The California Fair Employment and Housing Commission issued its final AB 1825 regulations. They can be accessed here. They will now be reviewed by the Office of Administrative Law. If they are approved, the will be submitted to the Secretary of State and become effective 30 days later. The FEHC estimates they will be effective around February 1, 2007. The final regulations are essentially the same as the last version submitted for comments in October.
Most employers that completed their initial training in 2005 will be training supervisors again in 2007. So, employers should ensure their training programs comply with the new regulations.
DGV
WHAT'S NEW IN EMPLOYMENT LAW? Welcome to Shaw Law Group, PC's law blog. We will focus on employment law developments, particularly in California. Nothing in this forum should be construed as legal advice, 'cause it isn't. So, please consult your lawyer or hire us! (We typically represent employers, not employees). Also - this is a public website, so communications are not privileged. Copyright Shaw Law Group, PC © 2017. All rights reserved.
Sunday, November 26, 2006
Monday, November 13, 2006
Get ready for more posts in 2007....
We haven't been posting a lot lately. We're saving our strength.
After years of no major federal employment laws (save last year's Pension Protection Act), Congress is changing hands. And here come the unions, trial lawyers, and politicians with some fresh ideas for employers. Here is an AP article on the subject.
Of course, having carefully studied civics as a child, I know it will take a lot of work to pass even one employee-friendly bill. (I also know that conjunctions' function is to hook up words and phrases and clauses.)
But I think even a divided Congress can pass some new employment mandates, assuming the President is willing to horse-trade a judicial appointment or a military appropriation or two.
DGV
After years of no major federal employment laws (save last year's Pension Protection Act), Congress is changing hands. And here come the unions, trial lawyers, and politicians with some fresh ideas for employers. Here is an AP article on the subject.
Of course, having carefully studied civics as a child, I know it will take a lot of work to pass even one employee-friendly bill. (I also know that conjunctions' function is to hook up words and phrases and clauses.)
But I think even a divided Congress can pass some new employment mandates, assuming the President is willing to horse-trade a judicial appointment or a military appropriation or two.
DGV
Thursday, November 09, 2006
SF Passes Paid Sick Leave Requirement
The SF electorate passed an initiative requiring employers to provide paid sick leave to employees. Although many employers provide paid time off, the measure applies to all employers (no matter how few employees), and it includes some provisions that could affect even large employers' sick time policies. Here are some highlights:
- "Small employers" of under 10 employees (counted as any 10 employees who perform any work in a week, must provide at least 40 hours of paid sick leave; larger employers must provide at least 72 hours. Employers are invited but not required to be more generous.
- Sick leave begins accruing after 90 days of employment. An employee accrues one hour for each 30 hours' worked. The sick leave accrues until it reaches a cap of 40 hours for small businesses or 72 hours for large businesses.
- Employers that provide more PTO or sick leave than stated above under existing policies are deemed in compliance. However, employers will have to adjust policies to comply with the uses of sick leave, attendance policies, and the like.
- Sick leave may be used either for the employee's own illness, OR for the illness of a covered person: "child; parent; legal guardian or ward; sibling; grandparent; grandchild; and spouse, registered domestic partner under any state or local law, or designated person." Employees without covered relations may designate one "designated person" for whom the employee may take paid sick leave to care for.
- The sick leave appears to be available for use for absences of less than one day, including medical appointments.
- Sick leave accrues and "carries over" year to year if not used, but need not be paid out at termination. The accrual stops at the caps above (40 hours for smaller and 72 hours for larger employers).
- Employees must provide "reasonable advance notice" of the need for leave, presumably on occasions when it is used to care for others or for medical treatment. Employers may take "reasonable measures" to verify or document time off.
- Employers must maintain records for four years and make them available to the city for inspection.
- Time taken under this provision may not be counted as an attendance violation under company policy.
- Any adverse action taken within 90 days of an employee's engaging in any of a number of "protected activities" relating to this leave benefit (including filing a complaint or even telling other employees about the availability of paid sick leave) creates a rebuttable presumption of retaliation.
- There is a provision for private civil enforcement, including penalties of up to 3 times the sick pay denied for violations or $250, whichever is greater, liquidated damages of $50, interest, costs and attorneys fees. Class actions are authorized only for equitable relief, costs, and attorneys' fees. And....
- Yes, there will be a new poster required to be posted.
Employers that do business in San Francisco must address the many administrative and payroll issues attendant to this law asap. It goes into effect 90 days from November 7, or about February 5.
- "Small employers" of under 10 employees (counted as any 10 employees who perform any work in a week, must provide at least 40 hours of paid sick leave; larger employers must provide at least 72 hours. Employers are invited but not required to be more generous.
- Sick leave begins accruing after 90 days of employment. An employee accrues one hour for each 30 hours' worked. The sick leave accrues until it reaches a cap of 40 hours for small businesses or 72 hours for large businesses.
- Employers that provide more PTO or sick leave than stated above under existing policies are deemed in compliance. However, employers will have to adjust policies to comply with the uses of sick leave, attendance policies, and the like.
- Sick leave may be used either for the employee's own illness, OR for the illness of a covered person: "child; parent; legal guardian or ward; sibling; grandparent; grandchild; and spouse, registered domestic partner under any state or local law, or designated person." Employees without covered relations may designate one "designated person" for whom the employee may take paid sick leave to care for.
- The sick leave appears to be available for use for absences of less than one day, including medical appointments.
- Sick leave accrues and "carries over" year to year if not used, but need not be paid out at termination. The accrual stops at the caps above (40 hours for smaller and 72 hours for larger employers).
