section 302 of GINA also increases federal penalties for child labor violations by 10%. The new provision modifes the Fair Labor Standards Act, section 216(e).
DGV
DGV
Labels:
child labor,
Wage and Hour
U.S. Supreme Court Issues Two Retaliation Decisions
The U.S. Supreme Court is wrapping up its Term. Yesterday, the Court issued two significant decisions regarding retaliation.
In CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, the Court ruled 7-2, that employees may sue for retaliation under 42 U.S.C. section 1981. Section 1981 is a post-Civil War anti-race-discrimination statute that does not require employees to pursue administrative remedies through the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. However, it substantially overlaps with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. California employees have the Fair Employment and Housing Act. The main benefit of section 1981 is its longer statute of limitations and the lack of an exhaustion requirement. Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented, noting that section 1981 is an anti-discrimination statute that protects people from conduct based on "who they are" rather than "what they do" (engage in protected activity). The opinion is here.
In Gomez-Perez v. Potter, the court, this time 6-3, held that the section of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act's protecting federal government workers authorizes retaliation claims against the federal government. The opinion is here. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented.
In CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, the Court ruled 7-2, that employees may sue for retaliation under 42 U.S.C. section 1981. Section 1981 is a post-Civil War anti-race-discrimination statute that does not require employees to pursue administrative remedies through the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. However, it substantially overlaps with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. California employees have the Fair Employment and Housing Act. The main benefit of section 1981 is its longer statute of limitations and the lack of an exhaustion requirement. Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented, noting that section 1981 is an anti-discrimination statute that protects people from conduct based on "who they are" rather than "what they do" (engage in protected activity). The opinion is here.
In Gomez-Perez v. Potter, the court, this time 6-3, held that the section of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act's protecting federal government workers authorizes retaliation claims against the federal government. The opinion is here. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented.
Labels:
retaliation
Saturday, May 24, 2008
Courts' First Kin Care Ruling
California law provides for "Kin Care," which essentially authorizes employees to use half of paid sick leave to care for covered family members' illnesses. Labor Code section 233, the statute that created Kin Care, prohibits employers from discharging, disciplining, or taking other action against employees for taking Kin Care. Section 234 invalidates absence control policies that count Kin Care against attendance. But Section 233 also says that employers can impose the same conditions on Kin Care that it applies to its sick leave policies applicable to employees' own illnesses.
The Court of Appeal decided in McCarther v. Pacific Telesis that employers may count Kin Care leave against attendance to the same extent as sick leave for an employee's own illness. The Court relied on the language in section 233 that permits employers to treat Kin Care the same as sick leave. The Court said that section 234 prohibits employers only from placing additional burdens on the use of Kin Care. This was a key ruling, since Pacific Telesis permits unlimited sick leave, but counts sick leave against employees' attendance. If section 234 prohibited the attendance policy, employees there essentially could take unlimited sick leave, call it Kin Care, and never come back to work.
Stay tuned for a full length article in the Daily Journal next week. In the meantime, here's the opinion.
DGV
The Court of Appeal decided in McCarther v. Pacific Telesis that employers may count Kin Care leave against attendance to the same extent as sick leave for an employee's own illness. The Court relied on the language in section 233 that permits employers to treat Kin Care the same as sick leave. The Court said that section 234 prohibits employers only from placing additional burdens on the use of Kin Care. This was a key ruling, since Pacific Telesis permits unlimited sick leave, but counts sick leave against employees' attendance. If section 234 prohibited the attendance policy, employees there essentially could take unlimited sick leave, call it Kin Care, and never come back to work.
Stay tuned for a full length article in the Daily Journal next week. In the meantime, here's the opinion.
DGV
Labels:
Leaves
Friday, May 23, 2008
Update - Cal. Supreme Court Review Granted
We posted on Schachter v. Citigroup here. The California Supreme Court has decided to review the decision, which upheld Citigroup's stock option plan's forfeiture provisions under California wage and hour law. The court of appeal also said that payment in stock options did not violate Labor Code section 212. Stay tuned for the Supreme Court's view, probably in 2009 or 2010.
Labels:
Wage and Hour
Meet GINA
President Bush signed the "Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act," or "GINA." Title I of the new law prohibits the use of genetic testing or genetic testing results to affect health insurance premiums. "Genetic testing" includes one's own test and the tests of family members.
Title II of the law addresses employment discrimination. Basically, the law follows Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and bars employers' reliance on genetic information in making employment decisions. The law specifically says there are no disparate impact claims allowed, so intentional discrimination must be proved. It's also illegal to request genetic information, although there are exceptions for inadvertent requests (such as family history) and when information is disclosed as part of an FMLA procedure.