- Employees must provide "reasonable advance notice" of the need for leave, presumably on occasions when it is used to care for others or for medical treatment. Employers may take "reasonable measures" to verify or document time off.
- Employers must maintain records for four years and make them available to the city for inspection.
- Time taken under this provision may not be counted as an attendance violation under company policy.
- Any adverse action taken within 90 days of an employee's engaging in any of a number of "protected activities" relating to this leave benefit (including filing a complaint or even telling other employees about the availability of paid sick leave) creates a rebuttable presumption of retaliation.
- There is a provision for private civil enforcement, including penalties of up to 3 times the sick pay denied for violations or $250, whichever is greater, liquidated damages of $50, interest, costs and attorneys fees. Class actions are authorized only for equitable relief, costs, and attorneys' fees. And....
- Yes, there will be a new poster required to be posted.
Employers that do business in San Francisco must address the many administrative and payroll issues attendant to this law asap. It goes into effect 90 days from November 7, or about February 5.
Saturday, October 28, 2006
California Court of Appeal: Class Action Should Have Been Certified
After the California Supreme Court's decision in Sav-On Drug Stores v. Superior Court, a trial court's decision on class certification should not be disturbed if (1) the trial court applies the correct legal standard and (2) substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings regarding the factors supporting class certification. In Aguiar v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, the Court of Appeal recited this "abuse of discretion" standard of review, and then proceeded to hold the trial court did not decide the certification question correctly.
The plaintiffs accused Cintas of violating Los Angeles County's Living Wage Ordinance by failing to provide the class with the legally mandated pay and benefits. Cintas argued that the case was not amenable to class certification because the plaintiffs were inadequate representatives, common issues did not predominate over individual ones, and class procedures would not be superior to other means of recovering. These are all proper factors for a trial court to consider under the legal framework for deciding class certification issues.
So, was it that substantial evidence did not support the trial court's finding? Hard to say. It appears the Court simply disagreed with the class certification order and decided it the other way. This is precisely what the Court of Appeal did in Sav-On, which is why the Supreme Court imposed the deferential standard of review.
The appellate court in Cintas decided that the trial court should have divided up the putative class into sub-classes, which would have ameliorated the commonality concerns. The court also held that class actions would be superior to individual actions for this type of case.
This case involves an allegation of a failure to apply a relatively simple law properly to a large group. Therefore, the common facts may well be more prevalent than in a more fact-intensive case such as involving exemptions from overtime.
DGV
The plaintiffs accused Cintas of violating Los Angeles County's Living Wage Ordinance by failing to provide the class with the legally mandated pay and benefits. Cintas argued that the case was not amenable to class certification because the plaintiffs were inadequate representatives, common issues did not predominate over individual ones, and class procedures would not be superior to other means of recovering. These are all proper factors for a trial court to consider under the legal framework for deciding class certification issues.
So, was it that substantial evidence did not support the trial court's finding? Hard to say. It appears the Court simply disagreed with the class certification order and decided it the other way. This is precisely what the Court of Appeal did in Sav-On, which is why the Supreme Court imposed the deferential standard of review.
The appellate court in Cintas decided that the trial court should have divided up the putative class into sub-classes, which would have ameliorated the commonality concerns. The court also held that class actions would be superior to individual actions for this type of case.
This case involves an allegation of a failure to apply a relatively simple law properly to a large group. Therefore, the common facts may well be more prevalent than in a more fact-intensive case such as involving exemptions from overtime.
DGV
Wednesday, October 25, 2006
Statute of Limitations for Vacation Claims
In California, by statute, all accrued, unused, vacation must be paid at the time of termination of employment. Long-term employees may have been accruing vacation for years. What happens when an employer fails to pay out vacation that accrued long ago? Does the statute of limitations bar recovery? The state Division of Labor Standards Enforcement and a court opinion previously answered that question, "yes." But in Church v. Jamison, a different Court of Appeal decided that the statute of limitations for unpaid vacation does not accrue until the termination date, and that all unused vacation pay earned may be the subject of a timely lawsuit.
The court also decided that claims for unpaid wages were subject to the statute of limitations for oral contracts (two years), rather than the three-year statute applicable to statutory claims. This holding likely will not apply to overtime claims, because overtime is a creature of statute. The obligation to pay (base) wages, on the other hand, arises from the "contract" to perform services in exchange for pay.
Finally, the court held that business expense reimbursement claims under Labor Code section 2802 arise as the employee incurs the expense, and that a three-year statute of limitations applies. This means that employees who do not submit expenses for reimbursement within three years of incurring them would be barred from recovery, even if the employees have not yet been terminated. Some of you know people who might wait three years to turn in an expense report.
DGV
The court also decided that claims for unpaid wages were subject to the statute of limitations for oral contracts (two years), rather than the three-year statute applicable to statutory claims. This holding likely will not apply to overtime claims, because overtime is a creature of statute. The obligation to pay (base) wages, on the other hand, arises from the "contract" to perform services in exchange for pay.
Finally, the court held that business expense reimbursement claims under Labor Code section 2802 arise as the employee incurs the expense, and that a three-year statute of limitations applies. This means that employees who do not submit expenses for reimbursement within three years of incurring them would be barred from recovery, even if the employees have not yet been terminated. Some of you know people who might wait three years to turn in an expense report.
DGV
Saturday, October 14, 2006
Court Cancels "Groundhog Day" for Serial Wage and Hour Class Actions
May Department Stores has been the subject of successive wage and hour class actions. The company defeated class certification in at least two cases and prevailed on appeal as well.
Yet, the plaintiff's lawyer was undeterred and filed yet another class action in Alvarez v. May Department Stores Co., this one venued in L.A. As with the prior cases, Alvarez challenged the exempt status of assistant managers.
The L.A. Superior Court sustained a demurrer to the complaint. The court held that the class action allegations were barred by the doctrines of "collateral estoppel" aka "issue preclusion." Huh?
Ohh.
So, Alvarez's lawyer appealed, arguing that collateral estoppel cannot preclude a later class action. Rather, Alvarez said at oral argument that he could continue to litigation class certification in new lawsuits until it was no longer "economically feasible" to do so.
Well, the Court of Appeal in Alvarez v. May Department Stores decided enough was enough and affirmed the trial court, barring re-litigation of the certification question. So, employers who defeat motions for class certification likely will not have to face endless "me-too" lawsuits on the same issue. It is unclear from this opinion whether collateral estoppel would apply no matter how much time has passed between the old lawsuit and the new one. Stay tuned.
DGV
Yet, the plaintiff's lawyer was undeterred and filed yet another class action in Alvarez v. May Department Stores Co., this one venued in L.A. As with the prior cases, Alvarez challenged the exempt status of assistant managers.
The L.A. Superior Court sustained a demurrer to the complaint. The court held that the class action allegations were barred by the doctrines of "collateral estoppel" aka "issue preclusion." Huh?
Collateral estoppel is a doctrine which prevents relitigation of issues
previously argued and resolved in a prior proceeding. . . . In order to apply this principle: (1) the issue must be identical to that decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue must have been actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the issue
must have been necessarily decided in the prior proceeding; (4) the decision must have been final and on the merits; and (5) preclusion must be sought against a person who was a party or in privity with a party to the prior
proceeding.
Ohh.
So, Alvarez's lawyer appealed, arguing that collateral estoppel cannot preclude a later class action. Rather, Alvarez said at oral argument that he could continue to litigation class certification in new lawsuits until it was no longer "economically feasible" to do so.
Well, the Court of Appeal in Alvarez v. May Department Stores decided enough was enough and affirmed the trial court, barring re-litigation of the certification question. So, employers who defeat motions for class certification likely will not have to face endless "me-too" lawsuits on the same issue. It is unclear from this opinion whether collateral estoppel would apply no matter how much time has passed between the old lawsuit and the new one. Stay tuned.
DGV
Wednesday, October 11, 2006
UPS's Safety Standard Violates ADA
UPS operates nearly 6,000 vehicles with a gross vehicle weight of under 10,000 lbs. Those trucks are not subject to US Department of Transportation safety standards. Yet, UPS required drivers of those vehicles to pass the DOT's physical requirements. These include a hearing test. A class of hearing impaired applicants challenged these standards under the ADA.
The Ninth Circuit, in Bates v. UPS, held that UPS's job requirement violated the ADA. UPS' primary argument was that the employees were not "qualified" because they could not perform the essential functions of the job (including hearing at the level mandated by the DOT) "safely" with or without accommodation.
The court rejected the normal "McDonnell Douglas" burden-shifting analysis, saying that when an employer takes disability into account when making a decision, it is unnecessary to use that analysis. The court analyzed whether UPS engaged in "discrimination" under the ADA by using a qualification standard that screens out people with disabilities - here, the hearing impaired. The hearing test of course did screen out the hearing impaired. UPS argued that the plaintiffs could proceed only if the proved that the hearing test screened out applicants who could drive "safely," an essential job function. But the court said that the burden was on UPS to show the contrary.
That left UPS with the burden of proving "business necessity" and "job-relatedness" as an affirmative defense. On that point, the court decided UPS had to prove one of two things to uphold UPS's blanket exclusion: (1) "all" deaf drivers would drive substantially less safely than the "hearing" drivers or (2) it would be impossible to prove whether that was true. The court analyzed the extensive expert evidence submitted and agreed with the district court that the findings were inconclusive. Thus, UPS would have to exclude drivers on a case by case basis rather than categorically reject all drivers having a certain level of hearing impairment or greater.
This case will affect employers who use medical examinations to screen out groups of employees who do not meet the given criteria. The employer will be foreclosed from arguing the employee is not "qualified." Instead, the employer will have the burden of proving the exclusion was "job-related and based on business necessity," a high burden.
The Ninth Circuit, in Bates v. UPS, held that UPS's job requirement violated the ADA. UPS' primary argument was that the employees were not "qualified" because they could not perform the essential functions of the job (including hearing at the level mandated by the DOT) "safely" with or without accommodation.
The court rejected the normal "McDonnell Douglas" burden-shifting analysis, saying that when an employer takes disability into account when making a decision, it is unnecessary to use that analysis. The court analyzed whether UPS engaged in "discrimination" under the ADA by using a qualification standard that screens out people with disabilities - here, the hearing impaired. The hearing test of course did screen out the hearing impaired. UPS argued that the plaintiffs could proceed only if the proved that the hearing test screened out applicants who could drive "safely," an essential job function. But the court said that the burden was on UPS to show the contrary.
That left UPS with the burden of proving "business necessity" and "job-relatedness" as an affirmative defense. On that point, the court decided UPS had to prove one of two things to uphold UPS's blanket exclusion: (1) "all" deaf drivers would drive substantially less safely than the "hearing" drivers or (2) it would be impossible to prove whether that was true. The court analyzed the extensive expert evidence submitted and agreed with the district court that the findings were inconclusive. Thus, UPS would have to exclude drivers on a case by case basis rather than categorically reject all drivers having a certain level of hearing impairment or greater.