I'm not sure whether any employers were discriminating based on genetic information, or where they were getting it. Apparently, Congress saw a need to step in, though. So, you genetic testers and discriminators - knock it off. Actually, the law takes effect in 18 months. By that time, remember to update your handbooks, applications, training programs, and EEO statements. Also, I'm sure there will be a new poster(!)
Here's the text of the new law.
H/T to Ross Runkel for the link and for lots of other information.
Title II of the law addresses employment discrimination. Basically, the law follows Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and bars employers' reliance on genetic information in making employment decisions. The law specifically says there are no disparate impact claims allowed, so intentional discrimination must be proved. It's also illegal to request genetic information, although there are exceptions for inadvertent requests (such as family history) and when information is disclosed as part of an FMLA procedure.
I'm not sure whether any employers were discriminating based on genetic information, or where they were getting it. Apparently, Congress saw a need to step in, though. So, you genetic testers and discriminators - knock it off. Actually, the law takes effect in 18 months. By that time, remember to update your handbooks, applications, training programs, and EEO statements. Also, I'm sure there will be a new poster(!)
Here's the text of the new law.
H/T to Ross Runkel for the link and for lots of other information.
Labels:
discrimination
Saturday, May 10, 2008
Court of Appeal Examines "Same Actor" Inference
Nita White-Ivy was a senior HR manager. She was Marietta Harvey's boss at a company called Pyramid. Then, White-Ivy became VP of Global HR for Sybase. She hired Harvey to be a director of HR at Sybase. Both women are Filipina. At Sybase, White-Ivy promoted Harvey several times, up to where she was the second-highest ranking employee in the department. Later, White-Ivy was considering demoting Harvey because she was unhappy with Harvey's performance and wanted to reduce her responsibilities. Harvey spoke with other executives about this proposed demotion. White-Ivy did not go forward with the demotion. However, she called Harvey on the carpet for "back-stabbling" and eliminated her position. Also, in response to some other executives' feedback, White-Ivy had commented that there were too many Asian females in the HR department, and she was interested in hiring more males, and more white males.
Harvey sued Sybase for race /national origin and sex discrimination. Thus, she accused White-Ivy, another female Filipina, of firing Harvey because of discrimination. That's the same White-Ivy who supervised Harvey at two companies, hired her at Sybase, and gave her several promotions. Harvey also claimed she was fired for discussing her salary in violation of the Labor Code.
A jury obviously found that there was no way White-Ivy was motivated by sex or national origin discrimination when she decided to fire Harvey, right? Wrong. The jury awarded her $1.8 million, including $500,000 in punitive damages.
The Court of Appeal rejected Sybase's argument that the same actor evidence - evidence that White-Ivy had treated Harvey well on so many occasions over a long period of time - was dispositive. The Court found "substantial evidence" on which the jury could have found discrimination - that White-Ivy was motivated to replace Asian females with males and non-Asians. Under well-settled principles, if a jury's verdict is based on substantial evidence, the jury is is privileged to reject contrary evidence, even if compelling. So, the Court affirmed the jury's verdict, acknowledging the evidence of non-discrimination was strong.
There are a number of lessons to be learned from this case, including about "diversity" efforts. Announcing a desire to hire members of one protected group or another to improve the mix of races and sexes in a department may be used as evidence of discrimination by members of other groups. Even a manager with a history of favoring members of one group may be found to have discriminatory motivations. Finally, the "same actor" inference remains part of employment law, particularly in the context of motions for summary judgment. However, it is unclear how this case, decided after a verdict, will affect courts' analysis.
The case is Harvey v. Sybase and the opinion is here.
Harvey sued Sybase for race /national origin and sex discrimination. Thus, she accused White-Ivy, another female Filipina, of firing Harvey because of discrimination. That's the same White-Ivy who supervised Harvey at two companies, hired her at Sybase, and gave her several promotions. Harvey also claimed she was fired for discussing her salary in violation of the Labor Code.
A jury obviously found that there was no way White-Ivy was motivated by sex or national origin discrimination when she decided to fire Harvey, right? Wrong. The jury awarded her $1.8 million, including $500,000 in punitive damages.
The Court of Appeal rejected Sybase's argument that the same actor evidence - evidence that White-Ivy had treated Harvey well on so many occasions over a long period of time - was dispositive. The Court found "substantial evidence" on which the jury could have found discrimination - that White-Ivy was motivated to replace Asian females with males and non-Asians. Under well-settled principles, if a jury's verdict is based on substantial evidence, the jury is is privileged to reject contrary evidence, even if compelling. So, the Court affirmed the jury's verdict, acknowledging the evidence of non-discrimination was strong.