This case will affect employers who use medical examinations to screen out groups of employees who do not meet the given criteria. The employer will be foreclosed from arguing the employee is not "qualified." Instead, the employer will have the burden of proving the exclusion was "job-related and based on business necessity," a high burden.
Tuesday, October 03, 2006
Still More Amendments to AB 1825 Regulations
On October 2, the Fair Employment and Housing Commission further revised the proposed harassment training regulations. In this round of revisions, the Commission primarily addressed "duplicate" training - e.g., when a supervisor is hired from another company and had AB 1825-compliant training at the former employer within two years. In such cases, the supervisor must receive, read, and acknowledge having read the new employer's anti-harassment policy. That supervisor must be trained again within two years of the prior training. The Commission also continues to wrestle with the interval between training, attempting to balance administrative convenience with the statutory mandate of training every two years.
DGV
DGV
Saturday, September 16, 2006
Commission Plans - Chargebacks and Forfeitures
As shown in Koehl v. Verio, the courts in recent times are more likely to enforce clear provisions in commission plans permitting employers to recover advanced commissions and bonuses. The language must be clear, and there must be a rationale for the advances and chargebacks. The key is to define when commissions are "earned," e.g., when payment is received, after a certain stage of the installation / serving process etc. The Court in Koehl relied in part on recent court decisions upholding such arrangements, as well as the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement's "Enforcement and Interpretations Manual."
This opinion is thoroughly reasoned, including a comprehensive discussion of related case law. It can help employers and their lawyers draft lawful commission plans that permit sales employees to benefit from early cash flow without receiving windfalls from overpaid commissions. Yes, even in California.
DGV
This opinion is thoroughly reasoned, including a comprehensive discussion of related case law. It can help employers and their lawyers draft lawful commission plans that permit sales employees to benefit from early cash flow without receiving windfalls from overpaid commissions. Yes, even in California.
DGV
Video Monitoring of Employees at the Workplace
Surveillance technology continues to collide with employees' privacy interests. Telephone monitoring and recording, email and web use monitoring, GPS tracking, and video camera surveillance all present potential employment law problems. The law is struggling to keep up, and employers must be careful to anticipate how courts will react to new technology.
The newest California decision is Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc. An employer set up a motion-activated video camera in an office to determine who was accessing a computer at night to view porn. The manager who installed the camera disconnected it each day and re-connected it only at night. Two employees who used the office during the day discovered the camera one day when it had not been disconnected. They sued for invasion of privacy.
The employer argued the camera was not even activated during the day (except for the one day it was mistakenly left on). But the California Court of Appeal held "a plaintiff need not establish that he or she was actually viewed or recorded in order to succeed on a cause of action for invasion of privacy." Employers can monitor employees' work areas by ensuring the employees do not have an "expectation of privacy." The way to do this is by giving notice of the monitoring. Notice may take away the element of surprise, but it also deters the conduct sought to be monitored.
Unintended consequences department: What effect will this decision would have on "nanny cams?" A nanny or babysitter is an employee. The workplace is the parents' home. Under this decision, a nanny may be able to argue a privacy invasion if the parents set up hidden cameras. However, the court pointed out that the employer failed to establish a sufficient justification for the monitoring, nor did the employer sufficiently establish the employees had a diminished expectation of privacy. Perhaps homeowners may argue that nannies do not have privacy expectations while working in a private home. Stay tuned (so to speak).
DGV
The newest California decision is Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc. An employer set up a motion-activated video camera in an office to determine who was accessing a computer at night to view porn. The manager who installed the camera disconnected it each day and re-connected it only at night. Two employees who used the office during the day discovered the camera one day when it had not been disconnected. They sued for invasion of privacy.
The employer argued the camera was not even activated during the day (except for the one day it was mistakenly left on). But the California Court of Appeal held "a plaintiff need not establish that he or she was actually viewed or recorded in order to succeed on a cause of action for invasion of privacy." Employers can monitor employees' work areas by ensuring the employees do not have an "expectation of privacy." The way to do this is by giving notice of the monitoring. Notice may take away the element of surprise, but it also deters the conduct sought to be monitored.
Unintended consequences department: What effect will this decision would have on "nanny cams?" A nanny or babysitter is an employee. The workplace is the parents' home. Under this decision, a nanny may be able to argue a privacy invasion if the parents set up hidden cameras. However, the court pointed out that the employer failed to establish a sufficient justification for the monitoring, nor did the employer sufficiently establish the employees had a diminished expectation of privacy. Perhaps homeowners may argue that nannies do not have privacy expectations while working in a private home. Stay tuned (so to speak).
DGV
Thursday, September 14, 2006
OFCCP Says, "Never Mind" Those Surveys
Contractors with the federal government may have completed an "Equal Opportunity Survey" (EOS) from the OFCCP, the federal agency that enforces affirmative action plan requirements. The OFCCP began the EOS program in 2000, and had issued some 80,000 of them to date. The EOS was intended to determine which contractors were most likely to be violating EEO obligations imposed on federal contractors, triggering audits.
Anyway, the OFCCP apparently determined the EO Surveys were not a necessary enforcement tool and eliminated the requirement. They initially proposed to do this in January.
One less paperwork obligation!
DGV
Anyway, the OFCCP apparently determined the EO Surveys were not a necessary enforcement tool and eliminated the requirement. They initially proposed to do this in January.
One less paperwork obligation!
DGV
Wednesday, September 13, 2006
Another Non-Compete Provision Struck Down
We know California law is tough on "non-compete" agreements. However, the law (Bus. and Prof. Code section 16601) does allow non-competes in the context of the sale of a business. So, if a doctor sells her practice to another doctor, the patient list and the ongoing "goodwill" will be a significant value. A transaction like that can include a non-compete, so the seller does not open a new practice across the street. But even those lawful non-competes have to be drafted correctly. The Court of Appeal held in Strategix, Inc. v. Infocrossing West, Inc., that a non-compete precluding the seller from soliciting the buyer's employees and customers (even those who were not the seller's former customers and employees) was too broad. The Court also refused to "blue pencil" or modify the agreement to apply only to seller's former customers. Ouch.
Non-competes, non-solicits, and trade secrets agreements are tricky (obviously). So, if they are important to you, ensure they are drafted to survive at least four judges' scrutiny (one trial judge and three at the court of appeal).
DGV
Non-competes, non-solicits, and trade secrets agreements are tricky (obviously). So, if they are important to you, ensure they are drafted to survive at least four judges' scrutiny (one trial judge and three at the court of appeal).
DGV
Tuesday, September 12, 2006
Independent Contractors in California
The characterization of workers as "independent contractors" can be tempting for employers: no workers' compensation coverage, no benefit plans, etc. Some workers may like being independent contractors too because they receive payment withhout tax withholdings. The government, on the other hand, is not a fan.
The California Court of Appeal in JKH Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Indus. Relations decided that a group of delivery messengers were wrongly classified as independent contractors rather than employees. The court brushed aside evidence that the employer, JKH, did not control the messengers' means or methods of performing the work. The court noted that when the job does not require specialized skills, the employee's autonomy is not as important. Rather, the court focused on the messengers' hourly rate of pay (rather than payment by the job), and the fact that the alleged contractors were performing the job essential to the business' purpose. (That is, JKH was a delivery service, and it classified those responsible for accomplishing that business purpose as contractors).
Interestingly, the court also decided that when independent contractor status is evaluated in the context of whether the employer should have provided workers' compensation insurance, the court must evaluate the case differently than when the case is brought in another context.
DGV
The California Court of Appeal in JKH Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Indus. Relations decided that a group of delivery messengers were wrongly classified as independent contractors rather than employees. The court brushed aside evidence that the employer, JKH, did not control the messengers' means or methods of performing the work. The court noted that when the job does not require specialized skills, the employee's autonomy is not as important. Rather, the court focused on the messengers' hourly rate of pay (rather than payment by the job), and the fact that the alleged contractors were performing the job essential to the business' purpose. (That is, JKH was a delivery service, and it classified those responsible for accomplishing that business purpose as contractors).
Interestingly, the court also decided that when independent contractor status is evaluated in the context of whether the employer should have provided workers' compensation insurance, the court must evaluate the case differently than when the case is brought in another context.
DGV
Wednesday, September 06, 2006
Even "Limited" Non-Competes Illegal in CA
Employers in many states implement "non-compete" agreements. The employer seeks to preclude employees from leaving going to work for the competition, typically to protect the employer's customer list or other proprietary information. Most states limit these agreements to one extent or another. However, in California, with just a couple of exceptions, agreements not to compete are per se illegal.
Employers and their lawyers, fonts of ingenuity that they are, have come up with a variety of end-runs around California's prohibition on non-competes. Non-solicitation agreements, for example, have been held lawful to the extent necessary to protect a valid, protectable interest, such as a trade secrets.
Another example is an agreement not to compete with the employer's primary competitors - a "limited" non-compete. So, hypothetically, McPotroast might implement an agreement restricting employees from going to work for King Carnivorous, but the employee can work for anyone else.
Is that sort of arrangement illegal in California? The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has ruled said "no," predicting how the California Supreme Court would rule on the issue.
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of California was wrong, says the Court of Appeal in the August 30, 2006 decision in Edwards v. Arthur Andersen.
The opinion surveys California non-competition law in some detail and the court then concludes even a limited non-compete is illegal unless necessary to protect trade secrets or unless one of the narrow statutory exceptions to the general rule applies:
The Court then held that requiring Edwards to sign the agreement established a required element of the tort of "interference with prospective economic advantage" (the "independently wrongful act" element.). As such, Edwards was permitted to proceed on this theory, exposing Andersen to the a panoply of tort damages, including punitive damages.
Employers and their lawyers, fonts of ingenuity that they are, have come up with a variety of end-runs around California's prohibition on non-competes. Non-solicitation agreements, for example, have been held lawful to the extent necessary to protect a valid, protectable interest, such as a trade secrets.
Another example is an agreement not to compete with the employer's primary competitors - a "limited" non-compete. So, hypothetically, McPotroast might implement an agreement restricting employees from going to work for King Carnivorous, but the employee can work for anyone else.
Is that sort of arrangement illegal in California? The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has ruled said "no," predicting how the California Supreme Court would rule on the issue.
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of California was wrong, says the Court of Appeal in the August 30, 2006 decision in Edwards v. Arthur Andersen.
The opinion surveys California non-competition law in some detail and the court then concludes even a limited non-compete is illegal unless necessary to protect trade secrets or unless one of the narrow statutory exceptions to the general rule applies:
In sum, we conclude the "narrow restraint" doctrine is a misapplication of California law. Noncompetition agreements are invalid under section 16600 even if narrowly drawn, unless they fall within the statutory or trade secret exceptions. Thus, the noncompetition agreement at issue here was invalid and violated California's public policy, unless, on remand, Andersen proves the trade secret exception applies.