There are a number of lessons to be learned from this case, including about "diversity" efforts. Announcing a desire to hire members of one protected group or another to improve the mix of races and sexes in a department may be used as evidence of discrimination by members of other groups. Even a manager with a history of favoring members of one group may be found to have discriminatory motivations. Finally, the "same actor" inference remains part of employment law, particularly in the context of motions for summary judgment. However, it is unclear how this case, decided after a verdict, will affect courts' analysis.
The case is Harvey v. Sybase and the opinion is here.
Labels:
discrimination
Proposed SB 1583 Imposes Liability for Bad Independent Contractor Advice
Non-attorney HR consultants - heads up!
SB 1583, now pending in the legislature, would impose penalties on third parties who merely advise employers that a given worker can be classified as an independent contractor. The penalty applies only if the worker is later found to have been mis-classified. The penalty is $200 per day per contractor. Licensed attorneys are exempt from this bill (whew).
The proposed bill text is here. Be careful out there!
DGV
SB 1583, now pending in the legislature, would impose penalties on third parties who merely advise employers that a given worker can be classified as an independent contractor. The penalty applies only if the worker is later found to have been mis-classified. The penalty is $200 per day per contractor. Licensed attorneys are exempt from this bill (whew).
The proposed bill text is here. Be careful out there!
DGV
Labels:
independent contractor
Wednesday, May 07, 2008
Newspaper Delivery Drivers Are Employees for Workers' Comp. Purposes
State Compensation Insurance Fund assessed Antelope Valley Press workers' compensation premiums for newspaper delivery workers. AVP classified these persons as independent contractors, not employees, and challenged SCIF's decision in court. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the delivery workers were properly considered employees.
The Court of Appeal found “the evidence does not show that in making deliveries. . . the carriers are engaged in a distinct occupation or business of their own” and “delivering papers requires no particular skill.” Moreover, the same company had employees, whom they admitted were employees, performing the same duties as the purported contractors. In addition, applying the seminal case of S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341, found that nearly all the factors therein pointed to employee status. In particular, AVP controlled numerous aspects of how the deliverypersons handled their duties.
Three recent court of appeal opinions have found employee status with respect to delivery persons. The previous ones were JKH Enterprises v. Dept. of Industrial Relations and Estrada v. Federal Express. The current case is Antelope Valley Press v. Poizner and the opinion is here.
Thanks to Matt Norfleet of our San Francisco office for pointing out the decision.
The Court of Appeal found “the evidence does not show that in making deliveries. . . the carriers are engaged in a distinct occupation or business of their own” and “delivering papers requires no particular skill.” Moreover, the same company had employees, whom they admitted were employees, performing the same duties as the purported contractors. In addition, applying the seminal case of S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341, found that nearly all the factors therein pointed to employee status. In particular, AVP controlled numerous aspects of how the deliverypersons handled their duties.
Three recent court of appeal opinions have found employee status with respect to delivery persons. The previous ones were JKH Enterprises v. Dept. of Industrial Relations and Estrada v. Federal Express. The current case is Antelope Valley Press v. Poizner and the opinion is here.
Thanks to Matt Norfleet of our San Francisco office for pointing out the decision.
Labels:
independent contractor
Tuesday, May 06, 2008
Contractual Attorneys' Fees Provision Bites Employer
Profit Concepts Management, Inc. sued Greg Griffith, a former employee, for trade secrets violations in California Superior Court. Griffith moved to quash service on the basis of no personal jurisdiction. Profit Concepts did not oppose the motion and the trial court dismissed the case.
The confidentiality agreement that formed the basis for the lawsuit contained a provision awarding attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. Griffith, having secured dismissal, moved for attorneys' fees under the agreement. Profit Concepts opposed that motion.
The Court of Appeal decided Griffith was the "prevailing party" under Civil Code 1717, which authorizes recovery of contractual attorneys' fees as costs to a prevailing party "regardless" of whether the case proceeds to final judgment. Profit Concepts vainly argued that there was no determination of who prevailed under the contract itself. The court said that section 1717 did not require the prevailing party to win on the contract claim itself.
The case is Profit Concepts Management, Inc. v. Griffith. The opinion is here.
The confidentiality agreement that formed the basis for the lawsuit contained a provision awarding attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. Griffith, having secured dismissal, moved for attorneys' fees under the agreement. Profit Concepts opposed that motion.
The Court of Appeal decided Griffith was the "prevailing party" under Civil Code 1717, which authorizes recovery of contractual attorneys' fees as costs to a prevailing party "regardless" of whether the case proceeds to final judgment. Profit Concepts vainly argued that there was no determination of who prevailed under the contract itself. The court said that section 1717 did not require the prevailing party to win on the contract claim itself.
The case is Profit Concepts Management, Inc. v. Griffith. The opinion is here.
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