The Court then held that requiring Edwards to sign the agreement established a required element of the tort of "interference with prospective economic advantage" (the "independently wrongful act" element.). As such, Edwards was permitted to proceed on this theory, exposing Andersen to the a panoply of tort damages, including punitive damages.
Tuesday, September 05, 2006
Sexual Harassment Training and Prevention Reducing Claims?
Clients who invest in sexual harassment prevention may be reaping a benefit, according to this article in the SF Chronicle. The number of EEOC filings claiming sexual harassment has decreased about 20% between 1997 and 2005. The average verdict in sexual harassment cases has increased tenfold. So, giving short-shrift to prevention is more risky than in the past.
The article tries to link the decrease in EEOC filings with AB 1825, California's mandatory training law. But that law took effect just last year, so it can't be responsible for the decrease in charges between 1995-2005. AB 1825 may further reduce harassment claims in the future, but employers' voluntary prevention efforts deserve at least some of the credit for the decrease in claims.
Since Clarence Thomas' confirmation hearings, companies even of modest size increasingly have implemented comprehensive prevention programs. More than just a zero tolerance policy - these include routine training, open door policies, "grievance" or in-house resolution programs, anonymous tip lines, and skilled investigators.
Harassment prevention really came of age as a result of the Faragher / Ellerth line of Supreme Court cases, where the U.S. Supremes provided employers with a defense to harassment claims when they take preventive measures. California employers also took notice after Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie, where a jury socked the big firm for millions in punitive damages on actual damages of $50,000 as I recall. Finally, the U.S. Supremes' decision in Kolstad v. ADA (why yes I did write an amicus curiae brief, thank you for remembering), provides a defense to punitive damages claims in federal discrimination cases, when an employer demonstrates its good faith efforts to comply with anti-discrimination laws. "good faith efforts" include training and other prevention efforts.
*** Warning: Only slightly tongue-in-cheek marketing ploy follows****
So, you ask, where does one find a great trainer - one who will motivate people to pay attention and take the training seriously, while covering all the legal bases? Hmm. (Yes, you're supposed to click the link!).
DGV
The article tries to link the decrease in EEOC filings with AB 1825, California's mandatory training law. But that law took effect just last year, so it can't be responsible for the decrease in charges between 1995-2005. AB 1825 may further reduce harassment claims in the future, but employers' voluntary prevention efforts deserve at least some of the credit for the decrease in claims.
Since Clarence Thomas' confirmation hearings, companies even of modest size increasingly have implemented comprehensive prevention programs. More than just a zero tolerance policy - these include routine training, open door policies, "grievance" or in-house resolution programs, anonymous tip lines, and skilled investigators.
Harassment prevention really came of age as a result of the Faragher / Ellerth line of Supreme Court cases, where the U.S. Supremes provided employers with a defense to harassment claims when they take preventive measures. California employers also took notice after Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie, where a jury socked the big firm for millions in punitive damages on actual damages of $50,000 as I recall. Finally, the U.S. Supremes' decision in Kolstad v. ADA (why yes I did write an amicus curiae brief, thank you for remembering), provides a defense to punitive damages claims in federal discrimination cases, when an employer demonstrates its good faith efforts to comply with anti-discrimination laws. "good faith efforts" include training and other prevention efforts.
*** Warning: Only slightly tongue-in-cheek marketing ploy follows****
So, you ask, where does one find a great trainer - one who will motivate people to pay attention and take the training seriously, while covering all the legal bases? Hmm. (Yes, you're supposed to click the link!).
DGV
Thursday, August 31, 2006
California Still Revising Harassment Training Regulations
The California Fair Employment and Housing Commission met on August 29 and revised the sexual harassment training regulations further. My previous post summarizing the regs is here. If you would like a redline copy of the current revision, please email Jennifer or me.
The most significant modification is that employers may elect to use a "training year" for all supervisors, such that each supervisor is trained once at some point in every other calendar year. For example, the employer could pick 2007 as a training year for all supervisors, thereby requiring all supervisors to be trained again by the end of 2009. (New supervisors and new hires still would have receive initial training within six months of hire or promotion). The regs' other alternative is to track each supervisor's training individually, ensuring that supervisor is trained on a bi-annual schedule. This change should help employers who would not be able to keep up with each supervisor's "anniversary" date for training purposes.
The final regulations should be out by the end of this year.
DGV
The most significant modification is that employers may elect to use a "training year" for all supervisors, such that each supervisor is trained once at some point in every other calendar year. For example, the employer could pick 2007 as a training year for all supervisors, thereby requiring all supervisors to be trained again by the end of 2009. (New supervisors and new hires still would have receive initial training within six months of hire or promotion). The regs' other alternative is to track each supervisor's training individually, ensuring that supervisor is trained on a bi-annual schedule. This change should help employers who would not be able to keep up with each supervisor's "anniversary" date for training purposes.
The final regulations should be out by the end of this year.
DGV
Bad ADEA Release Held Invalid
I previously have posted on well-intentioned releases gone wrong. Here's another installment.
Separation agreements and releases of claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act are not valid unless they comply with the technical requirements of the Older Workers' Benefits Protection Act of 1989. These agreements must, among other things, be written in clear language, advise the employee to seek an attorney, provide up to 21 days (45 in case of a layoff of two or more employees) for the employee to consider the release, and a 7-day revocation period. When a release does not follow the OWBPA requirements, the employee may keep the severance and sue under the ADEA.
In Syverson v. IBM Corp., the Ninth Circuit held IBM's release was insufficiently clear, thereby invalidating the age discrimination release and allowing a class of laid-off employees to sue for age discrimination. Unfortunately for IBM, the Eighth Circuit already held that the release was invalid. The Ninth Circuit, however, performed its own analysis, and reached a similar conclusion.
The main problem with this release was that it contained a release of all claims (including ADEA claims), but also contained a "covenant not to sue," exempting ADEA claims. A release extinguishes a claim; a covenant not to sue is a promise not to assert a right in court.
The employees argued the release was unclear because it left the reader with the impression that he/she could bring a lawsuit under ADEA even after signing the release. IBM argued (reasonably) that the covenant not to sue was significant because it provided IBM protection from employees who released claims but then filed lawsuits anyway. IBM explained the release invalidated the claim, but the covenant not to sue would permit IBM to recover its defense costs. Why carve out the ADEA claim from the covenant not to sue? IBM said it intended to comply with the EEOC rule that a covenant not to sue cannot be used to preclude employees from challenging the validity of the ADEA release in court.
The Ninth Circuit said that the IBM covenant not to sue was ambiguous and hard to understand. The tension between the covenant and release was sufficient to invalidate the ADEA release.
So, if you use a "standard" release for employees 40 and over, you may wish to obtain a tune-up in light of this decision. Additionally, federal courts have been scrutinizing the validity of "birthday lists" required for effective ADEA releases in the context of layoffs. So, be careful out there!
DGV
Separation agreements and releases of claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act are not valid unless they comply with the technical requirements of the Older Workers' Benefits Protection Act of 1989. These agreements must, among other things, be written in clear language, advise the employee to seek an attorney, provide up to 21 days (45 in case of a layoff of two or more employees) for the employee to consider the release, and a 7-day revocation period. When a release does not follow the OWBPA requirements, the employee may keep the severance and sue under the ADEA.
In Syverson v. IBM Corp., the Ninth Circuit held IBM's release was insufficiently clear, thereby invalidating the age discrimination release and allowing a class of laid-off employees to sue for age discrimination. Unfortunately for IBM, the Eighth Circuit already held that the release was invalid. The Ninth Circuit, however, performed its own analysis, and reached a similar conclusion.
The main problem with this release was that it contained a release of all claims (including ADEA claims), but also contained a "covenant not to sue," exempting ADEA claims. A release extinguishes a claim; a covenant not to sue is a promise not to assert a right in court.
The employees argued the release was unclear because it left the reader with the impression that he/she could bring a lawsuit under ADEA even after signing the release. IBM argued (reasonably) that the covenant not to sue was significant because it provided IBM protection from employees who released claims but then filed lawsuits anyway. IBM explained the release invalidated the claim, but the covenant not to sue would permit IBM to recover its defense costs. Why carve out the ADEA claim from the covenant not to sue? IBM said it intended to comply with the EEOC rule that a covenant not to sue cannot be used to preclude employees from challenging the validity of the ADEA release in court.
The Ninth Circuit said that the IBM covenant not to sue was ambiguous and hard to understand. The tension between the covenant and release was sufficient to invalidate the ADEA release.
So, if you use a "standard" release for employees 40 and over, you may wish to obtain a tune-up in light of this decision. Additionally, federal courts have been scrutinizing the validity of "birthday lists" required for effective ADEA releases in the context of layoffs. So, be careful out there!
DGV
Wednesday, August 30, 2006
California Appeals Court Interprets Bounty Hunter Amendments
The Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 is more commonly known as the "Bounty Hunter law" or "PAGA" - depending on whom you ask. This is the law that authorized employees to sue in court for "civil penalties," previously recoverable only by the state Labor Commissioner. PAGA also includes a "catch all" penalty to make sure most every provision of the Labor Code is associated with a penalty for non-compliance. One important catch is that employees suing under PAGA must share penalties recovered with the state.
Shortly after its passage, employees and their lawyers brought countless class actions for every conceivable violation of the Labor Code. In one of the more frequently cited examples, an employee sought tens of millions in penalties under PAGA because a poster was printed in the wrong font size.
The abuse of this law was so rampant, the Legislature amended the law just a few months after it became effective. The amendments were passed as "urgency" legislation that took effect immediately upon its passage. The amendments created a "safe harbor," requiring employees to notify the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement and the employer of perceived violations, so they might be corrected before a lawsuit was filed.
So much for the safe harbor. In Dunlap v. Superior Court (Bank of Am.), the Court of Appeal decided that a plaintiff may seek "statutory penalties" that were available under the Labor Code pre-PAGA, without complying with PAGA's notice requirement. Dunlap brought a class action for a pu-pu platter of Labor Code violations, including failure to pay overtime, failure to keep payroll records, meal and break violations, and failure to pay wages timely. Bank of America moved to strike, alleging Dunlap did not follow PAGA's notification prerequisites. Dunlap argued that he was suing for "statutory penalties," authorized by Lab. Code section 218, which existed long before the passage of PAGA.
The Court of Appeal decided Dunlap was correct. Even though PAGA specifically requires employees to follow its notice requirements for violations of the substantive laws Dunlap included in his Complaint, the Court of Appeal decided Lab. Code section 218 permitted a separate civil action without following PAGA. The Court distinguished between "statutory penalties" available to employees before PAGA and "civil penalties" recoverable only after meeting PAGA's exhaustion requirements.
This case cuts a huge loophole into PAGA. Why would an employee take the time to follow PAGA's exhaustion requirements and then divvy penalties with the state when the employee can bring his or her own action under section 218? (Yes, Virginia, that's a rhetorical question). PAGA will be used only for the obscure violations subject to penalties that previously could be recovered only by the Labor Commissioner, or the new catch-all penalty.
The Court of Appeal invited the Legislature to clarify PAGA again if its interpretation was incorrect. The PAGA"s notice provisions give employers a chance to comply with the many Labor Code mandates before facing huge liabilities for penalties. If the Labor Code is meant to protect employees, rather than create hundreds of opportunities for "gotcha" lawsuits, the Legislature should make whatever clarification is necessary to overturn Dunlap.
DGV
Shortly after its passage, employees and their lawyers brought countless class actions for every conceivable violation of the Labor Code. In one of the more frequently cited examples, an employee sought tens of millions in penalties under PAGA because a poster was printed in the wrong font size.
The abuse of this law was so rampant, the Legislature amended the law just a few months after it became effective. The amendments were passed as "urgency" legislation that took effect immediately upon its passage. The amendments created a "safe harbor," requiring employees to notify the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement and the employer of perceived violations, so they might be corrected before a lawsuit was filed.
So much for the safe harbor. In Dunlap v. Superior Court (Bank of Am.), the Court of Appeal decided that a plaintiff may seek "statutory penalties" that were available under the Labor Code pre-PAGA, without complying with PAGA's notice requirement. Dunlap brought a class action for a pu-pu platter of Labor Code violations, including failure to pay overtime, failure to keep payroll records, meal and break violations, and failure to pay wages timely. Bank of America moved to strike, alleging Dunlap did not follow PAGA's notification prerequisites. Dunlap argued that he was suing for "statutory penalties," authorized by Lab. Code section 218, which existed long before the passage of PAGA.
The Court of Appeal decided Dunlap was correct. Even though PAGA specifically requires employees to follow its notice requirements for violations of the substantive laws Dunlap included in his Complaint, the Court of Appeal decided Lab. Code section 218 permitted a separate civil action without following PAGA. The Court distinguished between "statutory penalties" available to employees before PAGA and "civil penalties" recoverable only after meeting PAGA's exhaustion requirements.
This case cuts a huge loophole into PAGA. Why would an employee take the time to follow PAGA's exhaustion requirements and then divvy penalties with the state when the employee can bring his or her own action under section 218? (Yes, Virginia, that's a rhetorical question). PAGA will be used only for the obscure violations subject to penalties that previously could be recovered only by the Labor Commissioner, or the new catch-all penalty.
The Court of Appeal invited the Legislature to clarify PAGA again if its interpretation was incorrect. The PAGA"s notice provisions give employers a chance to comply with the many Labor Code mandates before facing huge liabilities for penalties. If the Labor Code is meant to protect employees, rather than create hundreds of opportunities for "gotcha" lawsuits, the Legislature should make whatever clarification is necessary to overturn Dunlap.
DGV
Wednesday, August 23, 2006
Employers Who Hire Illegals Sued by Other Employers
California employers may wish to review their I-9 compliance policies and procedures. According to this article, an employment agency has accused a grower in California of hiring illegal aliens as an "unfair business practice." According to the article, the lawsuit was brought under Californians broad unfair competition law, Bus. and Prof. Code section 17200. The theory is that hiring illegal aliens is an unlawful business practice under the UCL, because the lower wages unlawful workers will accept results in an unfair competitive advantage for the employers who hire them.
Under Prop. 64, which narrowed the UCL's applicability, the plaintiff will have to establish "standing," or actual injury in fact in order to maintain the lawsuit. For example, an employer would have to establish that it lost business to a competitor that hires illegal aliens and could set prices lower as a result.
"Illegalemployers.org" a group that seems to have been formed specifically to target employers that hire undocumented workers, is referenced in the article.
It seems that the marketplace is going to implement its own immigration reform since the government's efforts to enact immigration reform legislation stalled back in April.
DGV
Under Prop. 64, which narrowed the UCL's applicability, the plaintiff will have to establish "standing," or actual injury in fact in order to maintain the lawsuit. For example, an employer would have to establish that it lost business to a competitor that hires illegal aliens and could set prices lower as a result.
"Illegalemployers.org" a group that seems to have been formed specifically to target employers that hire undocumented workers, is referenced in the article.
It seems that the marketplace is going to implement its own immigration reform since the government's efforts to enact immigration reform legislation stalled back in April.
DGV
Tuesday, August 22, 2006
California Minimum Wage Update
The L.A. Times reports Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and the legislature compromised on a minimum wage increase from $6.75 to $8.00. Under the current version of the bill, the increase will be phased in over two years. The first increase, which will take effect on 1/1/07, will be $0.75 (to $7.50 / hour). The second increase, from $7.50 to $8.00, will take effect on 1/1/08.
Under the compromise, the minimum wage will not be indexed to inflation.
If passed, the minimum wage increase will affect California's executive, administrative, and professional exemptions from overtime, which require a minimum salary of twice the minimum wage. So, the new minimum salary requirements will be $31,200.00 on 1/1/2007 and $33,280 on 1/1/2008.
The bill has not yet been signed, so it is possible additional changes will be made. We will keep you posted.
DGV
Under the compromise, the minimum wage will not be indexed to inflation.
If passed, the minimum wage increase will affect California's executive, administrative, and professional exemptions from overtime, which require a minimum salary of twice the minimum wage. So, the new minimum salary requirements will be $31,200.00 on 1/1/2007 and $33,280 on 1/1/2008.
The bill has not yet been signed, so it is possible additional changes will be made. We will keep you posted.
DGV
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